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Abstract
Authority figures permeate our daily lives,  particularly,  our political  lives.  What  makes
authority legitimate? The current debates about the legitimacy of authority are characterised
by two opposing strategies. The first establish the legitimacy of authority on the basis of the
content of the authority’s command. That is, if the content of the commands meet some
independent normative standard then they are legitimate. However, there have been many
recent criticisms of this  strategy which focus on a particular shortcoming – namely,  its
seeming inability to account for who can legitimately command whom. This is the basis of
the second strategy, which attempts to characterize the normative relationship that underlies
and makes possible authoritative commands. The central point of Part I is that these two
strategies are, in fact, not opposed and both raise questions which a theory of legitimacy
must  answer.  If  this  is  the case,  then we need to  ask:  how ought  we to determine the
legitimacy both of the content of commands as well as who can command whom? Part II
will answer this question. Starting with the question of standing, I argue that we ought not
to look for normative principles outside of the institutions in which authority is embedded.
Rather, one ought to start by elaborating the ontology of institutions in which a sui generis
form of normativity arises. A joint commitment account of social ontology provides the
tools necessary to see how the direction obligations emerge concurrently with the formation
of institutions. Similarly, the question of content can be answered by paying close attention
to the social ontology of institutions. We need not look beyond the internal constitutive
standards of the institution itself. The constitutive standards provide an internal criterion by
which the legitimacy of commands can be established. 
v
Introduction: Social Institutions, Social Standpoints and Social
Reasons
Authority figures  permeate our  daily lives  and,  in  particular,  our  political  lives.
Political offices are paradigm cases of practical authority. These authorities claim to have
the ability to command us to act in a certain way. They are practical authorities because
they are concerned with action, as opposed to epistemic authorities who are concerned with
what  we  ought  to  believe.  When  practical  authorities  issue  commands,  it  is  normally
presumed that they have the right to issue these commands; that is, authorities have a right
to rule even if it is in a limited domain. Concurrently, it is ordinarily presumed that the
addressees ought to defer to this authority and that there is, internal to the command itself, a
demand on the addressees to conform. 
These types of political office are both prominent and troubling for two particular
reasons. First, we seem not to have much of a choice in being part of a political society, or a
state (Hume 1985, pp. 475-476 and Dunn 1996, p. 66). Even if we are fortunate enough to
have the means to leave the particular state into which we are thrown at birth, we would
most likely leave it only for another state. Second, the authoritative commands of states are
backed by coercive power – they claim a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
in the enforcement of [their] order[s]” (Weber 1968, p. 54; cf. Weber 1946, p. 78). 
What  makes  these  authorities  legitimate,  and  when  are  authoritative  commands
justified? The term ‘authoritative commands’ may seem pleonastic, and in a sense it is.
However,  I  will  use the term 'authoritative commands'  to  denote 'commands which are
given by a legitimate authority', as opposed to 'commands given by a purported authority'.
The term ‘authoritative commands’ is then to be taken as a success term.
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In the following work, I will argue that the best way to understand the legitimacy of
authority is  to understand how authorities  are  embedded in institutions. The idea to be
explored is that when authorities command their addressees, they give the addressees new
reasons for action (this will be further discussed in Chapter One). However, these reasons
for action are not moral reasons for actions but social reasons for action. They are social
reasons because, unlike moral reasons, these reasons are limited only to those who belong
to the institution in which the authority is embedded.
How will an institutional model of authority help with the question of legitimacy?
The validity of the social reasons given by the commands is determined by the role that the
authority  plays  in  the  institution  and  what  role  the  authority  is  empowered  by  the
institution. In order to see how this works, we need to understand better what an institution
is. In particular, we need to understand how the structure of an institution contains its own
form of normativity internal to the institution. 
“Two Concepts of Rules”, an early essay by John Rawls, points clearly to this form
of normativity insofar as he defines ‘practice’ as:
 a sort of technical term meaning any form of activity specified by a system of rules
which defines offices, roles, moves, penalties, defenses, and so on, and which gives
the activity its structure (Rawls 1999b, p. 20n1).
In later works, Rawls favours the word ‘institution’ over that of ‘practice’:
Now by an  institution  I  shall  understand  a  public  system of  rules  which  defines
offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the
like. These rules specify certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden;
and they provide for certain penalties and defenses, and so on, when violations occur
(Rawls 1999a, pp. 47-78; cf. Thompson 2012, p. 193)
In turn, I too will favour the term ‘institution’. Rawls deploys this idea of institution in
order  to  show  the  importance  of  the  distinction  between  justifying  an  institution  and
justifying  a  particular  act  falling  under  the  institution.  On  the  one  hand,  justifying  an
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institution involves answering questions such as: Why this is institution important? Why is
it structured the way it is? Why these rules and not some other rules? On the other hand, to
justifying a particular act falling under an institution, we would ask: Does this act count as
an appropriate act or move? The latter question clearly points to a form of normativity.
Hence, an inappropriate move is a move that is not allowed within a particular institution.
One of the examples that Rawls uses to highlight this distinction is baseball (Rawls
1999b, pp. 37f).  As he describes the game, there are several actions one could perform
alone or with others, such as hitting, running and throwing. However, these actions do not
count as playing baseball unless they occur during or inside of a game. There really is no
sense to 'striking out' or 'stealing a base' outside of or before one is involved in a game; that
is, in the institution of baseball. 
We  can  call  this  Rawls's  priority  claim:  the  institution  is  logically  prior  to  a
particular move. The reason we refer to priority here is that what counts as an appropriate
or  justified  move  in  the  game  of  baseball  necessitates  the  rules  of  the  game  being
established prior to the acts involved in the game. For example, in order for stealing a base
to be a legitimate move in the game of baseball, there must be rules which establish such a
move as  a  legal  possibility.  Understanding the  logical  priority  of  rules  to  acts  is  what
grounds Rawls's distinction. 
In justifying the institution of baseball we could ask questions such as, 'Why should
a player only be allowed three strikes?' These types of questions need to be asked outside of
or external to the institution; the reason for this should be easy to understand. If we were
trying to play a game of baseball and one raised such a question, then the game would have
to be stopped until the question was settled. We would not know how to continue the game
without  such  questions  being  settled  first.  Hence,  questions  about  the  justification  of
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institution are questions about the constitution and structure of the institutions themselves.
The  logically  distinct  questions  of  the  appropriateness  or  inappropriateness  of
particular moves are then to be asked from inside the institution; for example, the question
of whether it is appropriate for the umpire to call a 'strike' or a 'ball'. The meaning of these
terms is constituted by the rules of the game and determines what call the umpire should
make, not excluding difficulties of vagueness, indeterminacy or what H.L.A. Hart called
'the open texture' of laws/rules for the discretion and judgement of the umpire (Hart 2012,
Ch. VII.1). 
The role of umpires as a part of the institution of baseball is analogous to the role of
many institutions permeating our everyday life. My reference here is to the offices within
institutions empowered with the ability to issue commands: Presidents, Prime Ministers,
Congressional Representatives, Members of Parliament, employers, supervisors and police
officers, referees etc. Notice that these offices only make sense when they are considered to
be  embedded  within  broader  institutions.  What  defines  and  constitutes  these  particular
offices and their role is the structure of the institutions to which they belong. An umpire
only makes sense within the institution of a certain game, like baseball. Political offices
only make sense embedded within the institution of governance. 
Being that practical authorities are roles embedded in institutions, we can follow
Rawls by asking two questions of these authorities. First, is this institution and its roles
justified?  Second,  we  can  also  ask  whether  or  not  a  particular  command  by someone
occupying the role of authority is appropriate; that is, does this particular act (a command)
fall under what is allowed within the framework of the institution? 
Which of these questions should we be asking when we consider the legitimacy of
an authority? On the one hand, should we think of legitimacy in terms of justifying the
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institution or,  alternatively,  should we think of it  in terms of justifying a particular act
falling within the rules of the institution? In the work ahead, I will argue that we should
take the latter question as the question of legitimacy. In contrast, the former question should
be thought of in terms of justice. 
Here I am making a highly controversial claim, one that will be seen as orthogonal
to  most  contemporary  theories  of  legitimacy.  For  this  reason,  I  will  begin  by  closely
examining the current debate and showing its shortcomings. This move will open up the
space for an alternative approach, one which is truer to the phenomenon at hand, as well as
containing more than enough critical resources to avoid the pitfalls of ethnocentric norm-
based reasoning (O'Neill 2000, p. 22).
The current debate about the legitimacy of practical authority is characterised by
two  seemingly  opposed  strategies.  The  first  strategy  to  establish  the  legitimacy  of
commands is based on the content of the command itself; commands are legitimate if the
content of the commands meets some independent normative standard. We may call this
‘the instrumental tradition of practical authority’ expressing, for example, the strategy of
Joseph Raz's highly influential 'service conception of authority' which we will examine in
more depth in Chapter Two (Raz 1986, 2009).  The instrumental tradition asks: does  the
content of this political authority's commands advance the interest of the individual more
than his being in a hypothetical state of nature, i.e., in a state without the authority? What
the authors in this tradition hold in common is their belief that authority is justified if they
make  individuals  better  off  in  comparison  to  the situation  that  would  result  from the
absence of the authority. We can therefore understand the meaning of 'better off' as a part of
the substantive issue which provides a distinction between particular accounts.
However, there have been many recent criticisms of Raz's account which focus on a
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particular shortcoming; namely, Raz's seeming inability to account for who can legitimately
command whom. This is the basis of the second strategy, an alternative strategy dominated
by the  consent  tradition,  which  attempts  to  characterise  the  normative  relationship  that
underlies and makes possible authoritative commands. 
Those of the consent tradition, such as A. John Simmons, draw inspiration from
paragraph 222 of John Locke's  Second Treatise of Government  which also compares the
consequences of being subject to a political authority with a situation in which there is no
political authority.  However, what the consent tradition takes the instrumental tradition to
answer is the justification of the state's existence, not the legitimacy of a state’s commands
(Simmons 2001, Ch. 7). The consent tradition would thus want to ask a further question,
looking beyond whether the state, or authorities more generally, are morally defensible.*
This question that the consent tradition wishes to pose is: What gives this particular
authority a right to rule over someone in particular? It is a question that is to be answered
by the consent tradition, with a story about an individual's ‘positive engagement’ with the
authority establishing a normative relationship (Locke 2003, ¶122). The thought is that, by
properly  characterising  the  normative  relationship,  we  can  explain  how  authoritative
commands  are possible.  This  normative relationship  is  called  'standing'  and consists  of
answering the question of who has the standing to command whom? Stephen Darwall has
adopted this  strategy in  his  second-person account  of practical  authority which will  be
further discussed in Chapter Two (Darwall, 2013a). 
The central point of Part I is that these two strategies are, in fact, not necessarily
opposed, with both raising questions that a theory of legitimacy must answer. If this is the
* Notice that we could make the Hobbesian minimum condition and the consent tradition condition both
necessary conditions for legitimacy in a pluralistic account. What is important now is seeing the two
major accounts in a pure ideal type account.
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case, then we should ask: How ought we to determine the justified content of commands as
well as who has the standing to command whom?
Both conceptions of the instrumental tradition and the consent tradition clearly wish
to look outside of the institution in order to answer the question of legitimacy. They both
want to justify the institution of authority as such; one looking towards the content of the
commands,  the  other  looking  towards  the  standing  of  who  can  command  whom.
Furthermore, in both cases we encounter individualistic answers where the evaluation of
authority is always from the individual standpoint; that is, from a point of view which is, by
necessity,  outside  of  the  institution.  The  maintaining  of  an  individualistic  standpoint
explains  their  inability  to  sustain  the  separation  between  questions  of  legitimacy  and
questions of justice. 
 Part II of this thesis will develop a radically different strategy. Starting with the
question of standing, I argue that we ought not to start by looking for normative principles
independent of the institutions in which authority is embedded. We ought rather to start by
elaborating the ontology of institutions in which, internal to the social ontology of such
institutions, a sui generis form of normativity arises. This sui generis form of normativity
consists of a new type of reasons: social reasons, referred to by others as 'public reasons'
(Freeman 1990b, Korsgaard 1996b, O'Neill 2000). They also have much in common with
what Charles Taylor has termed 'common understanding' (Taylor 1995). Following Anthony
Simon Laden (Laden 2005), I have chosen to opt for the term 'social reason' to emphasise
both its connection to and emergence from the social ontology of institutions.* As Hegel
would say, these reasons apply to individuals  as members of an institution (Hegel 2008,
§158).
* In opposition to Riamo Tuomela's account, the important type of reasons here are justificatory reasons,
not explanatory reasons (Tuomela 2013, p. 99).
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When one becomes a  member  of  an institution,  one also  gains  a  new practical
identity (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 101). This is precisely what it means to be a member of an
institution. For example, as a member of a state one gains the practical identity of being a
citizen.  This practical  identity of being a citizen brings with it  social  reasons to act  in
certain ways, e.g., to obey the law (Korsgaard 1996a, pp. 102-107, 120, 137f). 
The account of social ontology elaborated here is inspired by the work of Margaret
Gilbert. Her plural subject view provides the necessary tools to see how the obligations of
an owing relationship is constitutive of institutions. It is also this owing relationship that
establishes who can legitimately command whom. In a seeming paradox, it is the authority
of  a  'we'  who can  command an  'us'.  The  second chapter  of  Part  II  can  be  seen  as  an
elaboration of the following comment on the part of Gilbert: 
one interesting aspect of this conception is that it helps to explain the sense one might
have that the source of political authority in every case lies with 'the people'. Here, a
joint commitment of the whole population in question – the people – is  taken to
underlie whichever kind of rule is in place (Gilbert 2006b, p.213).
The resulting conception of political authority, and practical authority more generally, can
be traced back through the work of some of the most distinguished figures in the Western
philosophical  tradition:  from  Rousseau,  Kant  and  Hegel  to  the  later  work  of  Rawls,
Habermas and Korsgaard. 
What is at stake is precisely the constitution of social reasons. It is through this idea
that the second question that I posed can then be answered. This is the subject of the third
chapter of Part II. My main claim in this chapter is that the question of content can be
answered through paying close attention to  the ontology of  institutions.  As opposed to
seeking normative principles outside of the institution, we have no need, initially to look
further  than  the  internal  constitutive  standards  of  the  institution  itself.  The  constitutive
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standards  provide  an  internal  criterion  by  which  the  legitimacy  of  commands  can  be
established. 
Remaining within  institutions  in  order  to  understand the legitimacy of  authority
involves, within the debate about legitimacy, a shift from the standard question. However, it
does not follow from this that I am rejecting external points of view and the question of
justifying an institution as such. Rather, my point is that the internal, social standpoint of an
institution has  its  own normative force that  can be exploited in order  to  determine the
legitimacy of a command. 
My point can be illustrated with the following analogous case – the social practice
of language.* Before even asking if someone's claim that P is true or false (which I will take
as  structurally  similar  to  the  claim that  φ-ing  is  morally  right  or  wrong),  we  have  to
understand the practice of making this sort of claim; the appropriateness/inappropriateness
of claiming P. For example, one cannot appropriately claim that both P and ¬P are true. To
claim  that  P∧¬P is  flatly  contradictory  (leaving  aside  controversial  claims  about  the
possibility of dialetheic sentences and self-referentiality). Violating the principle of non-
contradiction, the “most certain of all principles” (Aristotle 1984a, 1005b24), would make
one “no better than a mere plant” according to Aristotle (ibid, 1006a15). The point is that
there  are  some claims which  are  not  raised  to  the  level  of  appropriate  claims.  We are
therefore not required to ask the further question as to the truth of said claim. This is all
internal to the social practice of language. 
More  in  line  with  the  issues  at  stake  here,  we  can  look  at  the  case  of  the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of a proposed law. Before we even need to move to
* This approach to the philosophy of language has been developed by Robert Brandom starting with his
1979 paper “Freedom and Constraint  by Norms” and received its  fullest  treatment  in 1998 with his
Making it Explicit.
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the external point of view and ask if this law is moral or if the law is good for me, we have
an internal question to answer: Is this law constitutional (Hart 2012, p. 120)? If the law
does not meet this  internal standard,  then we have no need to ask the further question.
Therefore,  the  question  to  follow  will  be:  When  is  it  internally  appropriate  for  A  to
command  B  to φ? I will argue that this is the best way to understand  the  legitimacy of
authority. 
Of  course,  it  is  reasonable  to  think  that  an  institution  must  be  just,  at  least
minimally,  in  order for it  to  be able  to  give authoritative commands.  If  not,  the social
reasons  might  be  so  easy  to  override  that  it  will  not  make  the  least  bit  of  practical
difference.  For  example,  a  constitution  which  allows  for  slavery could  not  possible  be
authorised to enforce slave-holding because the social reasons to remain a slave within that
society  would  be  completely  over-ridden  by  moral  considerations.  This  assertion  is
reasonable  and  more  will  be  said  about  this  minimally  just  requirement  for  practical
authorities. However, it does not follow from this minimal requirement that social reasons
never make a difference. There will still be innumerable cases in which social institutions
meet  this  minimal  standard  but  fail  to  be  completely just.  It  is  these  cases  that  are  of
paramount importance to our understanding of the issues at stake. In other words, how do
we make sense of a minimally just institution's ability to give reasons to their members? 
The fundamental claim, then, is that the legitimacy of practical authority turns on
understanding the social ontology that both underlies and makes possible commands in the
first  place.  In  other  words,  the  best  way  to  make  sense  of  practical  authority  is  by
understanding  it  to  be  embedded  in  an  institution,  so  understating  how  a  particular
command is enabled by the rules of the institution. A proper understanding of institution
involves giving an account of the social ontology of an institution.
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Part I: On the Concept of Legitimacy: Two Questions for
Authority
11
One: The Concept of Authority
A question which has interested philosophers since at least Plato's Crito is: When, if
ever, does an alleged authority actually have the right to rule? That is, when do commands
legitimately demand conformity from their addressees? 
However, this claim is in some ways anachronistic. The concept of authority has its
origins in Rome, not Athens, and from the term auctor (master, leader, author). In contrast,
the  Ancient  Greeks  did  not  have  a  single  word  to  capture  the  complexity of  authority
(Arendt 2000, p. 473; Geuss 2014, Ch. 6; Agamben 2005, Ch. 6). However, as Hannah
Arendt pointed out: 
the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, […] in quite different ways but from the same
political experiences, tried to introduce something akin to authority into the public
life of the Greek polis. (Arendt 2000, p. 473) 
We could align the question more with what Plato actually asked: Will Socrates act justly if
he disobeys the will of the Athenians? (Plato 1997a, 48c). Plato's arguments are usually
taken to focus on Socrates's obligation to defer to the commands of the city. However, it is
evident that each argument also relies on an implicit argument concerning that which makes
authority legitimate. That is, the structure of Plato's argument is that if there is a legitimate
authority, then it follows that the addressees of that authority have an obligation to defer by
suspending their judgement and conforming their will. Conversely, the addressees will only
have this obligation to defer if the authority is legitimate; a fact that becomes evident when
we think  about  how Plato  poses  the  question  over  and  over  in  the  dialogue.  Socrates
continually takes the point of view of the Athenians and asks what the Athenians would say
to him if he had disobeyed. 
This argument comes out in the opening exchange in the Crito. Crito comes to save
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Socrates's life by taking him away from Athens. He thinks that the Athenians are being
unjust in commanding Socrates to drink the hemlock. As Crito makes clear, if Socrates
follows the commands he will give “up [his] life when [he] can save it” (ibib., 45c). Yet
this, for Crito, is an injustice in itself. Furthermore, Socrates would be “betraying [his] sons
by going away and leaving them, when [he] could bring them up and educate them” (ibid.,
45d; cf. 50c). What Crito is questioning is the legitimacy of the Athenian authorities to
demand such things of Socrates.
It  would  then  seem that  authoritative  commands  have  a  dual  nature.  When  an
authoritative command is given, it is ordinarily presumed that the authority has a right to
give such a command and the addressee of the command ought to defer to the authority. It
is difficult to maintain a separation between these two aspects of commands: the legitimacy
of authorities and the obligation of addressees to defer to them. Firstly,  this is  because
authoritative  commands  are  always  given  by  someone  in  authority  to  an  addressee.
Secondly, part of what authorities are claiming for themselves is that their addressees ought
to  suspend their  judgement  about  what  to  do  and conform their  will  to  the  authority's
commands. 
Further, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that authorities can legitimately make
demands on their addresses without the addresses having an obligation. One way to bring
this out is to emphasise another ability that authorities claim for themselves, viz., the ability
to enforce their commands with coercive power. It is at least,  prima facie, reasonable to
think that at least one necessary condition for legitimising this ability of authority is to
show that addressees have, in fact, an obligation to defer. We ought to keep this whole
complex in view when thinking about practical authorities. However, different conceptions
of authority will surely come down on different sides of this issue. It will not be until we
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take a closer look at two major conceptions of authority in Chapter Two that we will be able
to resolve these issues. 
The arguments that Socrates proceeds to give on behalf of the Athenian authorities
are meant to show that they are indeed justified in demanding his compliance. This points
to a particular aspect of our question that we should keep in mind, for the criterion we are
seeking in answering Plato's question is something less than justice (cf. Rawls 2005, p.
428). He is not asking if the commands are just commands in themselves but rather whether
the commands bring with them some obligation to obey. He might even agree with Crito
that they are not just. Yet they may still be justified in the sense that he ought to defer to
them.
Part of the reason that Socrates gives for thinking that legitimacy is something less
than justice can be expressed the simple proverb: two wrongs do not make a right (Plato
1997a, 49a-d).  In other words,  if  it  is  wrong to disobey the commands of a legitimate
authority then it is not enough to show that a command is unjust. Here again, we see the
importance of the connection between legitimacy and obligation. When authorities are not
legitimate, there are no command-based reasons to defer. There may still be other important
reasons to act in conformity to what authorities demand, it is just that the reason does not
come from the command itself. 
Socrates seems to be making the point that we should not ground our answer to the
question of legitimacy in a comprehensive theory of justice. However, this does not rule out
there being some overlap between the two. It seems reasonable to think that a completely
unjust authority will also fail to be legitimate. This overlap may have to do with the idea
that a completely unjust authority will tend to be unpredictable in terms of what they will
command and not “let scruples concerning the rule of law interfere with their interests in
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particular cases” (Rawls 1999a, p. 52). In other words, the unjust authority will tend only to
give commands that further the authorities’ own self-interest. 
This appears to be the case with slave-holders and a constitution which allows for
slave-holding. The interest of those enslaved are completely subordinated to the arbitrary
will  of  the  slave-holder's  interests.  This  is  what  Kant  called  barbarism:  “force  without
freedom and law” (Kant 2007, 7:331; Ripstein 2010, p. 336f). As we will see, authorities
who  in  no  way  take  account  of  the  interest  of  their  addressees  are  unable  to  give
authoritative commands. 
Remarkably, Plato was able to outline several of the answers to his question, as he
did with so many other philosophical questions that remain prominent today. First, I want
briefly to canvas the contemporary arguments for two reasons. First, as with most Platonic
dialogues, we are left with unsatisfying answers. One gets the same sense when reading the
contemporary literature on legitimacy and political obligation; with all the ingenuity of the
different views defended, these answers often end up being one-sided. Second, the one-
sidedness of the contemporary arguments points to posing the question of authority in a
more nuanced, fuller manner. It is of primary importance to clarify what it is we are asking
when  we  approach  a  philosophical  problem.  This  is  the  primary  aim  of  this  opening
chapter.
1. Reformulating the Question of Authority
Let us begin with the argument from fair play (Hart 1955, Rawls, 1999b Ch. 6 and
Klosko 1987). The main thought behind this argument is that when one participates and
benefits in a cooperative joint enterprise, one also incurs an obligation to do one's fair share
to support the cooperative joint enterprise. What is implicit in this argument is the idea that
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the authority is legitimate because of the beneficial consequences it provides to its subjects
through supporting or making possible the cooperative enterprise. This fundamental line of
thought - that authorities are justified through the benefits they are able to provide - carries
through to the next arguments to be considered. These arguments then fit broadly in the
instrumental tradition outlined in the introduction.  There is an implicit comparison here
between the life in the cooperative joint enterprise and how life would be in a hypothetical
state of nature.
Another similar type of argument comes from utilitarianism. The argument here is
that, if deferring to the commands of authorities is for the discretion of the individual, then
commands will have no force whatsoever and the unifying function of the authority will no
longer be effective. Similar to the last argument, the idea seems to be that people are better
off with authorities than existing in the state of nature. However, John Horton notes that
utilitarian  arguments  tend  not  to  be  incorporated  into  contemporary  arguments  about
political obligation and legitimacy: 
Those  few  theorists  who  have  sought  to  incorporate  a  substantial  utilitarian
component within their justification of political obligation have invariably done so in
a highly qualified manner; and there have been few if any attempts to articulate a
fully elaborated theory of political obligation in uncompromisingly utilitarian terms.
As  utilitarianism is  a  far  from new or  underdeveloped  theory,  this  is  of  itself  a
significant  indication  of  its  limitations  in  this  area.  (Horton  2010,  p.  69  citation
removed).
However, we can still see the intuitive force behind this idea. The justification of authority
is parasitic on the overall benefit that the addressees as a whole receive from the existence
of  the  authority.  If  the  authorities  are  of  benefit  overall  to  their  addressees,  then  the
authority has the right to rule.
Next,  following a similar  move,  we might  present  the argument  from theory of
gratitude  (Walker  1988).  The  fundamental  premise  in  this  argument  is  that  when  one
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received  benefits  from someone  one  has  an  obligation  not  to  do  anything  against  the
interests of whoever provided the benefits. Moving from this premise, the argument runs in
the  following  way.  Since  citizens  have  benefited  from  their  state  then  they  have  an
obligation not to do anything against the interest of the state. Disobeying the commands of
state authorities goes against the interest of the state, for similar reasons as those presented
in the utilitarian argument. Therefore, citizens have an obligation to follow that commands
of the state.
Finally, there is  the  natural duty account (Waldron 1993 and Wellman 2005). The
basic idea behind this account is that in order for individuals to discharge some duty (e.g.,
justice, the duty to rescue), the individual must follow the commands of a state. Several
distinct reasons are provided here, e.g. under-determination of what is owed or issues of
disagreement. But again, this account turns on the authority providing some form of benefit
-  i.e.,  allowing their  citizens  to discharge some duty they already have -  as that which
grounds its justification.
These first  four arguments can be generally seen as arguments following what I
have termed ‘the instrumental tradition’ insofar as they gain their justificatory power from
the benefits  the individual gains  from the authority being in  place.  In other words,  the
institution of authority is justified through reference to the individual's interest. They are all
meant to show why the content of authoritative commands make the individual better off
than in the state of nature. However, what these arguments fail to establish is any sense as
to why this  applies  to  some authorities  and not  others;  that  is,  why are the authorities
entitled to make demands on any particular individual in the first place. Or, in the same
vein,  why  does  a  particular  individual  not  owe  their  obedience  to  all  the  authorities
providing these benefits? (Simmons 1979, Ch. II.i)
17
In other words, we might want to respond to the above arguments by asking why
these particular authorities - particularly if other authorities could provide the benefits more
effectively - bind us to the particular states to which we belong. Or, why these authorities
and not some others? 
The  obvious  response  to  such  a  question  would  be  to  turn  to  consent  theories
(Locke, 1993; cf. Simmons 1979). By agreeing to be part of the state, we become obligated
to defer to the commands of the state. This is one of the most intuitive and compelling
argument  for  why one  is  obligated  to  defer  to  authorities.  How does  this  account  for
legitimacy? The idea is that it is a necessary condition for the legitimacy of authorities that
the  addressees  of  that  authority  have  consented.  This  clearly  provides  a  tie  between
particular individuals and a particular authority. However, one might suspect that, in reality,
few people have ever consented to their state. Further, it is unclear why, if one consents to a
particular authority, that one could not withdraw one’s consent at any time.
Unlike  the  instrumental  tradition,  these  arguments  do  seem  to  go  a  long  way
towards showing why these particular authorities are owed their subjects deferral. Yet they
say nothing about the content of the commands that authorities are justified in giving. From
the perspective of the instrumental tradition, we may wish to ask 'What kind of normative
force do these relationships have if we do not pay attention to their content?' Up to now,
many have believed that we cannot agree to be enslaved, so demonstrating that consent, for
example, must have some content-ful limits which these relational accounts do not, on their
own, provide.
These types of worries have led to the recent development of pluralistic accounts.
Two particularly important  pluralistic  account  are  the  associative  account  of  obligation
developed by Ronald Dworkin (1986, Ch. 6) and John Horton (2006, 2007 and 2010). The
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idea  behind  this  type  of  account  is  to  establish  the  similarity  between  the  special
relationship between parents and children; that which brings with it special obligations and
duties, just as the special relationship between citizens and their state gives rise to special
obligations and duties. The idea is that membership in and of itself entails obligations. 
Furthermore,  in  different  ways,  both  Dworkin's  and  Horton's  accounts  attempt
consistently  to  provide  conditions  to  meet  the  worries  of  those  belonging  to  the
instrumental  tradition.  For  example,  one  condition  Dworkin  places  on  associative
obligation is  that each member must be concerned with the well-being of others in the
group  (Dworkin  1986,  p.  200).  Horton  makes  a  similar  move  when  he  claims  that
associative  obligations  can  only  arise  from  “associations  that  can  have  value  for  its
members” (Horton 2010, p. 176). These two accounts attempt to account not only for the
beneficial consequences of authority, but also the relationship that ties individuals to their
particular authority. The account that will be developed in Part II will be in this pluralistic
tradition. Therefore, we can hold off on a further discussion of Dworkin and Horton until
then.
However, from this all too brief discussion, I want to suggest that it is helpful to
break Plato's fundamental question down into two further questions. First, we should ask:
when, if ever, is the content of a command justified? This has been a dominant topic in
contemporary political philosophy, largely due to the influence of philosophical anarchism
(Raz 1979, ch. 1). The idea is that authorities are legitimate only if the content is justified.
The other important question, which has recently been overshadowed, viz., when is one
justified in being in a position of authority over another? When is  A justified in having
authority over B? The first question I will term 'the question of content' and the second, 'the
question of standing'.
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The question of standing has gone under different names; for example, the 'mark',
'sign', 'symbol', 'certificate' or 'credentials' of authority (Friedman 1990, p. 70). This latter
question, it will now be argued, is not a purely moral question. Rather, it is fundamentally a
question of social ontology and the social constitution of authority in which a sui generis
form of normativity arises. That is, by taking for granted social ontology, theories about
authority miss a fundamental aspect about authority; or, in Mark Turner's words, the task of
slaying  a  'dragon  of  obliviousness'  (Turner  2009),  being  that  that  most  conceptions  of
authority pay little heed to the social ontology which binds individuals to their institutions.
It is in this way that the answer to this latter question will have fundamental implications
for our answering the former question. The implication being that the constitution of the
institutions  empowers  authorities  to  create  social  reasons  as  well  as  limits  these  same
reasons; this will be the topic of Chapter Six. 
To put it differently, we can ask the question: Who has authority over whom and for
whose benefit?  Here,  both  questions  are  brought  together  in  a  manner  maintaining  the
importance  of  both.  The  formulation  is  adopted  from Raymond  Geuss's  discussion  of
Lenin's question of ‘Who whom?’, although the question of ‘Who whom?’ can be found as
far back as at least Hobbes (Geuss 2008, pp. 23-30; cf. Raz 1979, p. 10). The second part of
the  question,  ‘for  whose  benefit?’,  can  be  seen  as  far  back  as  Cicero's  “Pro  Roscio
Amerino” where he attributes the phrase, cui bono?, to Lucius Cassius; here, the context of
this question is a trial seeking to discover hidden motives (Cicero 2000, §84 and p.228n84).
The first half, the 'who/whom', refers to 'the question of standing', while the second
half, 'for whose benefit', refers to 'the question of content'. It is important to be clear that
'benefit'  in this question does not imply a theory tying the question of content to good
consequences for the addressee of the command. A deontologist could reasonably claim
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that the necessary benefit which authorities must provide is the assurance of freedom. For a
deontologist, authorities would only be justified if they provide the benefit of protecting
moral borders around the person (Schmidtz 1996, p. 84; Kant 1996c and Ripstein 2009).
I will argue, following Dworkin and Horton, that only if we answer both questions –
'the question of content' and 'the question of standing' – can we determine when authority is
legitimate; that is, whether or not an alleged authority in fact has the right to rule. The right
to rule  should be thought  of in terms of the authority being entitled to  the addressee's
deferral to the authority’s commands. The reason for framing the issue in this way is that it
highlights a significant point about authoritative relationships. As we shall see, authorities,
in the sense at issue here, do not merely hope that their commands are followed but are also
entitled  to  the  compliance  of  their  addressees.  If  the  subjects  do not  comply,  then  the
authorities  are  also  entitled  to  use  force  to  enforce  their  commands  and  to  ensure
compliance (more on this in Chapter Two). I therefore take it that having the right to rule is
what it means to be a legitimate practical authority.
2. The Question of Standing and the Question of Content
These two questions, the question of content and the question of standing, can easily
be  conflated,  which  can  partly  be  explained  by  how  tightly  related  the  questions  are
(Friedman 1990). To begin, let us examine the different implications of each question for
the legitimacy of authority.
It  is  at  least  conceptually possible  that  someone may have the standing to  give
commands without giving authoritative commands. Think of a corrupt police officer who
terrorises everyone on his beat. Detective Alonzo Harris, Denzel Washington's character
from the Antoine Fuqua film Training Day, exemplifies such a police officer. He is in debt
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to the Russian Mafia and in order to repay his debt, he uses his status and his force to steal
drugs and money from those he is  meant to protect.  Let us assume that Harris  has the
standing to give authoritative commands, at least those of a limited nature, being he is an
active duty police officer. However, it  so happens that the commands he does give (for
example, using fake search warrants to steal drug money) are illegitimate.  Nonetheless,
they have an aura of legitimacy which is parasitic on his standing as a police officer. 
That  the aura  of  legitimacy may be  highly  influential  on  people's  behaviour  is
evident not only throughout history, e.g. the Mỹ Lai Massacre ordered by U.S. Lieutenant
William L. Calley on 16 March, 1968 (Hersh 2015). This effect has also been demonstrated
in  the  famous and controversial  laboratory experiments  of  Stanley Milgram and Philip
Zimbrardo's Stanford Prison experiment:
By the 1970s, psychologists had done a series of studies establishing the social power
of groups. They showed, for example, that groups of strangers could persuade people
to believe statements that were obviously false.  Psychologists  had also found that
research participants were often willing to obey authority figures even when doing so
violated  their  personal  beliefs.  The  Yale  studies  by  Stanley  Milgram  in  1963
demonstrated that a majority of ordinary citizens would continually shock an innocent
man, even up to near-lethal levels, if commanded to do so by someone acting as an
authority.  The  "authority"  figure  in  this  case  was  merely  a  high-school  biology
teacher who wore a lab coat and acted in an official manner. The majority of people
shocked their victims over and over again despite increasingly desperate pleas to stop
(Zimbardo 2007b; cf. Zimbardo 2007a, Ch. 11 Milgram 1974 and Bauman 1989, Ch.
6).
The problem with Detective Harris's  commands in  Training Day,  as  well  as the
many other examples, seems to be that they are benefiting Harris, the authority, instead of
'serving and protecting' the members of the community. Harris is a tyrant in the sense that
he “rules in accordance with his own will and interest” (Ardent 2000, p. 467). He is a man
become wolf, as Plato might say (Plato 1997c, 565d-566a). The content of his commands
lacks justification.
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We  can  also  think  of  the  opposite  being  the  case,  viz.,  a  seemingly  justified
command being given by someone without  the  standing to  give such a  command.  For
example,  take  Mr.  Kurtz  from Joseph  Conrad's  Heart  of  Darkness.  As  we  learn  from
Marlow through the nameless narrator, Kurtz has become a sort of pseudo-god to the native
inhabitants of a remote part of central Africa. 
Now imagine a 'free thinking' native who does not fall under Kurtz's spell. Kurtz
might command him to  φ,  where φ-ing is a duty he already has. Perhaps, Kurtz, in an
attempt to fulfil his dream of 'civilising' the natives, which is evident in the book he has
written , commands the native to develop his musical talents by learning to play classical
violin. Kurtz  certainly  has  no  standing  to  demand  such  things.  The  native  could  now
respond rightfully to this command with: “Who are you to demand that?” 
Assuming  that  developing  one's  talents is  a  genuine  duty,  the  content  of  the
command seemingly applies by giving a concrete direction to the native to discharge his
duty and the native indeed has an obligation to do so. However, and here is the point: Kurtz
was not justified in issuing the command to the native. Perhaps, the native even has reason
to follow the command, but the important point is that the reason he has does not derive
from the command itself.  In other words, there is no authoritative command for him to
conform to. 
We thus see that, in two ways, the command itself makes no normative difference.
First, as the native already has a duty to develop his talents, the command has not given
him a new reason to act. Second, the command does not change the normative relationship
he has in accordance with the reasons that exist for him to develop his talents.  This second
way of making no normative difference is the most important for reasons that will become
clear in the next section. The point being that there seems to be an additional condition on
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legitimate authority beyond the content being justified. The person issuing the commands
needs to (in some way) be in the right position to issue those commands to a particular
addressee, i.e., having standing.
To clarify, in the above examples, neither command is meant to be an authoritative
command, as they both misfire. My intention was to illustrate that commands can misfire
for two distinct reasons. The first one misfires due to the content being unjustified; the
other misfires due to lack of standing.
The question of content is relatively straightforward even with disagreement over
how to answer it; put differently, we understand what the question is asking. On the other
hand, I take it that the question of standing is less straightforward as well as potentially
more  troubling.  As  we  have  seen,  someone  who  actually  has  standing  may command
dubious actions and the fact that they have the standing to issue commands imparts an aura
of legitimacy on to the particular command. This concern does not arise with the question
of content for if the question of content is answered, ipso facto, then the command's content
is justified. This is entirely right insofar as it is precisely what the question of content is
meant to answer. Therefore, a few remarks are in order about what is being asked in terms
of the question of standing.
Standing, as rendered here, is a relational concept insofar as commands are always
given  by the  authority  to  the  addressee  of  that  authority.  There  is  no  reason  why the
authority or the addressee of authority needs to be an individual. How an individual can be
related to another in an authority relation is quite clear: A has authority over B. What might
be less clear is the cases of a collective. A few words on collectives are therefore in order. 
We  will  assume  for  the  moment  that  the  United  States  Congress  is  indeed  a
legitimate  authority for  the  United  States  citizenry as  a  collective.  As a  collective,  the
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Congress of the United States issues authoritative commands both to the individual citizens
of the United States and to the United States as a whole. An example of the U.S. Congress
issuing commands to individuals would be commanding things such as the side of the road
one is to drive on or how much one is to pay in taxes. 
Another example is the U.S. Congress's ability to declare war. By declaring war, the
U.S. Congress changes, through a declarative act, the state in which the United States is in
as a collective. This changes the U.S. from a state of peace to a state of war and will have
implications  for  particular  citizens  to  be  sure.  However,  the  primary  addressee  of  the
declaration is the collective entity, the United States. An enquiry about the standing to issue
commands is one that will therefore consider the conditions that allow authorities - e.g., the
U.S. Congress - to issue commands to its addressees, so making the addressees accountable
to following the authority's commands. 
Further, the standing relationship is a normative relationship.* R.B. Friedman once
made this point about authority when he said that authority, “implies that there exists some
mutually recognized normative relationship giving the one the right to command or speak
and  the  other  the  duty  to  obey”  (Friedman  1990,  p.  71).  We  can  bracket  Friedman's
particular view. It is not my intention to defend his particular account. The important point
for us concerns the question of the normative relationship that is implied by authority, that
which  can  be  distinguished  from  the  justification  of  the  content  of  a  command.  The
normative relationship is that which then enables authorities to give commands in the first
place.
In this way, we can see that the question of standing is not what David Schmidtz has
* In the next chapter we will see how Darwall grounds this normative relationship in the second-person
standpoint. In Chapter 5, I will argue that this relationship must be grounded in a more fully developed
social ontology.
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called 'emergent justification'  (Schmidtz 1996, pp. 81-97).  For Schmidtz,  the “emergent
approach takes justification to be an emergent property of the process by which institutions
arise” (ibid., p. 82). In other words, this approach looks at the pedigree of an institution -
for example, in regard to consent (ibid.) - for if an institution is consented to then it is
justified. However, this is not the issue of standing, even if it goes some way to confronting
it.  Rather,  as we have seen, the question of standing is a matter of why authorities are
entitled  to  demand anything of  their  addressees  at  all.  Therefore,  it  is  not  the external
question of the justification of an institution but the internal question of a particular act of
commanding. 
The question of standing is therefore: What needs to be the case for someone in
authority to be entitled to command their addressees and for the addressees to be obligated
to defer? Or, what kind of relationship gives someone authority over someone else? Just as
the content of the commands must be justified, so too does the standing required to issue
commands. Before proceeding, let us try to be more precise about the type of authority with
whom we are concerned and what this type of authority is actually doing when it issues
commands.
3. Having Authority: Epistemic vs. Practical Authority
What  do  we  mean  when  we  think  of  someone  as  being  in authority?  What  is
someone doing when they are in a position of authority? The 'in' is suggestive. It is helpful
to distinguish being  in  authority from someone being  an  authority (Friedman 1990 and
Guess 2001 Ch 1. §5).  An  authority – for instance,  someone with epistemic authority -
possesses theoretical knowledge of a specific domain. A physician, to give an example, is a
reliable source of knowledge on health. A physician, therefore, is an authority on health. 
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Moreover,  an  epistemic  authority  has  essentially  an  advisory  or  counsel  role,
capable of delivering hypothetical directives.  If  we are committed to being healthy,  the
physician can advise us on how to maintain or regain our health which, in turn, gives us a
reason to follow the physician’s advice. These reasons are not derived from authoritative
commands.  Rather, the force of this  type of authority turns on linking up with specific
commitments  which  an  individual  already  holds.  If  the  individual  changes  her
commitments then authority’s advice fails to have force. However, this is not the structure
of when someone in authority gives a command.
Amongst others, Stephen Darwall has noted that the distinction between practical
authority and epistemic  authority is  “the point  of  Hobbes's  famous distinction between
‘command’ and  ‘counsel’”  (Darwall  2006,  pp.  12-13).  To  quote  the  first  paragraph  of
Chapter 14 of Hobbes's On the Citizen:
The distinction between  advice  and  law  is to be sought in the difference between
advice  and  command  [mandatum].  ADVICE  is  an  instruction  or  precept
[praeceptum] in which the reason for following it is drawn from the matter itself. But
a COMMAND is an  instruction  in which the reason for following it is drawn from
the will of the instructor. For one can only properly say: This is what I want, this is
my order, it will stand for reason. But since laws are obeyed not for their content, but
because of the will of the instructor,  law is not advice but command, and is defined
thus: LAW is a command of that person (whether man or council) whose instruction
is the reason for obedience [...] For law comes from one who has power over those
whom he instructs,  advice  from one who does not have power. To do what one is
instructed by law is a matter of duty; to take advice is discretionary. Advice is directed
to the purpose of the person instructed, law to the purpose of the instructor. Advice is
addressed only to those who want it, law also to those who do not want it. Finally the
right to  give advice  is  cancelled at  the discretion of  its  recipient;  the right of the
lawgiver  is not cancelled at the discretion of the person on whom  law  is imposed
(Hobbes 1998, pp. 153-154; cf. Hobbes 1996, Pt. II Ch. XXV).
When  someone  in  a  position  of  authority  gives  a  command  then  they  are  giving  the
addressee a new reason for action to which the addressee ought to conform. The reason is
“drawn from the will of the instructor” (ibid.); that is, the reason one ought to conform to
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the command does not refer to the content of the individual commitments one happens to
have. One ought to conform to the command because it was the will of the authority; one
ought to conform to the command because it  was commanded.  It  is  the 'say-so'  of the
authority that provides the reason for action. 
We can see an example of this difference playing out in the current debate in the
United States about vaccinations for children. There is a growing number of parents who
are opting not to have their children vaccinated for measles which, predictably, has caused
an increase  in  the  number  of  cases  of  the  disease.  There  is  overwhelming support  for
vaccination  in  the  medical  community,  with  the  majority  of  doctors  recommending
vaccinations  and  assuring  parents  that  they are  both  safe  for  their  children  as  well  as
necessary to maintain so-called 'herd immunity'. 
Here, the recommendation of the medical community is clearly a case of epistemic
authority. They are experts on health care issues and, in order to maintain the health of
children and prevent cases of measles, we ought to accept their advice. Now, many are
calling for local governments to reduce the number of exemptions given to parents. There
are calls for parents to be forced to immunise their children – for example, there is a bill
currently being considered in California which would, if passed, end the so-called 'personal
belief' exemption. These actions are not a case of epistemic authority. If this law passes
then the normative landscape is augmented (assuming California is a legitimate authority)
and parents ought to defer to the commands of the state, not because of their commitments
to keep their children healthy, but because it is the will of the state. What accounts for the
difference?
An authority is evidently not what we mean when we are thinking about the type of
authority that a head of state, the ordinary police officer or a supervisor claims to possess.
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For we typically do not think of them as counselling us nor do we take their commands to
be hypothetical. What then does it mean to be in authority? Being commanded to get your
children vaccinated does not imply: 'get your children vaccinated if you want to keep them
healthy and belief that vaccinations are safe.' Rather, the command itself is categorical: 'you
ought to get your children vaccinated.' Being in authority, then, has to do with giving first-
order reasons to act that would not exist independently of the command. This new first-
order reason to act - the reason given by the command of a legitimate authority - may or
may not depend on other first-order reasons to act. 
This is a matter that will be addressed when we turn to how authority is to be justified.
We are presently focused on what authority is; what is it that needs justifying. Being  in
authority, in the words of David Enoch, then entails the power to ‘give reasons robustly’,
i.e., “the ability to bring about a change in the addressee's reasons for action” (Enoch 2012,
p.5; cf. Marmor 2010, pp. 240-241 and Raz 1979, pp. 16-19). Someone in authority has the
ability to change the normative circumstances  of those whom the authority commands;
thus, practical authority makes a difference (Raz 1986, pp. 30-31). This is what is typically
meant by practical authority. 
 To clarify what it would mean to 'give reasons robustly' let us turn Joseph Raz's ‘pre-
emptive thesis’. It states:
The  fact  that  an  authority  requires  performance  of  an  action  is  a  reason  for  its
performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing
what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them (Raz 1986, p. 46;
cf. Raz 2009, pp. 140-142).
This thesis is about what authorities are doing when they issue commands, and how they
are changing the normative circumstances of the recipients of their commands. The thesis
consists of two main clauses outlined below. 
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First,  an authoritative command gives a first-order reason to act,  which replaces
other reasons to act (the replacement clause). That is, the addressee ought to act on the
authoritative command itself and not on other reasons. If people are asked why they are
getting their child vaccinated, the appropriate answer is (can be) 'because it is the law'. The
command itself is the reason for action. This clause is important because it gives addressees
who, having no reason prior to the command to act in conformity to the content of the
command itself, a reason to do so. These reasons are derived from authoritative commands.
One way to make sense of authoritative commands is to consider what Montaigne
says in his essay “On Experience”: “[i]f anyone obeys them [commands] only when they
are just, then he fails to obey them for just the reason he must!” (Montaigne 2003, p. 1216).
Montaigne's  formulation in  the B edition from 1588 – the last  edition published in his
lifetime – is even more forceful: “If anyone obeys the law because it is just, obeys it not.”
(ibid., n39). This is not to say that you cannot act in conformity with the command for other
reasons, for example, that the command is just. Authorities cannot tell, just as in general we
cannot tell, the particular reason that a person acts upon. Without further investigation, we
cannot tell the difference between a parent who vaccinates their child because it is the law
and  a  parent  who  vaccinates  their  child  because  they  are  following  the  advice  of  the
medical community.  Even with further investigation, it  is not obvious that we can ever
determine the reason that was actually acted upon. The point is rather that if you were not
going to act in the way commanded before the command, or if you were unsure as to how
to act, the mere say-so of the command give you a reason to do so. In other words, the
command ends further deliberation. This is therefore connected to the second clause.
Second,  with  the  exclusivity  clause,  an  authoritative  command  also  gives  an
exclusionary reason not to act for a certain range of other reasons (Raz 2009, §III.B; Raz,
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1986 pp. 41-53;  Hershovitz  2003, §§ 1-2).  That  is,  when a practical  authority issues a
command, it not only replaces other reasons to act but also excludes (at least some) other
reasons from being considered (Raz 1979, pp. 22). They give one “reasons not to act for
certain  reasons”  (Raz  1999,  pp.  183).  If  one  is  to  decide  whether  to  get  one’s  child
vaccinated, one ought not to consider reasons that conflict with the authoritative command,
e.g. fear about the health consequences perpetuated by questionable science or the advice of
Hollywood film stars. These reasons are not to be weighed against the command to get
children vaccinated. 
It is the combination of these two clauses that gives authorities the power to change
normative circumstances and to give authoritative commands. Practical authorities give one
first-order  reasons  to  act  which  did  not  exist  prior  to  the  command,  as  well  as  an
exclusionary reason not to consider a certain range of other reasons. There still might be
moral reasons why one should consider and weigh against authoritative commands. This is
why  we  no  longer  find  acceptable  the  so-called  'Nuremberg  defence'  of  'I  was  just
following orders'  as a moral defence for following immoral commands.  We still  expect
individuals to use judgement when it comes to the moral acceptability of a command even
if the command is valid from the point of view of the institution from which it was issued.
If  we take  the  distinction  between  command  and advice  together  with  the  pre-
emptive thesis, we see that this advice does not entail exclusionary reasons or first-order
reasons to act. That is why advice is hypothetical; advice gives you an ability to weigh your
reasons to act in a different, more accurate, way. It alerts you to reasons to which you did
not  have  access  before  the  advice  was  given.  This  is  not  the  case  for  a  command.  A
command excludes other types of reasons from consideration as well as robustly giving a
reason to act to which one ought to conform. Thus, a command is not hypothetical in the
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way that advice is, but rather, categorical. 
4. Normative Magic and the Mystical Foundations of Authority
So far,  we have  looked  at  what  authorities  are  claiming  to  do  when they give
commands. Many are troubled by this extraordinary ability authorities that claim to possess
–  the  ability  to  change  normative  circumstances  merely  by  'say-so'.  An  ability  that
legitimate authorities, if there are any, will in fact possess. With this ability it would seem
as though authorities were capable of performing a kind of 'normative magic' (Enoch 2012).
Authorities are able, through their mere say-so, conjure reasons for their addressees and
augment the normative landscape – connecting to the Latin roots of  auctoritas  deriving
“from the verb  augere,  “augment”” (Arendt 2000, p.486).  By mere ‘say-so’, authorities
would create new reasons for action that augment the moral landscape. How then are we to
make sense of the idea that authoritative commands create new reasons for action? 
Although it would appear as if this were a magical ability, this aspect of commands
can be demystified and accounted for in a quite non-mystical manner. David Enoch has
developed one way to demystify this ability in his account of 'robust reason-giving'; what
we have been calling authoritative commands: “the intention to give a reason merely by the
forming of the intention to give a reason” (Enoch 2012, p. 7). Let us look at his account of
how this magic is possible, i.e., how it is not magical at all. I will then go on to criticise it.
One of Enoch's favourite examples of authoritative commands is that of a parent instructing
a child to go to bed. According to Enoch, before the parent gave the instruction to the child,
there was no reason for the child to go to bed. By the ‘say-so’ of the parent and by an act of
will on the part of the parent, the child, suddenly, has a new reason to go to bed – now we
can see why we might want to call this normative magic!
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Enoch attempts to account for the possibility of authoritative commands in terms of
what he calls 'triggering reasons'. A triggering reason, according to Enoch, is when a change
in non-normative circumstances changes one's reasons for action. An example of this might
be when a bus company decides to change their bus schedules. The company did not intend
to give you, the traveller, a reason for action. However, since the bus is now scheduled to
arrive ten minutes earlier, and you have a reason to catch that bus, you now have a reason
to leave ten minutes earlier. The change in the bus schedule has triggered a reason for why
you  had  to  leave  the  house  at  a  certain  time.  Notice  that  one  may  change  one's
commitments, i.e., the commitment to take the bus; here the triggering reason no longer
applies. However, this is not going to be the case with all triggering reasons. There may be
normative background conditions that agents are not free to change.
Although authoritative commands, for Enoch, are a species of triggering reasons, he
claims that they are still a “unique particular instance of triggering reason-giving” (Enoch
2011,  pp.  2  and  §§4.1-4.2).  They are  distinct  in  the  way in  which  they  relate  to  the
intentions  of  the  reason-giver.  What  is  special  about  authoritative  commands  is  “the
intention to give a reason  merely by the very forming of the intention to give a reason”
(Enoch 2012, pp. 7). Compare this to the bus schedule example above. Opposed to the bus
company, which has no intention of giving you a reason, it is the intention of authorities to
give you reason. A parent, according to Enoch, who tells her child to go to bed intends to
give the child a reason to go to bed and succeeds in doing so when that intention triggers a
conditional  reason  the  child  already  possesses.  Enoch  gives  the  following  formalised
analysis on how authoritative commands are given:
(i) A intends to give B a reason to φ, and A communicates this intention to B;
(ii) A intends B to recognise this intention;
(iii) A intends  B's  given  reason  to  φ  to  depend  in  an  appropriate  way  on  B's
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recognition of A's communicated intention to give B a reason to φ (Enoch 2011, pp.
7-8; cf. Enoch 2012, §4.4).
Yet, we can already see that Enoch's account is part of a much larger phenomenon.
His words closely resemble those of H.L.A. Hart:
In many different situations in social life one person may express a wish that another
person should do or abstain from doing something. When this wish is expressed not
merely as a piece of interesting information or deliberate self-revelation but with the
intention that the person addressed should conform to the wish, it is customary in
English and many other languages, though not necessary, to use a special linguistic
form called the  imperative mood, 'Go home!' 'Come Here!' Stop!' 'Do not kill him!'
The  social  situations  in  which  we  thus  address  others  in  imperative  form  are
extremely diverse... (Hart 2012, pp. 18)
In other words, the issue of authoritative commands, in Enoch's sense, seems to be merely
the general phenomenon of declaratives. How is it possible just by the mere intention of
uttering something in  the imperative mood that  can one actually change the normative
circumstances of the addressee?
Enoch provides us with two success conditions for authoritative commands. The
first success condition, which is non-normative, reads: 
“For A's attempt to robustly give B a reason to φ to succeed, B must recognize A's
above specified intentions, and furthermore B must allow these intentions to play an
appropriate role in his practical reasoning” (Enoch 2011, p. 20; cf. Enoch 2012, p. 8).
However,  we might wonder if mere recognition of the intention,  allowing it  to play an
appropriate role is enough to do the work Enoch wants. This condition will be the topic of
the latter  part  of the next chapter when we look at  how it  is possible that subjects  are
actually addressable to the reasons authorities intend to give. 
What we will turn to first is the second condition that Enoch outlines. This second
condition is a 'normative' success-condition. It reads: 
the attempt must make it  the case that a  reasons to φ really does emerge (in the
appropriate way). And we already know that whether this procedure will result in
there being a reason to φ here will depend on there being an independent reason that
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is triggered by this procedure – roughly, a reason (for B) to do as A intends that B
have a reason to do (Enoch 2012, pp. 9; cf. Enoch 2011, pp. 20).
There are several things to notice about this 'normative condition'.  First,  the similarities
between it and Raz's 'Normal Justification Thesis' are evident and will be the subject of the
first part of the next chapter. Basically, what Enoch is saying is that for a reason to be
successfully given it must rely upon the reasons the subject already has. In this way it is
unclear why this is a success condition for the giving of a reason. We could accept that it is
a condition for giving the reason in a different way; that is, as would be suggested by Raz,
it is a condition of justification. What is the difference being made here? 
Returning  to  the  case  of  the  bus  company changing  the  bus  schedule,  the  bus
company may not be justified in changing the bus schedule. In fact, the current schedule
might be the best schedule possible. Yet, they did change it and so you now have the reason
to leave earlier. It does not matter if the bus company was justified or not in changing the
schedule. What matters is that they did. If you do not follow this new reason because, say,
you regarded it as unfair then you will miss the bus. Can’t we say the same thing about
commands? In order to answer this question, we will need to look more closely at this
condition and what it means for the content of a command to be justified based on the
reasons one already has in one’s possession.
35
Two: Two Individualist Conceptions of Authority
This chapter will examine and critique two individualist conceptions of authority.
Each conception focuses on only one of the questions facing authority. The first, Joseph
Raz's service conception of authority, focuses on the question of content. By looking at this
account  we  will  see  that  any  account  that  focuses  on  this  question  alone  has  trouble
answering the question of standing. As we will see, it is hard to understand how such a
conception can make sense of the idea of standing, or rather, how it is that authorities can
actually give pre-emptive reasons without having the standing to do so. 
We  will  then  turn  to  a  conception  which  focuses  primarily  on  the  question  of
standing. This will be Stephen Darwall's second-person conception of authority. However,
Darwall's conception of standing will be shown to be inadequate in answering the question
it sets out to answer. That is, although Darwall's conception is meant to answer the question
of standing, it fails to do so on its own terms. However, there is still a lesson to be drawn
from it and this will be important for the following chapters.
1. The Service Conception of Authority: An Answer to the Question of 
Content
As  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter,  for  Enoch's  second  condition  for  authoritative
commands to be successful an independent reason must be triggered. This amounts to Raz's
'Normal  Justification Thesis'  (NJT).  Let  us  now look more  closely at  Raz's  account  of
authority.
Raz starts by helpfully putting forth the following moral question: “how can it ever
be that one has a duty to subject one's will and judgement to those of another?” (Raz 2009,
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p. 135; cf. Raz 1979 Ch. 1) The centrepiece of Raz’s explanation of how this is possible is
what he terms the NJT. His justification reads, with a slight modification, as follows:
the normal way to establish that a person has authority over another person involves
showing that  the alleged subject  is  likely better  to [conform] with reasons which
apply  to  him  (other  than  the  alleged  authoritative  directives)  if  he  accepts  the
directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them,
rather than by trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly (Raz 1986, p.
53).*
This  is  an  explanation  of  'the  ideal  exercise  of  authority'  (ibid.,  p.  42),  i.e.,  Raz's
explanation of when authority is legitimate. Concisely put, authority is justified if and only
if it  enables subjects to act in conformity with what is required by background reasons
better than the subjects could on their own. These are background reasons because, as NJT
suggests, they are not followed directly; rather, they are pre-empted by the authoritative
command which is  to be followed.  Raz calls  his  conception the ‘service conception of
authority’, being that its main justification is that it serves to benefit those subject to it: “It
is to help them act on reasons which [already] bind them” (ibid., p. 56).
The NJT is one of a duo of mutually reinforcing theses (ibid., p. 55), the second part
being what Raz calls the ‘dependence thesis’: 
all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already independently
apply  to  the  subjects  of  the  directives  and  are  relevant  to  their  action  in  the
circumstances covered by the directive. (ibid., p. 47)
We can see how close this is to the NJT. The 'dependence thesis' states what kind of reasons
the justification of authority should be based on, viz., the subject's background reasons. A
* I  have,  following Scott  Hershovitz,  as  well  as  Raz's  more  recent  formulation,  replaced  the  original
“comply” with “conform” which is more accurate to Raz's original intention (Hershovitz 2003, pp. 206-
207). Raz recently reformulated the thesis in “The Problem of Authority”, it now reads: “that the subject
would better conform to reasons that apply to him any way (that is, to reasons other than the directives of
the authority) if he intends to be guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not.” (Raz 2009, p
137-138).  This  is  important  because  Raz  makes  a  technical  distinction  between  “complying”  and
“conforming”  to  reasons.  Hersovitz  nicely  sums  up  the  distinction  in  the  following  way:  a  person
conforms with a reason if she does what the reason requires, whereas a person complies with a reason if
she acts for it (Herschovitz 2003, p. 202; Raz 1999, pp. 178-179).
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command is to be justified by reasons for action that exist independently of the command.
Hence, the NJT is an evaluative judgement on how well an authority accomplishes this
task.  If someone claiming authority successfully gives commands based on background
reasons, then, according to NJT, they are a legitimate authority.
In a recent restatement of the service conception of authority, Raz adds a further
condition, something he calls 'the independence condition' to his account, reinforcing his
overall point. It reads as follows:
that the matters regarding which the first condition [NJT] is met are such that with
respect to them it is better to conform to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by
authority. (Raz 2009, p. 137)
This  added condition reinforces  an important  part  of  the NJT,  one intended to avoid a
problem which  Enoch's  account  is  liable  to  encounter.  Enoch's  account  would  make it
impossible for authorities to make mistakes; authoritative commands would only count if
they match the reasons that already exist. This is a high price to pay and it is doubtful that
any authority could ever live up to such a high standard. It conflates legitimate authority
with a completely just authority so the concept of legitimacy becomes redundant. Surely
what we are after when it comes to legitimacy is something less than justice; a standard or
criterion which authorities should meet even if they are unable to be fully just. It would
leave no room for authorities to make mistakes. Raz avoids this complication (and Enoch
could adopt a similar strategy) by qualifying his account with 'likely better to conform'; this
makes the justification turn on a counter-factual rather than the necessary connection that
Enoch seems to favour.
We must be careful with what Raz means by claiming that authorities have to serve
their subjects. On Raz’s account, the reasons for action are not synonymous with individual
interests. His claim that authoritative commands should reflect, and help subjects conform
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to reasons they already possess should be clearly distinguished from the similar sounding
claim that authoritative commands should advance the interests of their subjects (Raz 1986,
p. 48). There are many instances within Raz’s account in which an authoritative command
helps its subjects conform to reasons they already possess but are also against a subject's
individual interests. Raz's example is that of a military commander giving orders against
the individual interest of her soldiers. The command may still help the soldiers conform to
reasons, viz., the defence of their country, even though it goes against their personal interest
and so their survival (ibid.). 
One thing that is troubling about NJT and Enoch's success condition is that they rely
on the  existence  of  separate,  distinct  reasons  that  the subject  already has  and that  the
command must match up with. I do not think the right way to account for the triggering
aspect is by enumerating conditional duties. That is,  Enoch thinks that  A can only give
authoritative  commands  if  and  only  if  B already  has  a  specific  conditional  reason  to
conform to what A commands. In the case of the parent telling a child to go to bed, Enoch
says  that  the child  perhaps had the reason all  along 'to-go-to-bed-if-you-tell-him-to':  “a
reason that you successfully triggered precisely by telling him to go to his room” (Enoch
2012, p. 11). I therefore have trouble making sense of this example by Enoch. 
This particular example does, for the most part, seem to be a better described case in
terms  of  epistemic  authority,  insofar  as  there  does  not  seem  to  be  a  reason  created.
Remember that  the difference between epistemic authority and practical  authority turns
largely on whether a new reason is created. Is it really plausible that, in this case, a new
reason is created for the child to go to bed? Is this really the best way to think about the
relationship between a parent and a child? I would suggest not. Rather, the child does not
(yet) have capacity to properly recognise the reasons that apply. What the ideal parent, I
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presume, would do in these cases would be to attempt to explain to the child why she
should go to bed (cf. Edmundson 2013, p. 53). Part of the reason for thinking that this is the
case is  that a parent is  not  always interested in enforcing compliance.  Rather,  they are
interested in being a model for the child; a source of advice and counsel. 
Even in bracketing this worry about epistemic and practical authority, there is still a
problem with any account that attempts to justify commands based on specific reasons that
an agent already possesses. For a determinate answer to the question of content, such an
account relies on a consensus about what reasons exist. Granted, Raz and Enoch will object
claiming that consensus is irrelevant; for them it is a matter of fact whether there are these
reasons to be triggered or not. However, this seems to have little practical relevance for
concerns  about  the  actual  legitimacy of  authorities  because  of  the  deep but  reasonable
disagreement amongst people about what these reasons are. Indeed, it is not clear how we
are to determine which reasons actually exist without a full blown account of normative
reality, one that will be highly controversial.
What I will argue for in the following chapters is opposed to Raz and Enoch. What
we  should  be  looking  for  is  general  reason,  rather  than  specific  reasons;  that  which
authorities  trigger  to  justify  the  content  of  their  command.  For  one,  this  is  a  more
parsimonious answer and will allow us to create a critical standpoint internal to a particular
authority to judge the content of a command. This internal standpoint will give us greater
determinacy  in  the  question  of  content  and  our  judgements  about  the  legitimacy  of
particular authorities. However, we will have to wait for this positive story. 
Raz's and Enoch's point is that this  ability of authorities to create reasons needs
justifying. It is not enough for the authority to have the intention to give reason; we must
have a clear criterion as to the normative success of reason giving. We want to have a
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criterion in regard to which reasons are acceptable for authorities to create and to determine
those  which  reasons  are  not  acceptable.  That,  in  barest  outline,  is  Raz's  conception  of
authority. Let us now turn to what I take to be its shortcoming, viz., Raz answering the
question of standing.
2. Does the Normal Justification Thesis Deliver Command Based Pre-Emptive
Reasons?
It should be obvious in the way that this view is characterised that Raz's conception
of authority is concerned almost exclusively with content. Thus, to justify authority we look
at  the  command and its  relationship to  background reasons.  For  Raz,  it  is  through the
question of content that we will find an answer to the question of standing. However, the
claim of this section will be that answering the question of content does not provide enough
resources to give a compelling answer to the question of standing. 
To  make  clear  how  Raz's  answer  works,  we  can  begin  by  asking  the  leading
question of 'who has authority over whom and for whose benefit': 
A has legitimate authority over B if and only if A’s commands successfully get B to
conform with reasons B already had.
Here we can see that  A's standing as a legitimate authority over  B  is determined by  A's
ability to issue justified content to  B better than  B or anyone else is able to do. Jonathan
Quong has pointed out that this is the originality of the service conception in attempting to
answer the question of “Who has the legitimate authority to decide what I must do?” in
terms of “What should I do?” (Quong 2011, p. 119). The question of 'who/whom' is given
an answer by showing who can deliver the greatest benefit to those commanded (in terms
of conforming to background reasons). 
Raz still has more to say on the question of standing. For example, he discusses
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what he calls 'jurisdiction' in the Postscript to the Second Edition of Practical Reason and
Norms, saying that
“[i]n deciding whether  one ought  to  obey the authority's  directives,  one ought  to
exclude  all  the  reasons  both  for  and  against  [φ-ing]  which  were  within  the
jurisdiction of the authority” (Raz 1999, p. 192 emphasis added).
 
It is unclear exactly what Raz means here by ‘jurisdiction’, but I will take it to refer to the
domain in which the authority has standing to issue commands. Yet, Raz says nothing more
about how one is justified in having 'jurisdiction' or standing. 
However,  he  does  acknowledge  the  importance  of  the  question  of  standing  in
particular cases, viz., when there are two claims of authority that are incompatible (Raz
1986, p. 57). When Raz explicitly discusses the who/whom question, he says it is a matter
of evaluating individual cases (Raz 2009, p. 158-159). He claims that whichever authority
can do a better job helping subjects conform to their  reasons has a “better claim to be
recognized” (Raz 1986, p. 57). For Raz, then, it seems that standing, for the most part, is
not an issue. Most of the time there are no conflicting claims for authority, and when there
are conflicts, an appeal to the NJT will resolve the issue.
Many commentators of late have challenged Raz's answer to the standing question
(Darwall, 2013b; Hershovitz 2011; Marmor 2010 and 2011). They object that potentially
anyone can be a legitimate authority over others by virtue of being in a position to get their
subjects to conform better to reasons they already possess. This potential can be seen most
clearly when Raz discusses what he calls the 'scope of authority'. Raz tells us that the scope
of authority, “all depends on the person over whom authority is supposed to be exercised:
his  knowledge,  strength  of  will,  his  reliability  in  various  aspects  of  life,  and  on  the
government in question” (Raz 1986, p. 73). That is, legitimate authority and the obligation
to defer are a matter of a “special relationship between an individual and his state” (ibid., p.
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104). However, this so-called 'special relationship' only amounts to a reformulation of the
NJT. Is this plausible? Is it plausible to base standing on the justification of content?
Let us focus on one of these challenges, viz. Stephen Darwall. The way Darwall
frames his objection to Raz is by asking: is the NJT really enough to give pre-emptive
reasons (Darwall 2013a, pp. 146, 160)? Darwall's answer is, of course, the NJT does not
give pre-emptive reasons. Remember, it is Raz's view that commands function precisely by
giving pre-emptive reasons.  If  NJT does not  show that commands do in  fact give pre-
emptive reasons then, by Raz's own standard, there is something missing from his account.
It seems to me that this is a powerful challenge to Raz's account. Let us see why.
Darwall begins with the three following theses: 
I.  B will do better in complying with reasons if he treats A’s directives as giving him
pre-emptive reasons
II. There is reason for B to treat A’s directives as giving him pre-emptive reasons 
III. A’s directives actually do give B pre-emptive reasons. (ibid., p. 160)
Darwall grants, for the sake of argument, I and II but denies that III follows from the truth
of I and II.  All  that I and II (which amounts to the NJT) establish is that  B has good,
independent reasons to follow A's commands. Although it may be foolish for B not to φ, or
not to follow  A's  command to φ,  more needs  to be said in  order to establish that  B is
accountable to A for following the command to φ. Pragmatic reasons to follow a command
do not seem to be enough. The claim is that all Raz can establish is that it is good for the
subject to follow the command; not that the command is actually authoritative.
For Darwall,  it  is a conceptual matter that  B's responsibility to  A  (i.e. follow  A's
commands) is correlated with A's right to hold B accountable. It is Darwall's contention that
Raz's account does not supply enough resources to understand this normative relationship
between  the  authority  and  the  addressee.  Thus,  Raz  does  not  sufficiently  answer  the
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question of standing and A is not entitled to B's φ-ing, even if NJT holds.
This problem comes out most clearly in an example Darwall takes from Raz. In The
Morality of Freedom, Raz gives an example of John who is an expert in cooking Chinese
food. According to Raz's NJT, John would not have authority over Raz unless his goal
consisted in “nothing but to prepare the best Chinese meal [Raz] can manage” in which
case “[Raz] should just follow John's instructions” (Raz 1986, p. 64). Darwall modifies the
example in the following way:  Raz,  in fact,  has “no reasons to do anything other than
prepare the best Chinese meal” (Darwall 2013a, p. 147). Therefore Raz would be foolish
not to treat John's directives as pre-emptive reasons. 
But we can ask, with Darwall, does John actually have authority over Raz? In other
words, is there really a pre-emptive reason for Raz to defer to John? It seems that there is
not. Even though Raz has exclusionary reasons to follow John's commands, they do not
seem to have anything to do with John's commands. It is not an exclusionary reason derived
from authoritative commands. Rather, we are left with John being an epistemic authority.
If  we  recall  the  discussion  of  pre-emptive  reasons,  there  are  two  clauses,  the
'replacement clause' and the 'exclusionary clause'. What is missing in this situation is the
replacement clause: How is it that John can be entitled to Raz's doing anything in the first
place? With the replacement clause,  authorities are giving new reasons upon which the
agent  should  act.  It  doesn't  seem that  John  has  the  standing  of  a  legitimate  authority
because his commands do not create a new reason for Raz. Hence, there is no establishment
of pre-emptive reason. Raz only has pragmatic reasons to follow John's commands and to
treat them as pre-emptive. What this example is meant to show is that without an already
established relationship of accountability there is no justification for John to complain, nor
is  Raz  responsible  for  deferring,  however  foolish  that  might  be.  What  Darwall  instead
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wants to argue for is that: 
the  reasons  with  which  following  a  putative  authority’s  directives  secures  better
compliance already themselves assume background accountability relations that are
critical to establish the directives’ legitimacy or authority (Darwall 2013a, p. 152). 
Darwall puts his object in the slogan: “No preemptive reasons without the standing to hold
accountable” (ibid., p. 154). 
At best, Raz's reply to Darwall seems weak and unconvincing. He says that 
[t]he argument is not that one has those derivative reasons stated in III because it
would be good to believe in them. It is that it is good to believe in them because they
are there (Raz 2010, p. 299). 
Even if this is true, it still does not answer Darwall's fundamental question: How is it that a
legitimate authority can be entitled to hold its addressees accountable for non-compliance,
and why are the addressees answerable to this particular authority? It might be the case that
the command should be followed for the reason Raz states, but he still needs to say more
about why authorities are justified in holding individuals accountable. For even Raz admits
that a fundamental aspect of practical authority is that “it includes an appeal for compliance
by the person(s) subject to the authority” (Raz 1986, pp. 25-26). It is unclear, under Raz's
account, why any authority would be justified in demanding compliance.
If this is right, and it looks as if it is, then the question of ‘who has authority over
whom?’ seems to be a question that Raz's account does not currently answer. More needs to
be said about  accountability and the authority’s  justification for demanding compliance
than can be given from the justificaiton of content alone. Or, as Scott Hershovitz put it, 
[t]o establish that there is authority in these cases, Raz must explain how it is that an
authority acquires the right to bind subjects in virtue of the fact that [the addressees]
would be foolish not to treat [the authority] as if it had that right (Hershovitz, 2011, p.
20).
We ought to now turn to Darwall's positive picture of authority since this is the precise
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question he sets out to answer.
3. The Second-Person Standpoint in General
As we have just seen, Raz's service conception of authority does not adequately
answer the question of standing. Darwall  has developed a second-person conception of
authority,  which  he  claims  capable  of  giving  an  adequate  answer to  this  question.  His
fundamental claim about authority is that we need to give an account of who is accountable
to whom, i.e., we need to determine who has standing. 
Darwall originally developed his conception of the second-person standpoint as an
account of the nature of moral obligation. He draws on several historical figures in order to
illustrate  the  importance  he  sees  in  the  second-person  standpoint.  The  second-person
standpoint has proved to be a highly stimulating and active prospect for several areas of
philosophy (Lavin 2014).
One of the figures who has been widely associated with this renewed interest in the
second-person is Martin Buber. As a member of the dialogical movement in the early part
of the 20th century in Germany, he helped to make I-Thou relationship famous with the
publication of his Ich und Du – though the I-Thou relationship can be traced back at least as
far as Feuerbach (Feuerbach 2014 §59; cf. Honneth and Joas 1988, Ch. 1). He also had
connections  with  the  likes  of  Jacobi,  Hamann,  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  and  Fichte
(Theunissen 1986, p. 268; cf. Buber 2002a). 
Unlike  Darwall,  Buber  was  primarily  concerned  with  fundamental  questions  of
ontology, morality (although not primarily with moral obligation) and theology.* However,
Buber  does  develop  a  philosophical  anthropology  of  'encounter'  which  will  help  to
* Michael Theunissen gives a through and helpful exposition of Buber's dialogical ontology as well as the
broader  dialogical  movement  in  Germany in  his  Der  Andere partially  translated  as  The  Other.  The
translation omits a particularly helpful chapter on Buber's theological commitments. 
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illuminate  some  central  themes  of  Darwall's  second-person  account.  These  points  of
illumination  are  particularly  prominent  in  Buber's  important  essay  from 1938,  entitled
“What is Man?” – an essay Darwall explicitly draws on in his essay “Being With” (Darwall
2013b, Ch 6) – which focuses on an attempt to overcome individualistic methodology in
understanding this fundamental Kantian question* without lapsing into collectivism (Buber
2002b, p. 237ff). For Buber the fundamental relationship of the 'I-Thou' occurs in-between
individuals where each is completely open to the other in an encounter, yet neither is reified
as a thing, as an 'it' (Theunissen 1986, pp. 271-290). Buber does not maintain (as Hilary
Putnam has reminded us) that the I-Thou relationship is always a good thing, as there can
be 'demonic  I-Thou'  relations  (Putnam 2008,  p.  62).  The example  Buber  gives  here  is
Napoleon: 
The world 'I'  remains  the shibboleth  of  humanity.  Napoleon spoke it  without  the
power to relate, but he did speak it as the I of an accomplishment. Those who exert
themselves  to  copy  this,  merely  betray  the  hopelessness  of  their  own  self-
contradiction (Buber 1996, p. 119). 
It remains obscure how exactly to understand Buber here. However, for our purposes, we
can leave this complication aside.
 The important point for an entry into Darwall's view is that the I-Thou relationship
is  characterised  as  a  dialogical  relationship  between  particularised  and  irreducible
individuals. In this type of relationship, both individuals are to reciprocate the openness to
the particularity of the other: “some degree of mutual access characterises being with or
together” (Darwall 2013b, p. 112). This is because, as Buber puts it, “relation is reciprocity
[Gegenseitigkeit]” (Buber 1996 p. 58).
* Kant emphasises this as the fundamental question in  The Jäsche Logic where he adds to the questions
from the first critique (“What can I know?”, “What ought I to do?” and “What may I hope?”) the fourth
question,  “What  is  man?”,  the  question  of  anthropology,  which  “we  could  reckon  all  of  this  as
anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one” (Kant 1992, 25; cf. Buber 2002b, pp.
141-142) 
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To adopt a more Kantian tone, we must see the other as an end-in-itself and not as a
mere means to our individual ends; the importance of the other is not their mere use as a
thing. By seeing the other as a means to our own ends we turn the other into an 'it', the
relation becomes of 'I-it' rather than the 'I-thou': “Every means is an obstacle. Only where
all means have disintegrated encounters occur.” (Buber 1996 p. 63; cf. Theunissen 1986, p.
275).The thought is that in experiencing the relationship with the other in this way, we must
transform the way we live our lives (Putnam 2008, p. 64). We must change the way we live
in response to the other. 
What we can draw from this for Darwall's account is the following themes. First,
like Buber, Darwall is concerned with the encounter between 'You' and 'I' without reducing
either to a mere means, an 'It'. Furthermore, this encounter must be reciprocal and mutual.
However, this is where the two accounts start to diverge. 
In particular, the divergence springs from Darwall's addition of a Rawlsian element
to  the  dialogical  picture.  Namely,  he  also  understands  these  particularised,  irreducible
individuals to be sources of valid claims. Furthermore, the way that Darwall understands
the  'I-Thou'  relationship  is  that  of  free  and  equal  people  who encounter  each  other  in
dialogue. For example, he puts his view in terms of conversation with reference to the work
of Allan Gibbard:
Norm acceptance manifests itself not just in regulating conduct but also in tendencies
to avow the norm in contexts of “unconstrained normative discussion.” By normative
discussion,  Gibbard  means  not  just  the  sort  of  thing  that  moralists,  moral
philosophers,  or  writers  to  editorial  pages  engage  in  but  also  something  that  is
virtually ubiquitous in human life, from gossip, to discussion of novels, movies, and
sitcoms,  to  “I  was  like  …;  He  was  like  …” conversations  in  which  participants
display  their  reactions  to  others'  actions  and  feelings.  In  all  instances,  people
negotiate questions of how it makes sense to respond to what people do and what
norms for evaluating conduct it makes most sense to accept. And as they do, empathy
works to bring others' views inside our perspective so that they can be part of our own
critical  reflection  and  not  just  recorded  as  what  others  think.  Second-personal
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accountability is not the only form of social criticism, of course, but surely much of
what human beings discuss concerns what they and we can warrantedly expect and
demand of one another (Darwall 2006, pp. 170-171 citation removed).
It is in this type of dialogue where we find the grounding for ethical relationships. Darwall,
amongst others, has taken up this I-Thou, or second-person standpoint, as the ultimate arena
in which validity claims are exchanged – it is the space for the game of giving and taking of
reasons. Within the second-person standpoint both individuals maintain their autonomy as
self-legislating  beings  whose  wills  determine  themselves,  i.e.,  the  Kantian  idea  of
autonomy.
Darwall's conception, then, is based on a dialogical practice of giving and taking of
reasons by individuals.  Although he does not explicitly posit  his  account  in terms of a
dialogical practice of giving and taking of reasons, there are good reasons for thinking that
this is indeed what underlies his account – Darwall instead prefers the term 'second-person
address'.  For  example,  Darwall  opens his  Second-Person Standpoint  by saying that  the
foundation  of  morality  is  “the  perspective  you  and  I  take  up  when  we  make  and
acknowledge claims on one another's conduct and will” (Darwall 2006, p. 3). Of course this
perspective  is  the  second-person  perspective.  Like  the  discourse  ethics  of  Habermas
(Habermas 1995, Ch. 2 and 1992, Ch. 3) and Karl-Otto Apel (Apel 1996, Ch1), Darwall is
interested  in  working  out  the  pragmatic  presuppositions  necessarily  entailed  by  this
perspective,  the  perspective  of  second-person  address.  He  summarises  these
presuppositions in the following way:
[W]e hold ourselves  morally accountable to  others  when we impose demands on
ourselves that we think it sensible to impose on anyone from a perspective that we all
can share as free (second-personally competent) and rational. And we presuppose that
anyone we hold thus accountable is someone who can in principle also accept and
impose these same demands on himself by taking up this  impartial  second-person
perspective and seeing the sense of imposing them on anyone (Darwall 2006, p. 276).
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The idea being that what we are investigating when we are investigating the second-person
standpoint is the norms entailed in second person discourse. I think we can then say that
Darwall is concerned with the practice of the giving and taking of reasons. 
Clearly, fundamental to this idea is the Rawlsian conception of persons as “self-
originating source of valid claims” (Rawls 1999b, Ch. 16). The main idea behind Darwall's
account is that, in order for one person to hold another accountable, the other person must
first  be  able  to  hold  herself  accountable.  If  she cannot  hold  herself  accountable,  then
attempting to hold her accountable would be a case of 'mere force' and illegitimate. The
first person would be disrespecting her as a 'self-originating source of valid claims'. 
This brief summary will clearly not do justice to Darwall's full account of moral
obligation. However, Darwall does not want his account just to ground ethical relationships
and moral  obligation.  He also thinks  that  the  second-person standpoint  can ground the
standing which is internal to practical authority (Darwall 2013a; cf.  James 2007 and Kar
2011).  The following will bracket the moral obligation aspects of Darwall's account. I do
not intend to make any commitments as to the adequacy of Darwall's account of moral
obligation. The primary focus will be on Darwall's extension of his account to the nature of
legitimate practical authority.*
4. Second-Person Standpoint and Practical Authority: An Answer to the 
Question of Standing
Darwall's  main  thesis  is  that  the  best  way  to  understand  practical  authority  is
through the presupposition that a legitimate authority has the standing to make claims and
demands, as well as hold addressees accountable for them. This has led Raz to level the
* For  criticism of  Darwall's  extending  of  the  second-person  see  Lavin  2014,  §3  and  for  criticism of
Darwall's overall project see “Symposium on Stephen Darwall's  The Second Person Standpoint  in the
October 2007 issue of Ethics Vol 118, No. 1
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charge that Darwall “seems to use “authority” interchangeably with “standing” (Raz 2010,
p. 292). Indeed, Darwall does use the phrase “authority or standing” throughout his writings
on  the  second-person  standpoint.  What  Darwall  means  by this  phrase  is  that  practical
authority necessarily involves the presupposition of standing, or of a normative background
relationship, to make claims and demands as well as “to hold accountable” (2013b p 154).
This, Darwall is claiming, is a necessary precondition for the giving of commands. Without
this relation, no command would be possible.
The argument Darwall is making is a transcendental one. That is to say, he is trying
to answer the question: what are the necessary grounds of the possibility for a successful
command? 
His  answer  is  that  successful  commands  are  necessarily  “grounded in  (de jure)
authority relations that an addresser takes to hold between him and his addressee” (Darwall
2006, pp. 3-4). In other words, we must presuppose the relation in order to make sense of
commands. For this reason Darwall focuses on the pragmatic structure of the commanding
situation, i.e., the second-person standpoint. It will take some time to unpack what exactly
this means and what it implies for a theory of practical authority. The rest of this chapter
will be devoted to doing so.
Moving,  then,  directly  into  our  leading  question  of  practical  authority:  who,
according to Darwall, has authority over whom and for whose benefit? The simple answer,
which can already be seen from his response to Raz, is: 
A has authority over B if and only if A has the standing to command B and hold B to
account for non-compliance. 
This captures what Darwall calls 'second-personal address'  which is characterised by an
irreducible family of concepts: practical authority, responsibility to, valid claim or demand,
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second-personal reasons (Darwall 2013a pp. 141 and 151; cf. Darwall 2006, pp. 11-15).
Furthermore, ‘second-personal address’ is irreducibly relational as it is always made by an
addresser and “necessarily always to someone (an addressee)” (Darwall 2013a, p. 151; cf.
Darwall 2006,  pp. 11). We may worry that the account relies on 'practical authority' as a
fundamental element; in other words, that it cannot then give an account for the concept
being presupposed. However, this is not the case. Rather, through elucidating this family of
concepts  in  conjunction  we  can  learn  a  great  deal  about  how  to  understand  practical
authority, particularly about the question of standing.
We can already see how radically different this starting point is from Raz's service
conception. While Raz starts with, and focuses primarily on, how to justify the content of
authoritative  commands,  Darwall  starts  by  asking  what  characterises  the  background
normative relationship which makes practical authority possible. This is clearest in Second-
Person Standpoint when Darwall, in a footnote, asks:
But what gives the “law” we committed ourselves to normative force? The fact that
we committed ourselves to it, as if adopting it together? That could be so only if there
exists a further background normative relation that gave us the authority so to bind
ourselves  voluntarily  and  whose  authority  does  not  itself  depend  on  a  voluntary
commitment (Darwall 2006, pp. 264n26 emphasis added; cf. Ware 2009).
In other words, Darwall's account focuses primarily on the question of standing.
The  best  way  to  get  a  handle  on  Darwall's  second  person  standpoint  and  his
conception of standing is to start with an example he borrows from Hume when introducing
his theory. It is Hume's 'gouty toe' example (Hume 1975,  pp. 226): you stepping on my
foot. Darwall concedes that there might be several reasons for you to remove your foot
from mine (Darwall 2013a, pp. 136-137, 155). 
For example, it might be the case that you think suffering is a bad state of affairs to
which you do not want to contribute. Based on this fact alone, you might think that you
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should not step on feet, as stepping on feet causes undue suffering. Therefore, when you are
alerted to the fact that the weight of your foot on mine causes suffering (the suffering here
should be phrased third personally because it is irrelevant whose suffering it is), then you
find yourself  in  the best  position to  alleviate  the suffering,  and you remove your  foot.
Alternatively, you might think stepping on feet is “base thing and so beneath” the virtuous
person, you aspire to be a virtuous person; therefore, naturally, you move your foot when
alerted (Darwall 2010, pp. 262). 
According to Darwall, both of these reasons can be accepted “without holding that
anyone has any claim to [you] not stepping on other's feet or that it would wrong anyone
for [you] to do so” (ibid.). The problem in both of these cases is that there is no-one in a
position to give a pre-emptive reason or to hold anyone accountable for non-compliance. In
fact, it is not necessary for there to be other people at all, only that there are other beings
who can suffer (or have feet). Hence, there is no authority and the reason why there is no
authority, and why there cannot possibly be authority in these situations is, according to
Darwall, a lack of the normative second-personal relationship that holds between you and I.
In other words, I must be entitled to make demands on you and hold you accountable for
wronging me, and you must be answerable to my demands – this is just what it means, for
Darwall, to be in a second-personal relationship.
Darwall  grounds  this  prior  normative  relationship  in  the  idea  of  equality  and a
common basis of authority. This is what he terms 'Fichte’s point', which posits that 
any  second-personal  claim  or  'summons'  (Aufforderung)  presupposes  a  common
competence,  authority,  and, therefore,  responsibility as free and rational;  a mutual
second-personality  that  addresser  and  addressee  share  and  that  is  appropriately
recognized reciprocally (Darwall 2006, pp. 21).*
* We can leave aside the historical accuracy of Darwall's reading of Fichte's point as he can make this point
independently  of  its  purported  historical  origins  but  doubts  have  been  raised  about  the  fidelity  of
Darwall's reading (Ware 2009, pp. 262-282).
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'Fichte's point' is supposed to show that for (legitimate) authoritative relationships to arise it
is necessary that individuals recognise the other's common dignity. In Rawls's words, that
each is a “self-originating source of valid claims” (ibid., Ch 10; Rawls 1999b, Ch. 16).
How does this connect to the gouty toe example? In Darwall's essay on “Fichte and
the Second-Person Standpoint”, he tells us that:
Since second-personal reasons concern not the goodness or badness of states of the
world considered independently of our relation to them, but rather agent's relations to
one another, they are invariably agent-relative in some way or other. (Darwall 2013b,
p. 227)
In other words, what matters for practical authoritative relationships is not the reasons
that might already apply to the individuals. What matters is rather the reasons that we
justify to each other as free and equal persons.
It is only in you recognising my claim on you that you are made responsible. For
you to be responsible for removing your foot from mine, you must recognise as valid my
claim upon you; this is also what allows me to hold you accountable. Now we might
wonder why we need to think of ourselves as responsible to the other's claim in order to
be accountable to him? In other words, if another person makes a valid claim on us, why
do we need to accept such a claim in order to be accountable to him for it? However, it is
still open to Darwall to say that we are responsible for the content of the claim but this is
not his question. Rather, the question he is raising is about who we are accountable to
and who can hold us accountable.
Darwall answers this question by defending a further point, viz., 'Pufendorf's point'.
This point says that in order to hold someone responsible for an action, that person must
already be able to hold herself accountable. In Darwall's words: 
owning to the [conceptual] connections that Pufendorf insists on between obligation
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and accountability, someone can be under a moral obligation to do something only if
he can hold himself to the relevant demand through recognizing its legitimacy […]
Someone can be accountable only by holding himself accountable (Darwall 2013b, p.
213; cf. Darwall 2006, pp. 23, 250).
Again, with the gouty toe, you would be responsible for moving your foot when I demand
you to do so, only if it is something for which you can already hold yourself accountable.
This point seems, like 'Fichte's point', to be based in a particular reading of Rawls’
fundamental claim that people are 'self-originating sources of valid claims'. If I demand that
you  φ,  then  you  have  to  recognise  my demand as  something for  which  you  can  hold
yourself accountable in order for me to hold you accountable for your φ-ing. Why? If you
do not recognise my demand as something for which you can hold yourself accountable,
then I would be violating you as a source of a valid claim. I would be disrespecting you
while  demanding  that  you  respect  me  as  a  source  of  valid  claims,  and  this  would  be
violating our equality as moral beings for me to treat you as a mere means.
5. Coercion, Accountability and the Right to Rule
The  relationship  between  recognition  of  the  others  claim  as  valid  and  being
accountable for that claim becomes clearer if we turn to another claim of Pufendorf's which
Darwall also accepts and insists upon.
Darwall insists that there is a conceptual distinction between mere force or coercion
and holding someone accountable; a distinction any act of legitimate authority presupposes
(Darwall 2006, pp. 250 and Darwall 2013b, pp. 189, 216, 252; cf. Arendt 2000, pp. 463).
This distinction amounts to the following: When A has the standing to demand B to φ and B
fails to comply, it would be legitimate for A to hold B to account. Where A does not have
standing to hold B to account, A's commands would become mere coercion “and this would
violate the addressee's authority” (Darwall 2006, pp. 250). The reason for this is that  A's
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command cannot be justified to B and B can only be accountable for a command if and only
if  B can hold  B accountable. Thus,  B is not responsible to  A.  B has no second-personal
reason to follow  A's command. Legitimate authority, then, fully turns on presupposing a
normative, second-personal, relationship of  A and  B – of 'you and I'.  A can legitimately
command B if and only if  A can justify his commands to  B  in the sense that  B  can take
himself as responsible to A's demands.
The distinction between accountability and mere force is hugely important for the
understanding of authority. In particular, this distinction opens up the possibility of seeing
how  authorities  could  legitimately  enforce  their  commands.  This  is  one  of  the  most
important elements that Darwall's account helps to highlight. It is particularly important
being that the enforceability of commands is one of the core aspects of authority. As John
Dunn writes: 
what they have to be able to do and go on doing if they are to exist at all, and hence to
be in a position to do anything else. The capacity they must create and maintain is the
capacity to make each of their subjects in the end act as they direct and not as the
subject in question would otherwise be inclined (Dunn 2000, pp. 117-118).
In other words, the authorities not only purport to determine their addressees' commitments
but they are also concerned with ensuring that their subjects do, in fact, act as commanded.
This is particularly true in the case of our political lives, which is the target of the quote
from Dunn. States claim the right to subject their citizens to a certain range of commands
and obligations. Yet perhaps, even more problematically, these commands are backed by
the threat of physical coercion for non-compliance. 
However, the claim that only states have coercive authority should be rejected. It
seems that most authorities have coercive means at their disposal to criticise disobedient
members and enforce their commands (Lagerspetz 1995, Ch. 4.1). Think of the ability of
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businesses to terminate employees and religious institutions in order to  excommunicate
their members, e.g., the famous  herem of Spinoza. One might claim that we are free to
leave jobs or religious associations much easier than we are able to leave a state. In some
cases this may be true, but it does not seem to be true in all cases. In any society, without
strong labour rights and a social safety net the poor will not be able to walk away from a
job so easily, much as the poor will not be able to leave a state as easily as their wealthy
counterparts.
The type of coercion that does seem to be unique to states is,  as Weber rightly
pointed out, the monopoly on  physical coercion (Weber 1968, p. 54 and Weber 1946, p.
78).  In  other  words,  all  authorities  claim  for  themselves  the  ability  to  enforce  their
commands.  This  is  not  just  something that  authorities  claim.  It  is  a  feature  internal  to
commands themselves. As we have already seen, commands are not suggestions that one
takes up as a further consideration in practical reason; instead, they demand conformity by
their very nature.
Now,  the  claim is  that  if  one  decides  not  to  conform,  a  legitimate  authority  is
entitled to extract conformity due to the enforceability which is also internal to the nature of
commands  (Ripstein  2004;  cf.  Derrida  1989,  pp.  925).  The  coercive  violence  of
enforceability  mediates  between the  autonomy of  the  individual  and the  authority  of  a
command. Kant makes the same point - law and freedom without force is anarchy: 
[I]n order for law to be effective and not an empty recommendation, a middle term
must  be  added;  namely,  force  [Gewalt],  which,  when  connected  with  freedom,
secures success for these principles (Kant 2007, 7:330). 
If a command is not backed up with some sort of sanction for non-compliance then it would
seem not to be a command at all, but rather a mere suggestion; one that can be accepted or
rejected at will being that this is not how commands are given (that is, commands are not
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mere suggestions).
We should  be clear  about  what  such an  enforcement  entails;  it  is  not  a  further
incentive to act. However, the incentive view of enforceability and coercion is common.
When  one  takes  up  this  incentives  view,  then  coercion  becomes  secondary.  This  is
expressed by Raz, for example, when he says that:
we can imagine other rational beings who may be subject to law, who have, and who
would  acknowledge  that  they  have,  more  than  enough  reasons  to  obey  the  law
regardless of sanctions (Raz 1999, p. 159; cf. Green 1988, pp. 72-73). 
The idea being here that the coercion and the enforceability of commands in only secondary
when it comes to understanding authority. In relation to this view, this aspect of commands
is to provide extra motivation for addresses to act. The extra motivation is only necessary
because we are limited human beings. If we were fully rational then there would be not be a
need for this aspect of commands. Hence, this is not the best way to understand coercion
and enforceability and how it is related to commands.
Instead, the idea is that the one who is commanded is doing something wrong when
they do not conform to the command, while the authority, when legitimate, is entitled to
extract  conformity  through  coercion.  This  is  what  Darwall  helps  us  to  see  with  the
distinction  between  'mere  force'  and justified  coercion  turning on the  addressee  of  the
command becoming accountable to the authority for the conformity.
When the enforcement of a command turn out to be legitimate, it is because the
addressee is in fact accountable to the authority to defer. As in Roman law, a creditor has
the right to extract payment, with force, from a debtor because the debtor is accountable to
the creditor; conversely, the creditor is entitled to what the debtor owes (Ripstein 2004, pp.
7-8). It is this owing relationship which ensures that addressees are in fact accountable for
following commands. This is how we should understand the right to rule. It is a directed
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relationship where the addressee is accountable to the authority. When this accountability
relationship exists,  then the authority has the right  to extract authority from addressees
when the addressees fail to conform. 
David Enoch has developed a 'debunking' case against the idea of a right to rule.
Enoch objects to the notion of the right to rule generally. In particular, he objects to the idea
of the directionality of authority; that is, obedience to the command is owed to the authority
(Enoch 2012,  §7). If Enoch is right, then Darwall must be wrong. For Darwall, it is the
directionality that is necessary to make sense of authority: for you to have authority over
me, you must be entitled to make demands on me and for you to be so entitled, I must be
accountable to you for those demands. This is the irreducible directionality in Darwall's
account. Therefore, it is worth spending some time on this issue.
If we recall Enoch's normative success conditions for authoritative commands, the
reasons  why  Enoch  thinks  that  he  does  not  need  the  right  to  rule  become  clear.  For
authoritative commands to be successful, it needs to trigger independent reasons that one
must already possess. He then claims that the reasons triggered by authorities are not a
general reason why one owes the authority obedience. Instead, it is the reasons triggered
themselves for which individuals are accountable, explaining why then these reasons will
always  be  conditional  reasons.  Remember  Enoch's  explanation  of  how  a  parent  can
successfully  give  a  child  reason  to  go  to  bed.  He  claims  that  the  parent  is  only
(normatively) successful if the child has a conditional reason to 'to-go-to-bed-if-you-tell-
him-to'.  Leaving aside the adequacy of this particular example,  we can see why Enoch
wants to deny the directionality of authority. It is because, according to Enoch, that for
which the addressees are accountable is the reason triggered.
There is no need for the directionality of authority because the individuals whose
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reasons have been triggered already have sufficient normative reasons. The authority is
there simply as a secondary means to help motivate individuals to conform. Why do they
need any further reasons?
However, his reasoning seems weak. For one, most of the force of his claim turns
on one example, that of arbitration. Enoch asks, if A is arbitrating between B and C and A
rules in favour of  B, whom does  C owe the duty of obedience to (ibid., p. 29)? Enoch's
answer is the same as in the case of a parent triggering a child's conditional reason to go to
bed. All A does is trigger C's reason for φ-ing. Hence, C is accountable for φ-ing, not to A
for φ-ing. 
Notice that arbitration is an institution insofar as it is defined by particular rules
about the roles,  penalties and moves that give a structure to the activity of arbitration.
Obviously what will not make the penalties follow the decision of the arbitrator will vary,
based on the larger institutions in which the arbitration is embedded. However, one thing
that seems clear is the roles that any arbitrating institution will entail and the general moves
that will be allowed. Arbitration is characterised by an arbitrator who has authority over the
decision and parties who will give testimony in regard to which the arbitrator will decide
between. The question that Enoch is asking is: what does the party in this institutions owe
and to whom? His answer is that the two parties, and not the arbitrator, are the only two
who could  own anything to  the  other.  The arbitrator  is  not  owed anything.  No-one is
accountable to the arbitrator, to A.
Yet, it is not entirely clear why it is that C is not accountable to A. It is intuitive that
C owes B whatever it is they went to arbitration to determine. One thing that matters to C
and  B, then, is determinacy. They both want concrete closure on a deliberative question.
Both  B and  C are making claims upon the other but disagree as to the validity of these
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claims being that they are appealing to a procedure to give a determinate answer.
Now let us take it for granted that both  B and  C are acting in good faith; that is,
neither  is  trying  to  manipulate  the  other.  They  both  genuinely  believe  that  their  own
position is justified and the other is mistaken. They need a determinate answer to their
question but neither can give such an answer – this is precisely the problem. If they are
arguing about whether C ought to φ or not, where B claims that C must φ and B claims that
he does not, after A's decision C in fact now owes it to B to φ. This is particularly clear if it
is a matter of payment. If B claims that C owes her $100 and A rules in favour of B, then C
owes B $100.
Presumably, if all they were after was determinacy then they would agree to flip a
coin, or some other procedure to give them some determinacy. Yet, due to the fact that they
both think they are in the right, they want to make their cases to an objective third party
who will be able to give a determinate and intelligent judgement to settle the disagreement.
However, Enoch would argue that this verges on decision fetishism (Enoch 2009,
§2). That is, he believes that to focus only on the procedure and how a decision is made is
only  one  thing  to  be  valued  in  such  a  decision,  and  what  really  matters  most  is  the
instrumental value of such procedures. 
Further, B and C both want assurance that the decision, whatever it is, holds. They
want the dispute to be over. Neither would bother going to arbitration if they believed that
the  other  would not  be  accountable  for  conforming to  whatever  decision  the  arbitrator
made. This would re-establish the problem which they originally wanted over-come, and
they would want the decision to be enforceable. 
For  Enoch,  this  cannot  actually  be  enough  because,  for  A's  decision  to  be
normatively successful, one of two things must be the case. Either A must in fact be right
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about C owing B, or C (and B) must have a conditional reason triggered by A's decision 'to-
φ-when-A-decides-against-you'. 
However, this latter option is foreclosed by Enoch due to his eschewal of a general
right to rule. Why? To have such a reason, it seems that this must be directed or it would
otherwise be difficult to make sense of the content of such a reason. With other reasons
triggered, we can see why it is not owed to the authority. For example, if we return to the
case of the parent 'commanding' a child to go to bed, we see that the content of the triggered
reason 'to-go-to-bed-if-you-tell-him-to' is derived from the benefit of getting enough sleep.
Alternatively, it could be expressed in the case of arbitration, if the reason given is that of
'you-must-pay-what-you-owe' seems reasonably to derive its content from already owing
something. This is the first option. 
The first option, viz.,  A must make the right decision, must be Enoch's view. This
seems to be too high a standard to place on authorities. Part of the role of arbitrators (and
practical authorities more generally)  is  to make determinate judgements about issues of
disagreement. If authorities are not give enough room for error, then their roles would seem
to be completely undermined.
Putting aside this issue, there is arguably a deeper issue inherent to Enoch's account.
Enoch does not seem to capture fully the phenomenon of the arbitrator situation. This is not
surprising as his account is, by design, a debunking account. 
What Enoch's account misses is that C also owes it to A, as arbitrator, to defer A's
ruling. In fact both B and C owe this to A, to affirm exactly what Enoch wants to rule out;
that is, a general right to rule or to say that both B and C have a general reason 'to-φ-when-
A-decides'.
The reason why this must entail the right to rule is that the content of the reason
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seems to be that one owes it to  A to follow what  A says. The thought would be that the
structure of the arbitrating situation is one were the parties make themselves accountable to
the  arbitrator  and  that  this  is  constitutive  of  arbitration  itself.  Without  this  element  of
accountability, it would be difficult to make sense of the idea of arbitration at all.
One way to view this situation is to think about the enforceability of A's decision. In
other words, who can compel C to make payments? It would seem that the answer is A. Is it
not the case that, by going to the arbitrator, both B and C are giving up some of their rights
and responsibilities to the arbitrator? By investing A with authority in this circumstance, not
only do B and C give up their judgement to A, but A is also granted the right to enforce that
decision. 
If the decision was enforceable by  B, would  B and  C not be back in the 'state of
nature'?  Back  into  the  situation  they  were  trying  to  escape  by going  to  arbitration?  It
appears to me, contra Enoch, that there is directionality of obligation here and it does play a
large role in aiding our understanding of authority.
Otherwise, it  is difficult to understand what force agreeing to arbitration has for
either party. Furthermore, this makes much more sense of how to account for the reason
being triggered in the case of arbitration.  As opposed to holding the arbitrator to some
exceedingly high epistemological standard requiring the right answer for the decision to be
legitimate (assuming there is even a right answer to all cases of arbitration, which it is not
necessarily clear), we are left with the procedure of the arbitration which triggers the 'to-φ-
when-A-decides-against-you' reason for action, that which is both grounded in  B and C's
agreement to the procedure of arbitration.
What is at issue here is a matter of when an authority actually has the right to rule.
Darwall's suggestion seems to amount to the claim that authorities have the right to rule
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only when addressees can hold themselves accountable for the commands of the authority.
6. Radicalising the Question of Standing: A Critique of Darwall's Second 
Person Standpoint
For all that Darwall has to say about standing and its necessity for understanding
authority relations, it is unclear what ties A and B together in such a way that A has the right
to hold  B accountable in non-moral cases. It is a question of institutions and the type of
relation individuals have to them. The question is not what makes it appropriate for  A to
hold B morally accountable? Darwall supplies an answer to this question., The question is
rather, why should we think that  A has any right to demand anything from B in the first
place? Why are A and B committed to a particular institution? 
The answer is clear in Darwall's fundamental moral example of the second-person
standpoint, Hume's gouty toe. In stepping on A's foot, B seems to have, potentially, already
infringed upon A. There is already a connection between the two which makes it clear why
A's 'summons' - why A's demands - connects to B. B is already morally interacting with A;
there is already a reason for  B to be moved by A's demands. After all, it is  A's toe. Thus,
through some moral interaction already occurring between A and B, they are already in the
second-person standpoint. 
What is  unclear is  why this  type of case can be generalised to other non-moral
interactions. What is particularly unclear is why individuals are tied into the institutions
where  we  find  practical  authorities  embedded.  That  is,  why  are  there  bonds  between
employer and employee, between sergeant and a private or between a state and a citizen?
What Darwall fails to deliver in his second-person conception of authority is a story as to
why individuals can demand reasons and hold others accountable without there being some
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prior moral event or relationship which ties the addressee and addresser together.  What
Darwall has given us is a story that characterises the background relationship that gives us
the authority to bind ourselves. Indeed, this may be the bedrock of moral obligation. How
do we move from this potential insight to an account which captures practical authority? 
Darwall would claim rightly that what he is concerned about is giving an account of
a second-person relationship as such. This may be fine for the case of morality since it
seems that moral address can reasonably be assumed to be a universal practice. We do not
seem to be able to escape this form of address and from this sort of practice. We are always
eligible to be tied up into second-person address by another when the claims are about what
is morally unjustifiable. The thought would go, that because we are always already part of
the moral community, all our actions must be justifiable to others who are affected by them
(cf, Korsgaard 1996a, Ch. 10, Habermas 1992, Ch. 3). If one of our actions is potentially
unjustifiable  to  others  who  are  affected,  then  we  would  be  disrespecting  them  as  an
autonomous person. 
For example, if  B  is trying to violate the integrity of  C,  A  would be justified in
demanding B to stop because he would (potentially) be doing something immoral – even if
A must be making this demand on behalf of  C.  A would be hindering a hindrance (Kant
1996c, 6:231), However, B could reasonable respond that, in fact. C agreed or consented to
the behaviour or that they were practising a scene in a play or some other excuse. If  A
accepts this reason, then it would look as if B was not doing something wrong. If A rejects
this reason (perhaps B is doing something that C could not reasonably consent to), then B
looks accountable and should stop.
It  may then be that for purposes of moral obligation,  my rights or freedom end
where another person begins – and perhaps by extension, where the other person's property
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begins. In short, we may need a prior, potentially wrongful, event to occur in order to hold
the other responsible. Otherwise, we seem to be left again with the question of standing, a
question which Darwall's account is meant to make determinate. We can always ask when
someone is making a demand on us, who they are to make such demands?
If this is right, then we would seem to be left with a problem in the case of practical
authority;  the question  of  the “would-be independent,  who would  genuinely prefer  life
without the state” (Wolff 1995, p. 95). Hence, if we are going to maintain the idea of a
person as a 'self-originating source of valid claims', it seems difficult to understand how it
is possible for practical authority not to be a case of mere force and hence illegitimate.
Another way of putting the point is in terms of the particularity requirement: Why is  B
bound in any way to A? What Darwall will need to show is the rational impossibility of a
'would-be independent',  otherwise any case of authority is merely contingent and could
lapse into mere force. Kant,  for example,  attempts to give this type of argument in the
opening pages of the 'Doctrine of Right'. However, when Darwall discusses individuals in a
second-person reason giving situation, he always takes them to accept already the structure
which they are in:
Consider,  for  example,  an  order  delivered  by  a  superior  to  an  inferior  within  a
military chain of command. If  a sergeant orders a private to  do ten pushups,  she
addresses a reason to him that presupposes her authority to give the order and the
private's obligation to obey it. So far, the only relevant normative presupposition is of
unequal authority; the sergeant has the standing to give orders to the private, whereas
the private has no standing to give orders to the sergeant. (Darwall 2006, p. 259)
What is clear from the way Darwall sets-up his conception of authority, it must be the case
that the private is the one that binds herself and accept the sergeants commands as a free
and equal person (ibid, p. 260). For Darwall, the question arising at this point is why the
private cannot rescind her commitment to being a private, to being part of the military chain
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of command? Why does she not have this right as a free and equal person? If she can bind
herself, why should she not be allowed to unbind herself? If this can happen, it would seem
as if the sergeant has no grounds to complain. If the sergeant tries at this point to force the
private to recognise his role as private, then the sergeant is disrespecting the private as a
free and equal person. In other words, the sergeant has lost her authoritative standing over
the private and any commands the sergeant now attempts to give and enforce will be cases
of mere force and not legitimate authority. Granted, it may be costly but it is unclear that it
is either irrational or violates any sort of obligation which Darwall is entitled to assert.
There seem to be three ways in which Darwall can escape this problem. First, he
can appeal to an idealising account of what a 'reasonable' person would believe and desire.
This ‘reasonable person’ must exclude the reasonableness of the 'would-be independent'.
However, it is unclear how this will work without the classic problems and objections to
idealisation coming about (e.g. Gaus pp. 17-18; 318-319 and Quong 2011). Even if these
problems  can  be  overcome  and  the  idealisation  restriction  justifiably  excludes  many
individuals  from  being  considered  reasonable,  it  is  hard  to  see  what  is  conceptually
problematic with a reasonable person wanting to be an independent. 
Further, this idealisation seems to be in tension with the idea that fundamental claim
about individuals being a 'self-originating source of valid claims'. Would it not be the case
that we would be stripping a person of their personhood if we rejected his claim out of hand
as unreasonable? This is especially true of the case of the would-be independent. What
harm  in  terms  of  repressing  the views  of  others  (Rawls  2005,  pp.  61)  would  the
independent be doing to others? 
One way to do this without violating the personhood condition, that which seems
open to Darwall, would be to put consistency conditions on individuals’ beliefs and desires.
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This would at first seem a harmless form of idealisation. However, a problem remains. This
form of idealisation would still violate the personhood condition because there is always a
choice when it comes to resolving inconsistencies. If two beliefs are inconsistent, to regain
consistency one only needs to relinquish one’s belief. Or in the case of an inconsistency
between a belief  and an intention,  the individual can relinquish either  the belief  or the
intention (Broome 2007). The question of which one of these is relinquished is up to the
person.  Therefore,  with idealisation,  even in  this  minimum form, we risk violating the
personhood condition and turning authority into mere force.
Darwall's second option would be to appeal to higher order procedures. This is the
strategy taken, for example, in the later Rawls. This higher order strategy, is compelling but
fails to deal with the problem of particularity. All of the challenges of the first strategy
come back in. How can some form of idealisation fit with the personhood requirement?
Why should we think that this particular individual is answerable to these procedures? Why
should any person be held to account if they no longer find these particular procedures
beneficial or desirable or acceptable basis to cooperate?
Third, and finally, there is the option of traditional consent theory. Even given all its
problems, this might go some way to answering why A and B are bound together. If they are
bound together in this way, then it looks like some higher order procedure to determine the
content of that relationship could do a lot of the work required. However, once again, the
personhood requirement becomes an issue. If it is an individual commitment to join, then
why should the individual not maintain the right to rescind that individual commitment?
After all, this seems to be something we can do with our normal commitments (more on
this in the next chapter).
These are not meant to be insurmountable criticisms of Darwall, but are intended to
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raise doubts about his ability to answer the question of standing with the conceptual tools
internal to the second-person standpoint. 
Let us close with an example which will highlight these problems. We can look at
the important issue of climate change. We can agree that climate change is anthropogenic
and will cause massive harm if we do not act collectively. There seems to be at least two
reasonable  strategies  about  how to deal  with  such harm. First,  there is  a  market-based
strategy of carbon trading. Second, there is a non-market based strategy. One of the major
differences between these two strategies has been characterised by Michael Sandel through
the moral distinction between fines and fees (Sandel 2013, Ch. 2 and Sandel 2005, Ch. 14).
The distinction is that “[f]ines register moral disapproval, whereas fees are prices that imply
no moral judgement. When we impose a fine for littering, we’re saying that littering is
wrong” (Sandel  2013, pp.  65-66).  Many,  like Sandel,  think reasonably that using more
carbon than one ought to (how much carbon one has a right to use is another question),
should carry a 'moral stigma'. Those who support a carbon trading policy do not see this
type of argument as persuasive (Caney and Hepburn 2011). Neither strategy seems to be
unreasonable.  Hence,  if  we  were  to  accept  the  second-person  conception  of  practical
authority,  no  authority  can  legitimately arbitrate  this  issue.  If  they do,  it  will  be  mere
coercion. I think this will hold true for any issue in regard to which there is any reasonable
disagreement.
Focusing on higher order procedures of the decision makers will not necessarily
help. If everyone agreed on the procedures through which the state makes its decisions,
then those accept the procedures, like Sandel, must also accept (for the time being) the
outcome. Now this might be true for a while. However, consider what would happen if
Sandel and those who agreed with him consistently lost out on all decisions or, for some
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other reason, began to doubt the validity of the decisions procedure.  At a certain point
though, according to Darwall's view, it might be reasonable for Sandel to stop supporting
the decision procedure and any decision being taken through that procedure would now be
a case of mere coercion. In order to stop this from occurring, Darwall would need to give
an argument justifying why people like Sandel would not be entitled to change their mind
about the acceptability of a decision procedure, particularly in view of the fact that the
number of logically possible decision procedures open to any group is “a number that on
some estimates exceeds the total number of elementary particles in the universe” (List and
Pettit 2011, pp. 49).
The conclusion  one  could  draw is  that  the  bond between the  authority and the
addressees is made to appear like a pretty weak relationship. So weak, in fact, that it looks
like the addressees could renounce their bond to the authority for just about any reason they
find valid. The authority would have to accept these reasons, otherwise they would become
illegitimate. Darwall's account would be extraordinarily revisionist in regard to how we
normally think  about  the  relationship  between authorities  and their  addressees;  it  is  in
danger of losing the phenomenon of authority relations as such. What we find then, is that
one of the issues that Darwall's conception of authority is meant to address - viz., who is
accountable to whom, the question of standing - appears not to be to very promising. Again,
this is not to say that this strategy will not work in the case of moral theory. The important
point for us is that it does not seem promising to answer this question of standing without
some more theoretical work regarding why A and B are bound together in some way that
respects their autonomy as individuals.
In the next chapter, I will give a general argument that will reinforce these doubts
and show why any account of standing remaining inside an individualist framework (even
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if there is room for a modest sociality like Darwall's) will always face the dual problems of
particularity and the independent, requiring that they be overcome.
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Three: Authority as Social Practice
We ended the last chapter by raising some doubts about Darwall's second-person
conception of authority and its ability to answer the question of standing, the very question
the account is intended to help us answer. Those doubts revolved around why individual
people, thought of as self-originating sources of valid claims, are bound to the institution in
which  authorities  are  embedded;  why  are  citizens  bound  to  their  particular  state  or
employees to their employers?
This was highlighted by the case of the private and the sergeant. It is only in the
institution of the military that we can make sense of why the sergeant has the authority to
command the private to do push-ups. Now the question is, why is it the case that the person
who inhabits the role of private is bond to following the commands of the sergeant? Why
should the private not be able to renounce such a role and walk away without the sergeant
having any normative reasons to complain?
Darwall does not directly engage with this question. However, there is a growing
wealth of writing on exactly this issue. In this chapter, we will look at how individualistic
accounts of sociality do not provide enough resources for understanding the binding force
of institutions. By way of introduction, we will look at one of the founders of sociology,
Max Weber, whose individualistic account of social action has had a lasting impact. Then
we  will  move  to  the  contemporary  work  on  Michael  Bratman  who  shares  many
methodological  assumptions  with  Weber.  What  we will  see is  that  these individualistic
assumptions make it difficult for these views to properly account for institutions and their
ability to bind individuals.
72
1. Modest Sociality and Social Practices: The Inadequacy of Sociality Based 
on Content
Max Weber's account of social action can be seen as a paradigmatic example of
individualistic  methodology in  understanding  human sociality.  Weber  sees  action  to  be
about the individual's subjective meaning, or intention, attached to behaviour (Weber 1978,
p. 4; cf Schutz 1967, Gilbert 1992, Ch. II and Greenwood 2003, p. 100). Action is social
when it takes into account the behaviour of others (ibid.). From this, Weber defines social
relationships in the following way: 
The term 'social relationship' will be used to denote behavior of a plurality of actions
insofar as, in its meaningful content, the action of each takes account of that of the
others and is oriented in these terms (ibid, p. 26).
One way to make sense of Weber's understanding of 'subjective meaning' is in terms of
commitments and intentions of the individual (Schutz 1967, p. 6). Weber maintains that we
can give a full account of sociality wholly through the means of individual intentions and
their 'taking account' of and their 'orientation towards' the behaviour of others. 
Weber's  definition can indeed be useful  in distinguishing between cases of non-
social and social actions without asserting that any action involving others is by definition
social.  In  fact,  there  are  several  actions  involving  others,  for  Weber,  which  are  not
considered social action proper. First, there are cases where an individual sees others not as
actors, as a 'you', but as an inanimate object, as an 'it'. An example of this, for Weber, might
be when a cyclist navigates through a crowd seeing people as things to be avoided. If there
is a collision, it can be seen as a “natural event” (Weber 1978, p. 23). A second, similar
case, would be when a large number of people open their umbrellas when a rain shower
begins (ibid.). This is not a social action for Weber. The individuals are reacting not to other
people but to some natural event, i.e., raining. Finally, there is mere imitation. This is when
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one is learning to do something by observing a stranger (Greenwood 2003, p. 100). This,
for Weber, is not social action because it is only causally determined by the others action
and not “meaningfully oriented” to the other persons behaviour (Weber, p. 24). 
Social  actions,  then,  must  be  individual  actions  meaningfully oriented  to  others
actions. For example, if we are going to walk down the street together, the meaning, or our
intentions, must be oriented towards the other doing the same. If we are merely walking
down the street next to each other then our actions are not meaningfully oriented towards
each other.  The logic of this  Weberian account is  that for two individuals to be acting
socially, both need to meaningfully orientate their actions to the other’s meaningful actions.
There are many obscurities in Weber's account and it is unclear if his distinction
between social and non-social actions holds on closer inspection. The important point for us
is  the  methodological  individualism  which  underlies  Weber's  account.  He  wants  to
understand  how  social  action  is  possible  without  bringing  in  resources  other  than  the
'meaningful behaviour' of individual actors. 
Bratman's  planning theory of  joint  action  is  a  contemporary version  of  Weber's
social  action  account.  The  benefit  of  looking  at  Bratman's  account  is  its  clarity  and
sophistication while still being wedded to the basic methodological assumptions of Weber's
account. By investigating Bratman's account we will see the limits of this individualism as
well as see more clearly a fundamental problem with Darwall's account of authority, viz.,
Darwall's difficulty accounting for how individuals are bound together in not moral cases.
It should be pointed out that Bratman is up front that his account is individualistic.
It focuses on:
the shared intentional activities of small, adult groups in the absence of asymmetric
authority  relations  within  those  groups,  and  in  which  the  individuals  who  are
participants remain constant over time (Bratman 2014, p. 7).
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However, he does think that his account can provide a basis for an extension to 
larger  institutional  agents  like  corporations  or  governments,  institutions  with
hierarchical authority relations, with potential flux in the list of their members, and,
perhaps with an embedded distinction between those participants who are officials of
the institution and those who are not (ibid., p. 8).
We will see two fundamental objections to this modest sociality strategy. First, there is the
problem of persistence.  How is it  that individual persons, as free and equal,  are bound
together in shared cooperative activity? By looking closely at this issue, it will be come
evident that individualistic accounts face a dilemma. Either, they will not get beyond small
group activities to institutions which necessarily have normative force, or, they will need to
bring in resources from outside of their account which will be less parsimonious than a
non-individualist  account  –  parsimony  being  a  major  reason  one  would  want  an
individualist account in the first place. 
Second, there is the problem of the 'own-action', or mineness, condition that seems
to be a necessary condition for intentional states. This is a question about how it is possible
for one to practically reason for another, something that seems to be happening in cases of
authority  in  that  authoritative  commands  are  meant  to  bring  closure  to  one's  practical
reasoning as well as give the addressee a new normative reason for action. Before turning
to these two issues, we need to set out more clearly what Bratman's account looks like.
Bratman gives us 3 conditions for joint action in his “Shared Intention Thesis”: 
We intend to J if and only if:
1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J.
2. I intend that we J in accordance and because of 1a, 1b, and meshing subplans of 1a
and 1b; you intend that we J in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b and meshing
subpans of 1a and 1b.
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us. (Bratman 1999b, p. 121)
We can  see  this  as  an  attempt  to  formalization  of  what  Weber  was  originally  moving
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towards. Notice that what holds two individuals together in a Bratman-type shared intention
is that both individuals intend that 'we  J'  – both individuals are meaningfully orientated
towards the other in terms of the content of their individual intentions.
I  do  not  want  to  argue  that  Bratman-like  shared  intentions  are  not  a  real
phenomenon. They might very well be an important part of our everyday lives. It is quite
possible that if two individuals driving down a road in opposite directions happen upon a
small  downed  tree  which  is  blocking  the  road  that  their  actions  are  coordinated  in
something like  Bratman's  shared intention  thesis  (cf.  Tuomela 2007,  pp.  115-116).  The
individuals involved are simply intent on solving a small scale practical problem, move the
tree so they can continue to drive. Neither can accomplish this alone and can easily be
accomplished by cooperation. The idea would be that such one off encounters do not have
time or persistence to generate anything like the normativity which we find in social action
which are extended in time. I will not claim that Bratman's account cannot explain such
small scale interactions. The target here is on the larger scale interactions which Bratman
hopes to be able to extend his account to.
In the following, I will be arguing that there is a strong parallel between Bratman's
account  of  joint  action  and  Darwall's  account  of  authority  relations.  Both  begin  with
individualistic understandings of non-hierarchical relationships and intend to build out from
these  to  hierarchical  accounts  (Darwall  2013a,  p.  167).  What  I  intend  to  show in  the
following is that this becomes highly problematic in trying to understand how individuals
become bounded to  the  others  in  an institution.  Bratman thinks  that  this  type  of  bond
“might  issue  in  downstream  interactions  that  induce  […]  obligation-based
interdependence” (Bratman 2014, p. 72). However, it is unclear how this will happen and
why it is the case that 'obligation-based interdependence' should be understood in the way
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Bratman suggests. The target here is to look at the individualistic logic behind this account
and show why this type of account is inadequate for the relationship of authority which is
embedded in institutions. Let us now turn to the problem of bindingness and persistence of
joint intentions.
2. The persistence Interdependence of Shared Agency and the Problem of 
Instability
One of the major obstacles of Bratman's account is understand why each individual
will continue to intend that 'we J'. This is important because, as we have seen, in order for a
joint action to occur all participants to the join action must intend that 'we  J'  and have
meshing  subplans.  However,  if  one  participants  stops  intending  that  'we  J'  then  the
character of the shared intention changes fundamentally. In order to avoid the instability
that could possibly arise, Bratman introduces what he calls 'persistence interdependence'.
The  idea  is  that  each  participant  of  a  joint  intention  knows  whether  or  not  the  other
participants continue to intend that 'we J'. In knowing this, they will each adjust their plans
accordingly  and  in  “responsiveness  to  norms  of  individual  plan-theoretic  rationality”
(Bratman 2014, p. 65).  One of the main features of Bratman uses to explain persistence
interdependence  is  the  individual  norms  entailed  by  the  plan-theoretic  rationality.
Therefore, let us review these norms in order to see how they might create stability and
bindingness. 
The  lesson  that  action  must  conform  to  certain  rational  norms  has  been  a
philosophical  theme since  Plato  and  has  recently  been  taken  up  by many accounts  of
practical reasoning, including Bratman himself, Christine Korsgaard and Harry Frankfurt.
What these accounts are attempting to understand is the rational norms embedded in self-
binding of agents. It is through these norms that we see how agents can be effective and
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stable. Without affirming a commitment, or set of commitments, there is no sense to being
an agent.
We can bring out the force of this line of thought by looking at how we are to make
it through a single day. We must plan to complete different activities and fulfil different
desires we may have. However, as we all know, there are not enough hours in the day to do
everything we may desire or wish to do. This is why the anarchic or wanton soul will never
get anything done, will not act in the full-blooded sense. 
When a person succumbs to just any desire that comes to them it may feel as if an
alien force is pushing her, as movement is imposed upon them 'from the outside'. I take this
to be a common experience. We feel pulled by our desires in multiple directions and being
thus overcome by a desire we tend to feel alienated from actions – we do not feel that the
action performed was really our action, because we cannot identify with the movements of
our body. A classic example is that of a drug addict (Frankfurt 1998). The agent may want
to stop using, but they feel overcome by their addiction, by a desire that they no longer
identify with. Harry Frankfurt helpfully draws this out when he writes:
It  is  in  virtue  of  this  identification  and  withdrawal,  accomplished  through  the
formation  of  a  second-order  volition,  that  the  unwilling  addict  may meaningfully
make the analytically puzzling statement that the force moving him to take the drug is
a force other than his own, and that it is not of his own free will but rather against his
will that this force moves him to take it (ibid., p. 18).
The addict is “a helpless bystander to the forces that move him.” (ibid., p. 21)
This  is  superbly  illustrated  by Eddie  from David  Rabe's  1984  play  Hurlyburly.
Eddie is a depraved drug fuelled Hollywood wannabe. Throughout the play he continually
wants to  know 'how things  pertain to  him'.  However,  due to  his  drug fuelled paranoia
and'semantic insanity'  it is revealed that there is not really an 'Eddie' there for things to
pertain to – that is exactly his problem and why he cannot do anything. We can see this
78
clearly  in  the  telling  response  from  his  friend  Bonnie  to  one  of  Eddie's  nearly
incomprehensible rants
about how he is a 'real person':
EDDIE (sitting there, his legs dangling over the edge of the balcony, he is framed in
the square of the railing): Talking about love makes you feel like you're watching TV,
Bonnie... (noticing the railing framing him, he realizes he looks like a TV image) that
why you're so interested? I'm real, Bonnie. I'm not a goddam TV image in from to
you, here. (He starts to pound his legs, having a little fit.)  This is real. I'm a real
person, Bonnie, you know that, right?
Eddie then abruptly demands a sexual act from Bonnie. She responds:
BONNIE (he is reaching for her; she pushes him away and heads down the stairs):
You know, if your manner of speech is in any way a reflection of what goes on in
your head, Eddie, its a wonder you can tie your shoes.(Rabe 1995, p. 309)
Eddie, is what Frankfurt calls a “wanton” and Plato called a “democratic soul” (Frankfurt
1998, p. 17 and Plato 1997c, 516b). Eddie does not seem to have what Frankfurt has called
“second-order  volition”  (Frankfurt  1998,  p.  16)  or  what  we  may  call  intentions  or
commitments. Rather, he is nothing but a 'mere heap' of desires with nothing to pull him
together (Korsgaard 2009b).
If they are able to get something done it will be a purely contingent matter. The
wanton will continually chase after whatever happens to win the battle of motivation at a
particular moment. In order to avoid this fate, we must prioritise our commitments in the
forms of plans in order to coordinate our lives. One will need a general plan (not an exact
plan of every movement) in order to coordinate all of one's ends and also help not to get
distracted by other inclinations that inevitably crop up. 
The importance of this is clear and can be a way of making sense of why intentions
are known without observation (Anscombe 2000, p. 14): If I decide to perform a particular
action tonight,  φ-ing,  it  is  necessary (in  the practical  sense)  that  I  conform my further
79
reasoning and planning to the constraint 'of me φ-ing tonight' (Soteriou 2013, Ch. 13). It is
important to put this in this way, i.e., 'me φ-ing tonight', in order to mark the distinction
between the commitment to φ-ing and predicting that 'I will φ'. My plan to φ tonight is not
something I know through observation but rather something I know from the inside because
I am the one making the commitment to do so. Another way to make the same point is that
our projected actions, characterized by our commitments to φ-ing must always be put in the
future perfect tense: I will have φ-ed (Schutz 1967, Ch. 2.9-2.10). When we are practically
reasoning about what to do we are not concerned with the truth of what will happened in
the same way as if we were theoretically reasoning about the future. Rather, we must reason
about the future as if it were open. 
However,  it  does  not  follow  from  this  that  one  cannot  change  one's  own
commitments. What we will discover, however, is that because one can maintain rationality
in the face of changing one's commitments and the content of one's intentions, this will not
be enough of a foundation to build the stability necessary for shared action. After all, shared
action, as Bratman understands it, needs to have multiple agents intending that 'we J'. If any
of them can change their minds at will then this relationship will be inherently unstable.
With these preliminaries in mind, we can not focused on the rational norms themselves.
There are two rational norms implicit in action. These can be formulated, following
Bratman, as a 'consistency constraint' and 'means-end coherence' (Bratman 1999a, p. 31).
These two constraints are fairly uncontroversial but is worth saying a word about each.
Before  turning  to  charactering  each  constraint  individually,  it  is  important  that  these
constrains are at least partly constitutive of action as such. If we continually fail to conform
ourselves to these constraints we will not be acting irrational but fail to be an agent at all.
Without these norms we will lose the agent. Also, these are not norms of good or bad action
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but rather constitutive norms of any action as such, implicitly endorsed by all agents. That
is, there will be no fact of the matter as to where the agent stands in relation to the practical
questions at stake; there will be no closure on what to do, hence no action. 
The  first  constraint,  the  consistency constraint,  can  be  formulated  as  follows:  I
cannot be committed to two ends that I believe to be mutually inconsistent. It is important
to note a distinction in play here. This follows from the distinction between wishing or
desiring some end and making a decision to pursue some end, i.e., forming an intention in
the planning sense. In both case, we are not entitled to said end. That is, we do not have any
prior right to the ends which we wish for or intend. At most we have the right to our means
as well as a right to pursue our ends. 
What  we  have  control  over,  what  makes  us  autonomous,  is  the  forming  of
commitments to pursue our ends, not achieving of our aims and goals – this is the root of
Aristotle's and Kant's distinction between wish and choice (Aristotle 1984b, 1111b4-30;
Kant 1996c, 6:213). This seems also to be the root of Bratman's distinction between desires
and intentions (Bratman 1999a, p. 20). We can wish for or desire all sorts of thing but we
can only will what 'depends on us' or is 'up-to-us', what is in our power or control. Making
sense of this distinction and its implications for agency, Korsgaard writes, 
to will an end is not just to cause it, or even to allow an impulse in me to operate as
its cause, but, so to speak, to consciously pick up the reins, and make myself the cause
of the end (Korsgaard 2008, p. 59).
 
What we have control over then, what our autonomy is essentially about, is the 'picking up
the reins', as it were. There are many things we cause incidentally or accidentally. It does
not make sense to demand reasons for the behaviour which caused them. For example, what
reason did one have for alerting a prowler who happens to be in the kitchen when one goes
for a glass of water in the middle of the night (Davidson 2001, pp. 4-5)? None. The reasons
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for turning on the light, rather, was to get a glass of water. The getting a glass of water is
what rationalizes the turning on the light. The alerting the prowler was only incidental to
this decision. Or to put it another way, what we have control over is making up our minds
about what to do and initiating the actions necessary to bring about those ends. 
It is only when we make a decision or form an intention to pursue some end that we
become rationally committed to the end. Once one has formed an intention is it that the
consistence constraint is in play. We can desire or wish for all the mutually inconsistent
ends  we  want  –  what  would  stop  us?  However,  once  we  commit  ourselves  to  some
particular end, we cannot, on grounds of irrationality, also commit ourselves to another end
which is inconsistent. Why? Because we would no longer be able to fulfil what we have set
ourselves to fulfil. We cannot effectively coordinate our future behaviour so that it will be
in line with our past decisions. Notice here that we have, in a sense, an 'I-thou' relationship
(Korsgaard 2007). The 'I' of t1 makes a normative claim on the same 'I' at t2. Notice that the
inconsistency only arises when one believes there to be one. 
To briefly illustrate, let us imagine a case in which I commit myself to two mutually
inconsistent ends: 
C1: I will bring a book to the office today to read. 
C2: I will not carry anything on my walk to the office today because I want to have
an enjoyable walk and carrying things makes walks less enjoyable.
These are obviously inconsistent. C1 commits me to carry something to the office today
and C2 makes it impossible for me to do so. It is irrational to knowingly maintain both of
these commitments. I cannot make a coherent plan to do both at the same time.
The second constraint,  means-ends coherence, means that I must fill  in my plan
with  further  with  'sub-plans',  i.e.,  means,  that  will  bring  about  the  end  which  I  have
commitment myself to. For example, if I make a decision to φ tonight then I must not make
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an incompatible decision to ψ and I must conform any further practical reasoning to the
constraint of 'me  φ-ing tonight' (Soteriou 2013, Ch. 13). That is, I must conform to and
reason in accordance with the self-imposed constraint of me φ-ing tonight. I cannot know
that the means will bring about the ends which I intend and still not intend those means. If I
fail to this, I ought to have a self-referential reactive attitude towards myself, e.g., regret. I
ought to regret that I did not live up to my commitment to φ.
There is nothing said so far that would stop me from rescinding my commitment to
φ. For if I can bind and commit myself to a certain end, it is not, strictly speaking out of the
question that I change that end. What we have in these types of cases is a tension between
two 'I's,  the past  'I'  – in an I-thou relationship – which made the commitment and the
present 'I' which must determine whether it will grant authority to the past 'I' and regard the
commitment as valid. There seems to be at least four primary reasons why the future 'I'
might not take up the commitment of the past 'I'. 
First, as has already been mentioned, making incompatible commitments. I cannot,
on pain of irrationality, commit myself both to φ-ing and to ψ-ing when these commitments
directly  contradict  one  another.  I  cannot  (rationally  speaking)  be  both  committed  to
travelling and committed to stay at home during the same period of time. I may of course
be indecisive or desire to do both but once the commitment is formed in favour of φ-ing, it
becomes irrational to then commit to ψ-ing. It is not impossible to actually commit to two
incompatible commitments. Surely, this has happened to everyone. However, if it comes to
my attention that I have two incompatible commitments, I ought to be motivated to drop
one of them. If I fail to rescind one of these incompatible commitments then I continue to
run afoul of the consistency constraint, hence I am being irrational. 
Second, if I change my belief about what is entailed by a particular commitment.
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For example, I commitment myself to defending my honour in a duel. Then, I have an
epiphany: “If I win the duel I will be murdering someone! Murdering is a bad thing to do!”
Based on this  epiphany,  I  realize my end is  entails  a second end which I  was already
committed  to  rejecting,  viz.,  murder.  I  now  must  rescind  one  of  these  commitments.
Following John Broome's  discussion  of  wide-scope rationality  (Broome 2007),  either  I
have have to give up the intention or have to give up the belief about the action.
Third, one might realize that they have not done enough to really bring about the
end which  they have  committed  themselves  to.  This  is  to  run  afoul  of  the  'means-end
coherence' constraint. However, it seems open to an agent to rescind the commitment in
order  to  maintain  their  rationality.  We  might  realize  that  the  cost  of  maintaining  the
commitment has become too high for us to bother continuing to commit ourselves to the
end. I might intend to go for a walk tomorrow so I make a commitment to myself to go for
a walk in the morning. However, I slept in too late, have a lot of work still to accomplish
and it is raining out. It seems reasonable to just rescind the commitment to go for a walk
today.  If  someone  continues  to  do  such  things  they  may  never  accomplish  anything.
However, there seems nothing said so far which would make one locally irrational about
periodically rescinding a commitment.
Finally, there seems to be no principle reason why someone could not change one's
mind. Why would there be? Yes, it might be costly for a person to rescind a commitment
but surely that is the prerogative of a free agent. If after stepping back from and reflecting
on  one's  commitments,  surely  the  agent  can  decide  not  to  maintain  this  particular
commitment any longer. This would be the case with an 'I' which made a commitment at t1
but no longer sees the point in pursuing the commitment at t2. Since the past 'I' is in the past
it is hard to see how such a change of heart by the 'I' t2 at could be contested by the past 'I'.
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Perhaps there needs to be something that motivates the change of heart but this does not
have to be because of either of the constraints on rational action. There also maybe more
'fundamental' commitments that are more resistant to changing but this surely will not be
the case for most or even all of our commitments and intentions. 
In all these cases we have no reason to regret the rescinding of the commitment (this
does  not  mean  we will  not  have  some feeling  of  regret,  rather,  it  means  we have  no
normative reason to regret) except perhaps the third case but it is by no means obvious that
in  every case we should.  In order  for  rescinding these commitments in  this  way to be
irrational,  we  would  need  to  give  an  independent  account  of  why  rescinding  any
commitment is irrational. 
Now the point of going through these reason one can rescind a commitment is that
even when a commitment is rescinded by an individual agent it does not render that agent
ineffective. The agent carries on, fulfilling other commitments. As we will see, this is not so
in the case of shared agents. The instability is a much greater problem for shared agents
then it is from individual agents. With this in mind, let us turn to case of two individuals in
an I-Thou relationship and the creation of modest sociality.
The idea of the persistence interdependence is to account for why the intentions of
each participant in a shared action continues intending that 'we φ' and how they mutually
reinforce each other in so intending. To see how this works it will help to have an example
in front of us. I will use a recent example from Margaret Gilbert and discussed by Bratman
(Gilbert 2014, Ch. 5; Bratman 2014, pp.116-117). To put the example in Bratman's terms:
1. (a) Ned intends that we hike to the top of the hill (b) Oliver intends that we hike to
the top of the hill.
2. Ned intends that we hike to the top of the hill in accordance and because of 1a, 1b,
and meshing subplans of 1a and 1b; Oliver intends that we hike to the top of the hill
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in accordance with and because of 1a, 1b and meshing subpans of 1a and 1b.
3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between them.
Now obviously there might be all sorts of important subplans to be settled by Ned and
Oliver. We can assume that this all gets worked out between them. However, what will
happen if Ned changes his mind? According to Bratman's own account, the shared intention
no longer exists:
[O]nce Ned has changed his mind they no longer have a shared intention to climb to
the top, one that is set to explain their climbing to the top. After all, at that point Ned
no longer intends to climb to the top,  or that they together climb to the top, and
instead fully intends  not to climb to the top; and what is now going to need to be
explained is not their climbing to the top, but rather their failure to climb to the top
(Bratman 2014 p. 117).
This makes any shared intention to be contingent on each individual’s continuing to share
the content of the intention. So long as all the participants of the shared intention maintain
their commitment to that content, in this case hiking up the hill, the shared intention exists.
However,  once  one  individual  stops  sharing  the  content  of  the  intention,  the  shared
intention is fundamentally changed and might cease to exist at all. This is because “shared
intention need not ensure mutual obligations” (Bratman 1999b, p. 134). 
Bratman, however, thinks that even though shared intentions are contingent on each
individual maintaining their individual intentions that 'we φ', that there is reason to think
that this is strong enough. This is because each person's intentions, Ned's and Oliver's, give
each other “mutual rational support” (Bratman 2014, p. 70). 
This rational support comes in three potential forms: desirability-based, feasibility-
based  and  obligation-based  interdependence.  However,  this  last  form  of  persistence
interdependence is drawn from outside of the structure of shared intentions, for example, in
the form of making promises (ibid., p. 72). We will return to this last form in a moment. For
now, we will focus on the first two forms.
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The first two types of persistence interdependence are quite straight forward. For
desirability-based  interdependence,  Ned  and  Oliver  both  judge  that  it  is  desirable  to
continue to intend to hike up the hill as long as the other continues to so intend but if either
stops intending to hike up the hill the other would no longer find it desirable to so intend
(ibid., p. 70). They only want to hike up the hill if the other also wants to hike up the hill.
Feasibility-based interdependence is structurally similar (ibid, pp. 71-72). However,
opposed to only finding it desirable to continuing to intend if the other continues to intend,
Oliver sees Ned's intention to hike up the hill as what makes his hiking up the hill feasible.
Perhaps Ned is the only available person to drive Oliver to the hill. If Ned no longer intends
to hike up the hill, it might no longer be possible for Oliver to get to the hill. Likewise,
Oliver is the only of the two who knows where the hill is, if Oliver changes his mind then
Ned will no longer find it feasible to hike up the hill because he will not know how to get to
it.
If this account is going to be able to account for larger, more stable institutions then
these two types of persistent conditions seem to be inadequate. For example, the types of
institutions that characterise the modern state or universities or workplaces etc which are
the type of institutions which have authority relationships embedded within them, seem to
need something like obligation-based persistence conditions. 
Bratman at this points turns to Scanlon's 'Principle F' which says “If A provides B
assurance that she will do x, in the absence of a special justification, A must do x unless B
consents to x's not being done” (Hindriks 2013, p. 476; cf.  Bratman 1999b, Ch. 7 and
Scanlon 2003). However, we can ask, 'who are we obligated to'? If the obligation is only to
ourselves,  it  looks like the other  party really has  no reason to hold us accountable for
changing our minds.
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What is wrong with Scanlon's 'Principle F' and why doesn't it create stability which
we are looking for in larger groups and institutions? First, we can ask why expectations
have  any  normative  force  on  its  own.  We  typically  do  not  attach  normative  force  to
expectations to the behaviour of things that are not human. Furthermore, there are many
cases in which we have a positive evaluation of someone's actions precisely when they do
not conform to our expectations. Expectations as such do not seem to have any normative
force. Now Scanlon would be quick to point out that 'Principle F' only gives  pro tanto
reasons to conform to expectations. So it might be that in the cases just mentioned that we
have over-riding reasons to look past exceptions.
Another reason to have doubts about the principle would be that the normative force
that  we find in  institutions  is  not  about  what  we are obligated  to  do individually.  The
obligations are directed obligations rather than obligations of how one ought to act. In this
way, they are not individual obligations. As Gilbert puts it:
Let  us  assume  that  a  given  promisor  will  have  an  obligation  –  indeed,  a  moral
obligation – that derives from Scanlon's Principle F. It is not at all obvious that this
obligation corresponds to a right of the promisee against the promisor to performance
of the promise. In order for it to do so, it will have to be not just an obligation, but an
obligation towards the promisee, an obligation that is the other side of the coin from
the promisee's right against the promisor to performance. An obligation […] is not, or
not necessarily, a directed obligation. (Gilbert 2014, pp. 278-279)
If our target is to understand authority, this type of obligation will not do. As we have seen,
the question of standing needs to be answered with a relational, directed obligation. The
authority  needs  to  be  able  to  hold  the  addressee  accountable.  Thus  far,  Bratman's
persistence conditions, even his obligation-based condition, does not seem to bring about
the type of bond necessary to make sense of authority or the institutions which they are
embedded.
This is the instability that is at the heart of acting together when conceived solely in
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terms of an 'I-thou' account. We might want to invoke something like Scanlon's 'Principle F'
in order to overcome this instability. However, it does not seem that this principle can do
the required work. In the case of individual commitments both individuals have individual
intentions with the content of some end in which the other is a necessary component, to be
sure. Further, they might have deeply held (and accurate) expectations of what the others
commitments are and how they will act. However, in the case of acting together, there is a
need for both parties to be united in their commitment in a different way than is necessary
for cases of expectations. 
3. Normative Construction of Agency, Practical Identity and the Bindingness 
of Commitments
So far we have looked at Bratman's theory of planning agency and seen that nothing
in synchronic norms of rationality impose a strong form of bindingness on agents. That is,
as  far  as  Bratman's  theory  is  concerned,  no  irrationality  in  changing  one's  individual
intention to φ. However, this is not to say that there is not a bindingness of individual
intentions and commitments.  Bratman does have a further strategy which he develops in
order to secure the stability of intentions over time. 
What  Bratman is  trying to  deal  with in  his  account  of  the diachronic aspect  of
agency  is  how  to  answer  two  questions.  First,  the  problem  of  subjective  normative
authority. This is about the relation between desiring or having a pro-attituted towards some
end and taking oneself to have a normative reason to pursue that end (Bratman 2007, pp.
90-91). Reflective distance is one way this space can open up. When we step-back from our
desires we are able to deliberate about the normative reasons for and against pursuing some
desired end. The deliberation takes the form of 'should I endorse this desire?'. Second, the
problem of agential authority. This is about how to make sense of the difference between
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cases of motivated action, i.e., a desire has lead to an action, and cases of action which were
governed or determined by the agent (ibid. pp. 92-93).
Bratman's answer to these two questions is through his planning theory of action.
That is, agents commit themselves to prior, future directed plans. These plans, according to
Bratman, have a certain from of stability in that “there is, normally, rational pressure not to
reconsider and/or abandon a prior plan” (ibid.,  p. 26). Initially in  Intention,  Plans, and
Practical Reason  Bratman develops some ideas about the diachronic stability of agency
over  time (Bratman 1999a,  Ch.  5-6).  This  is  what  Bratman in  his  later  work calls  the
'intention stability strategy' (Bratman 2007, p. 264). These ideas revolved largely around
the  reconsideration  of  plans.  Stability,  Bratman  argued,  was  achieved  because
reconsideration  is  both  costly  and  risks  undermining  coordination.  Furthermore,  the
deliberative resources exerted when one reconsiders a plan can reduce the effectiveness of
temporally extended and limited agents.
Of course, Bratman does not want to say that reconsideration of plans is generally
irrational (Bratman 2012, p. 79; cf. Bratman 2007, p. 26). There are many cases in which it
is  perfectly  rational  to  reconsider  one's  plans.  For  example,  one  might  acquire  new
information that undermines one's earlier plans or one might recognize that the formation of
one's earlier plan was flawed in some way (ibid.).
These general consideration leads Bratman to introduce the following diachronic
rationality constraint: 
The  following  is  locally  irrational:  Intending  at  t1 to  X  at  t2;  throughout  t1-t2
confidently taking one's relevant grounds adequately to support this very intention;
and yet at t2 newly abandoning this intention to X at t2 (ibid.).
 
The idea being that unless there is some reason to reconsider one's intention at a later time,
one is rationally constrained not to reconsider one's prior intention. That is, if one does not
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acquire  new information  or  recognize  some flaw that  grounds  the  prior  intention,  one
should remained committed to one's plans. 
However, as Bratman recognises, this is a fairly minimal constraint (ibid., p. 80).
The constraint is relaxed enough that one can change one's mind simply because it “would
be a nice change of pace” (ibid.). This hardly seems like much of a constraint at all. If
something as minimal as it would be nice for a change is enough to maintain rationality
when changing one's mind then it is unclear when, if ever, one would run afoul of such a
constraint. Furthermore, much of the time when we change our minds there are reasons to
do so. For example, if I am tired, is that enough reason to reconsider an earlier plan? If so,
there does not seem to be much binding one to one's prior intention. 
Bratman has a further response to attempt to deal with his bindingness problem.
This is what he calls the 'agential authority strategy' (Bratman 2007, p. 265). This strategy
revolves around anchoring the stability of intentions in the agent's point of view. The idea
being that the agent can gain reflective distance from a current desire and decide not to
endorse such a desire.  Since this  endorsed desire is  endorsed by the agent of having a
certain value, according to Bratman, it becomes a general policy that is embedded in the
point of view of the agent (ibid.,  pp. 271-275). The idea is that this general policy has
priority over  singular  intentions and desires of the agent  that crop up because it  is  the
general policy which structures the ongoing practical reasoning of the agent. The general
policy structures the ongoing practical reasoning of an agent because it is an intention about
“the weighting of pros and cons in one's motivationally effective practical reasoning” (ibid.,
p. 273).
The idea here is that if I have a general policy to walk to the office everyday rather
than take the bus then as I practically reason about how to get to the office today I will give
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more weight to walking than taking the bus. This is true even if today I feel like walking.
The general policy, according to Bratman, gives more weight to the plan of walking than
taking the bus which should outweigh my current desire to take the bus. However, again,
why should could I not just decide to change my general policy? It is unclear what gives the
general policy can not just be changed as particular intentions can be as well.
The final point Bratman makes about stability of intentions is to look at the stability
within intentions themselves. He argues that when we form an intention to φ that we must
conform to the 'no-regret condition' (Bratman 1999b, p. 79). The 'no-regret condition' says
roughly that if we were to stick with our intention to φ in the future we will be glad and if
we do not we will regret that we did not. As he notes, “this no-regret condition includes
both the absence of regret at having followed through and the presence of regret if one did
not follow through” (ibid., p. 79n37). However, if one has a reason to change one's mind,
why should one feel regret? They may regret changing their mind but that seems to be a
contingent issue about a particular person's physiological make-up. It is not obvious why
one should regret changing one's mind.
The issue seems to be with Bratman's psychologism about commitments. Following
Jonathan Dancy, “[p]sychologism is a view about motivation; it is the claim that the reasons
for which we act are psychological states of ourselves” (Dancy 2000, p. 99). One point in
which Bratman makes his psychologism explicit is in the following remark: “we need to
know whether this phenomenon of agent (or, self-) determination consists in some, perhaps
complex, causal structure involving events, states, and processes of a sort we might appeal
to within a broadly naturalistic psychology” (Bratman 2007, pp. 91-92; cf. pp. 28-32, 99-
100,  262).  If,  as  I  have  argued,  the  stability  of  commitments  cannot  be  convincingly
achieved through Bratman's account of agency, we will need to look for another model.
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The competing model of agency we will look at is the one the Christine Korsgaard
has developed. This “normative constitutionalist” model of agency (Korsgaard 2014) has a
more promising answer to the stability question, or so I will argue. This strategy focuses
primarily on the question of agential authority but gives a different and more compelling
answer than that of Bratman's in that it does not rely on a pyschologistic understanding of
commitments but rather a normative understanding.
Korsgaard aligns this model with four of the most important names in the history of
philosophy: Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, and Kant, as well as with the contemporary work of
Margaret Gilbert. I think we can add others that might fit broadly into the Kantian tradition,
such as Hegel's practical philosophy (Hegel 2008; cf. Pippin 2008, especially Ch. 3) and
Robert Brandom's understanding of the norms of practical inference (Brandom 1998 Ch. 4,
Brandom 2000 Ch. 2, Brandom 2009 Ch. 2-3, Brandom 2013).
According to the normative constitutionalist view of agency, the agents’ ability to
create  laws  or  norms  for  herself  transforms  mere  activity  into  the  robust  action  of  an
autonomous agent. In a rough characterization of this view of agents, Korsgaard tells us: 
These philosophers suppose that the kind of unity that is essential to the notion of
agency is something that must be normatively constituted, that is, something that is
achieved by conformity to certain norms. (Korsgaard 2014, p. 192)
Importantly, the norms which must be conformed to for the unity to be achieved are the
norms created by the agent.
The theory contains the idea that there is a normative relationship between the 'parts'
of the agent, i.e., the multiplicity of desires that tend to pull agents in multiple directions.
One part of the agent speaks for the whole in the sense that it imposes/creates the norms
which  unify  the  parts.  This  is  how  Korsgaard  understands  the  agential  authority  of
imposing norms. However, we can not step back from our desires and choose to endorse
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them from a view from nowhere, Korsgaard claims. Rather, we must reflect on our desires
and impose norms from a conception of oneself, from a practical identity “under which you
find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking" (Korsgaard
1996a p. 101). However, for Korsgaard, agents typically have several practical identities
which, she claims, are all grounded in the fundamental identity of as human. We can leave
aside this grounding project of Korsgaard's. What will be important for us here is how
practical  identities  bring  stability  and  unity  to  an  agent  in  a  stronger  form  than  was
available in Bratman's planning theory.
Notice, however, the similarity to Bratman's account, particularly his claims about
general policies and the weighing up of pros and cons in ongoing deliberation. There is a
similar move here on Korsgaard's part. However, there are some fundamental difference.
Namely, for Korsgaard a practical identity is a much deeper phenomenon that a general
policy. As Bratman describes it, a general policy seems to be just about particular types of
activities, how many glasses of wine, for example. Korsgaard's practical identities are about
being a certain type of person and the integrity inherent in one's identity. To understand
why this is, we need to look more closely at Korsgaard's account.
Korsgaard has helpfully pointed to Plato's tripartite distinction in the soul so as to
highlight this relation: Reason is the head of a man, Appetite a multi-headed monster, and
High-Spiritedness comes in the shape of a lion head (Plato 1997c, 588c-e; Korsgaard 2009
Ch.  6-7  and  Korsgaard  2008,  Ch.  3.2).  Alternatively,  we  might  think  of  the  alternate
metaphor Plato uses in the  Phaedrus,  in which the charioteer (Reason) holds the reins of
two horses, one of a noble breed (Spirit), and one of an ignoble breed (Appetite).
Plato's metaphor of the multi-headed beast seems particularly apt for the idea of
appetite. Appetite can be fruitfully understood as equivalent to Kant's  inclinations, which
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are “[h]abitual sensible desire[s]” (Kant 2007, 7:251) or “[t]he dependence of the faculty of
desire upon feelings is called inclination, and this accordingly always indicates a  need”
(Kant 1996b, 4:413note).  Desire and appetite pull  us in multiple directions. Most of us
have, at least at times, felt as if we are being torn apart by different and conflicting desires
we want to fulfil: 'Should I be a lawyer or a philosopher?' What is needed for agency on
this view, then, is a way to bring the disunity or diversity driving the potential agents in
multiple directions together into a unity. This is necessary in order to legitimately attribute
an action to an agent.  If any inclination wins through its will-to-power, the inclination,
rather  than the  agent,  is  in  control.  Furthermore,  it  is  the norms which hold  the agent
together that are the reasons that the agent has and are therefore the reasons that the agent is
accountable for. This is why people need the unifying power of a rational will, to which we
will now turn.
 Our Reason – our will – allows us to have a practical identity due to Reason’s
nature as the legislator that gives direction to the appetite through rational commitments.
Reason is identified as the part of the soul that has the standing to speak for the whole.
Whether  we  account  for  these  in  terms  of  some  sort  of  'second-order  volition'  or  as
'reasons', we will see that this is how we can make sense, not only of the person acting but
also how this connects with the idea of accountability.  We can see this as connected to
willing in the Kantian sense: 
duty is the necessity of an action from respect for the law […] Now, an action from
duty is to separate off entirely the influence of inclination, and with it every object of
the will; thus nothing remains for the will that could determine it except, objectively,
the law and, subjectively, pure respect for this practical law, and hence the maxim of
complying with such a law, even if it infringes on all my inclinations (Kant 1996b,
4:400 – 4:401). 
How should we think about the legislative power of the will? The will must be thought
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about  in  procedural  terms  so  as  to  avoid  the  problem of  disunity.  If  we  are  to  give
substantive ends to our will – that is, if the will must be subordinated to the inclinations –
the will is not autonomous. The will would be dictated by something outside of itself and
the agent would no longer be able to say that it has given itself its own laws or norms (Kant
1996b, 4:441). This does not mean that inclinations are not important for agents. Rather,
they serve as in-puts into our practical reasoning, in-puts that we must endorse (or not)
through the process of reasoning itself – they ought not determine what a good outcome of
the reasoning must be. This is achieved through reflective distance.
Consider  the  way  Korsgaard  describes  the  way  reflective  distance  effects  the
relationship  between  persons  and  the  norms  which  grip  them.  She  says  that  “Self
consciousness opens up a space between the incentive and the response, a space of what I
call reflective distance” (Korsgaard 2009, p. 116). What is at issue for us is no longer just
how to achieve our ends, to do this first than that, how to gobble up the objects of our
desire, but our very ends themselves – should this be done at all. This reflective distances
loosens the grip which desires have on us. John McDowell makes a similar point. He says, 
One difference reason would make is to bring the facts about what wolves need to
conceptual awareness, and so make them available to serve as rational considerations.
But  what  converts  what  animals  of  one's  species  need  into  potential  rational
considerations is precisely what enables a rational animal to step back and view those
considerations from a critical  standpoint.  So when they become potential  reasons,
their status as reasons is, by the same token, open to question […] Reason does not
just open our eyes to our nature, as members of the animal species we belong to; it
also enables and even obliges us to step back from it, in a way that puts its bearing on
our practical problems into question (McDowell 1998, p. 172 and §10)
In other words, due to our ability to step back from our desires, we put those very desires
into question. At this point we are unable to plan and carry out our actions. Action for a
person, is always a matter of accepting a norm of action for oneself. Making sense of our
actions and valuings. That is, we posit a norm for our own action and we are responsible to
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conform to those norms by recognising them. In this way, our actions are intelligible to
ourselves and to others. Valuings and desires, for Korsgaard, only become reasons when we
recognize them and endorse them as our reasons for action.
Let us look at an example of this process which will help in understanding what is
going on. We can use the modern hero who embodies such and is trapped by reflection,
Hamlet. His famous soliloquy in the first scene of Act Three ends with these lines:
Thus conscience does make cowards of us all;
And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,
And enterprises of great pith and moment
With this regard their currents turn awry,
And lose the name of action. (Shakespeare 1992, Act III Scene i)
In this soliloquy Hamlet is deliberating the question: “Whether 't is nobler" to endure the
rot that is Claudius “Or to take arms against a sea of troubles” (ibid.). However, thinking
too much has led him to contemplate failure. I take this to be a paradigmatic problem in
deliberating about what to do. 
Hamlet's,  as  well  as  our  own,  thinking  can  imagine  more  possibilities,  more
potential points of view that he could endorse than he could possible carry out the actions
which that would follow from endorsing them – should he take the standpoint of prudence
or of vengeance? When deliberating we are not only concerned with different conflicting
and in compatible ends to realise but also with the person we are to be and our integrity to
our identities. Each option puts different commitments into question; each option puts us
into a position in which we must abandon some other end we may value. Yet, the more we
think the more we cannot act. “We may say” to quote Theodore Adorno, “in general that
this discrepancy, this divergence of consciousness and action constitutes the central theme
of Hamlet” (Adorno 2001, p. 112; cf. Adorno 2006, p. 231f and Adorno 1973, p. 228). This
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is exactly what we might except if we take seriously the idea of reflective distance. We step
back and ask, are these rational ends to pursue, should I really value this? What accounts
for this inability to act, the loosing the name of action, once we gain the ability to step back
from our desires to deliberate about which ends should count as reasons for us? For Hamlet
it  is  his  deciding which hero to be,  for us it  is  deciding on which practical identity to
endorse.
Following Korsgaard,  I  think  the  answer  is  a  disunity of  the  soul  which  is  the
question of stability. We begin to split apart contemplating these different options, these
different  selves  we  could  become.  That  is,  how we  are  going  to  constitute  ourselves.
Obviously, Hamlet's problem is is more extreme than most. He seems to be going mad. The
point seems to be a question of whether this action is the type of action Hamlets want to
characterise  himself.  The literary critic  Harold Bloom captures  this  when,  as  he writes
about the end of the play, that Hamlet “does not die as a vicarious atonement for us, but
rather with the single anxiety of bearing a wounded name. Whether we ourselves expect
annihilation or resurrection, we are likely to end caring about our name” (Bloom 2001, p.
217).
We can be struck by key moments in our lives where we are uncertain not only of
what it is we are to do but who we are to become. When we encounter certain obstacle and
problematic situations we find ourselves forced to step-back and ask who we are. We do not
simply have doubts about our means to realise what we will but the ends in which we will
as well. Doubt arises as to whether it makes sense to be this type of person or not. The point
is  that  the question  of  who we are,  or  the  question of  self-constitution,  is  deeper  than
Bratman's content question about what kind of policy we should have about wine drinking.
Rather, what Korsgaard is pointing to is the identity, the character, of the one creating the
98
policy. Internal to this identity, stability is usually secured by integrity which is what is
challenged in these difficult  moments  of deliberation – to lose one's  identity is  to lose
oneself.
We are looking for a way to maintain the integrity of our will in difficult situations
which we confront. Constitutive of this integrity is asking what type of will we ought to
have. The rightness is about maintaining ourselves in the face of disunity. If we are trying
to decide between becoming a lawyer or philosopher we are trying to decide what type of
person to be, to figure out who we are, since we cannot be both or at least most of us cannot
be both.  As Korsgaard puts it “to will an end is not just to cause it, or even to allow an
impulse in me to operate as its cause, but, so to speak, to consciously pick up the reins, and
make  myself  the cause of the end” (Korsgaard 2008, p. 59). The anxiety about rightness
then is not outside of us; it is about making ourselves actual through our actions. This is the
circle of self-constitution. 
Hamlet begins in uncertainty. The conclusion of his deliberation is a commitment of
his will; it is him determining what his ends ought to be. What rule of action he is going to
lay down for himself. The conclusion of practical deliberation then is a commitment of the
will. It is deciding what to do, deciding upon a course of action. 
This is about putting constraints on our own action. When we treat a consideration
as a reason, we represent the world in a certain way by recognising those self-imposed
constraints. In this way, to treat those self-imposed constraints on our action as true is to act
in  a  way  that  respects  those  self-imposed  constraints.  When  we  impose  a  constraint
ourselves.
Conceptually tied up with the legislative activity of the will is an accountability to
conform to the norms given by Reason. Besides being necessary to maintain the unity of
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the agent, this second aspect is important as it is the success criterion of agency. Only when
an agent conforms to its self-willed norms is the agent successful. As Brandom has recently
noted: 
The  distinction  that  action  implies,  between  purpose  and  achievement  is  in  play
because these are the elements one must compare in order to assess success or failure.
And the unity essential to the concept of action – the fact that endorsing a purpose,
adopting it  as one's  own is committing oneself  to a norm according to which the
achievement ought to be what one intends – is just what sets the normative standard
for success. Disparity of purpose and achievement is failure (in accomplishing what
one  intended  to  accomplish);  identity  of  purpose  and  achievement  is  success  (in
accomplishing what one intended to accomplish) (Brandom 2013, p. 78).
The idea is that integrity of practical identities is more than just extra motivation of plans. It
brings with it a normative criterion of success. IF we fail to live up to the self-imposed
norms which we endorse from a particular identity, or standpoint, we ought to regret our
failure.  We ought  to  have  this  reactive  attitude  towards  ourselves.  In  this  way we are
accountable to ourselves for our failure to do as we willed, to do as one of our practical
identities gave us reason to act. This does not, of course, make it impossible to change our
minds, to change who we want to be. However, it does make us normatively responsible for
doing so and we ought to have the reactive attitude of regret for failing to live up to our
own norms.
4. Own-Action Condition and the Mineness of Intentions
Let us now turn to the second problem with Bratman's shared intention account. Its
violation of the own action condition. That is, it violates the condition that says that “it is
always true that the  subject  of an intention is the  intended agent of the intended action”
(Bratman  2014,  p.  13).  Bratman  himself  acknowledges  that  his  account  violates  this
condition but he goes on to reject such a condition (ibid.).  Before turning to Bratman's
rejection of the own-action condition,  let  us look at  why it  is  an intuitive condition to
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accept.
A good place to start is with Michael Oakeshott and something he writes in his last
and under appreciated 1975 work, On Human Conduct. He writes there that the “definitive
postulate  of  human  conduct”  is  “free  agency”  or  “self-determined  autonomous  human
beings” (Oakeshott 1975, pp. 234-235, 315 and Ch. I.II.2; cf. Friedman 1989). In other
words, free agents are autonomous in the sense that they have the capacity to decide on
which commitments to make and which projects to pursue. This type of autonomy does not
beg the question of authority in the direction of philosophical anarchism, contra R.P. Wolff
(Wolff  1970). We are not here dealing with political  or moral authority but rather with
personal  autonomy;  we are dealing with a  central  aspect  of  the metaphysics  of human
agency. 
Another way to put the idea is: only a particular type of minded being can be an
agent in a robust sense. “Let us say that a person is minded in a certain way, if he has the
perceptions of salience, routes of interest, feelings of naturalness in following a rule, etc.
that constitute being part of a certain form of life” (Lear 1982, p. 385 and Lear 1984, p.
229). A being can only be an agent in a robust sense if the agent can engage in practical
reasoning. Which only minded beings are able to do. Rather, minimally, for something to be
an agent there must be some reasoning about the means to its ends; something cannot be
determined otherwise what sense can be made of agency?
Now  it  should  be  clear  why practical  reason  is  important  here  –  at  least  in  a
minimum sense. The ability to make simple choices in a plan is a necessary condition to
attribute an action to something and hence for something to be an agent.
Consequently, the intention to do this (rather than that) must be that of the one who
is acting in order for it to be the one agent who brings about, to be the cause of, the end.
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Others seem to only be able to encourage or influence our actions. They cannot, however,
make up our minds, intend, or act for us. As Hans Bernhard Schmid writes, evidently with
Heidegger in mind: 
[j]ust as one cannot die the death of others, even though in some cases, one can die
for them, one cannot pursue the other's goals without making these goals one's own.
This is an essential fact about our intentionality (Schmid 2009, p. 124). 
This  dimension  of  intentional  agency  is  the  mineness  (Jemeinigkeit)  of  intentionality
(Heidegger 1962, p. 42). For your action to be your action and not being moved by some
external  force  you  must  be  the  one  picking  up  the  reins.  One  of  the  most  important
elements of this mineness is that it is what makes us accountable for the actions in which
we perform. We are accountable for our actions because they are our actions. They are the
actions which we decided to under take and make ourselves the efficient cause of. 
This fact has been pointed out by many in objection to Michael Bratman's theory of
joint action (Velleman 2000, p. 203; Schmid 2009, p. 124). The objection runs as follows: if
we conceptualized joint intentions as 'I intend that we φ', then each person who is part of
the joint action must intend the other's φ-ing. However, how can it be that one person can
settle a practical question for another? It is not in one's power to intend the φ-ing of another.
Bratman responds that we do not need to accept the own-action condition because it
is  quite  normal  for  us  to  'intend  that' others  φ  which  is  different  from 'intending  to'
(Bratman 2014, p. 60). The idea seems to be that indeed the own-action condition does
attach to 'intending to'  but we often 'intend that'  others do things. For example,  parents
intend many things for their children:  that  they go to a good school,  that  they do their
homework, that they go to bed on time etc. Or a teacher might intend that her student are
prepared  for  the  seminar.  However,  this  seems  to  miss  the  point  of  the  own-action
condition. When we intend that our children or students do something, it does not seem that
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we  are  committing  them  to  anything.  Rather,  we  are  only  trying  to  influence  their
behaviour. We want them to take into account our desires for them in their own practical
reasoning. Our 'intentions that' they do something does not settle what they will be doing.
Only they can do that.
Another important aspect of the own-action condition, as Frederick Stoutland has
noted, is that “[t]he own-action condition is implicit in another constitutive condition: an
agent cannot intend to A if she is not prepared to take full responsibility for having done A
intentionally – even if doing A depended on the will of others (or on luck)” (Stoutland
2007, p. 241). The way that Bratman has interpreted this is that separating out the 'two
faces'  of  intentionality,  that  between  psychological  explanation  and  understanding  and
taking responsibility – to focus on the latter is to moralize the verb 'to intend' (Bratman
2014, pp. 62-63). Let us note two points about this move.
First, by making this move, Bratman shows that he is not entitled to any of the
bindingness that comes from practical identities and commitments of the will that we have
looked at in the previous section. This is important in that one might think that an appeal to
practical identities might lend enough bindingness to shared intentions to account for the
stability of institutions (Laden 2000). 
Second, it  is not entirely clear that being 'prepared to take full  responsibility'  is
necessarily a moralizing move. One possible way to understand Stoutland (although it is
unclear if he would accept this) would be to think of the responsibility in a de-moralized
way. What one is responsible for is the rationality of ones actions. In other words, one must
be prepared to take full responsibility for Bratman's own rationality conditions. When we
intend for others, it does not seem that we are prepared to take full responsibility for the
rationality  of  their  actions.  Rather,  we are  only concerned with  a  limited  part  of  their
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psychical economy, viz., what we intend for them to do. When we ourselves are acting, we
must be concerned and responsible for the whole psychical economy otherwise we would
be liable to run afoul of the consistency constraint on intentional action.
To turn back to the problem of authority, it does seem that this is what authorities
are trying to do when they give commands. They are intending and practically reasoning
for their addressees. We can see this in two respects. First, a command brings to an end the
deliberation of the addressees by giving them a new first-order reason for action and a pre-
emptive reason for not considering other reasons (see Chapter One §§4-5). Second, the
addressees are accountable for following the intentions of the authority (when the authority
is  legitimate).  If  they do not conform to the intentions of the authority,  they are doing
something wrong. They are accountable to the authority for their conformity. 
Therefore, it seems that we will need an account of authority which can account for
how authorities  can practically reason for  their  addressees  without  conflicting  with  the
own-action condition. 
5. Robust Sociality: Grounding Authority in Social Practice
To conclude this chapter and Part I, let us summarise. We now have two criteria
needed to establish the standing of authority. First, we need to be able to account for the
bindingness between the authority and the addressee. Our critique of Darwall's conception
of authority has opened up the way to see how to approach accountability and from there
how to begin to answer the question of standing. What we have learned by looking at the
inadequacy  of  Darwall's  account  is  that  starting  with  individual  commitments  of
autonomous individuals leads us directly into the problems of the particularity requirement.
It  is  unclear how we are to  determine who is  accountable to  whom if  the autonomous
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individual has the right to rescind her commitments when she chooses. Further, if we cash-
out the commitment that is apparently incurred when a commitment is formed, we find that
the obligation is not directed which is part of Darwall's point but it is unclear how he can
make such a point with the way his theory is structured. The obligation is not to the other
person but rather an obligation about which acts are acceptable.
The second criterion is the own-action condition. That is, we need an account which
can overcome the tension between the autonomy of individual agents and the necessity of
intentions being the intentions of the subject who is acting intentionally. It is not clear at all
that Darwall has any resources in his account to deal with this problem either. 
In order to avoid this fate, we should turn our investigation to institutions. This will
be  the  topic  of  Part  II.  There  I  will  argue  by  understanding  the  social  ontology  of
institutions we can fulfil both of these criteria. Furthermore, by understand institutions in
this way, it also allows us to answer both the question of standing (Chapter Five) and the
question of content (Chapter Six). Before turning to these questions, we will first need to
say  more  about  social  ontology is  and  how it  will  meet  the  two  criteria  for  standing
discussed in this chapter (Chapter Four).
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Part II: Governing Together: On the Social Ontology of
Authority
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Four: On the Bindingness of Social Ontology
Part I  has left  us with questions about how binding institutions are.  In order  to
answer this question, it will be helpful to step back and ask a prior one which John Searle
has posed: “What is the ontology, the mode of existence, of social institutions?” (Searle
2005, p.  1).  In this  chapter,  I  am going to  argue that  the way we need to  answer this
question  is  to  move  away  from  the  individualism  and  overcoming  the  'Cartesian
brainwashing' of contemporary theories (Schmid 2009 Ch. 2 and 9; Pettit). The way to do
this is to develop an adequate theory of institutions and collectives. It is in these social
relationships that authority emerges. What is typically missing from contemporary theories
of legitimacy, and what I want to suggest is the reason for the inadequacies found in them,
is  the  recognition  of  the  authorities  as  embedded in  larger  institutions.  Many classical
political  theorists  from Hobbes to  Rousseau and Hegel* have had some sort  of holistic
understanding of the state. As Christian List and Philip Pettit suggest, “as fascism took over
Europe, however, [holistic theories] also became associated with a totalitarian image of
society, and this may have led to its ultimate demise” (List and Pettit 2011, p.9; cf. Gilbert
1992,  p.  428).  Without  a  full  understanding  of the  social  ontology of institutions  it  is
difficult  to  see  why  institutions  should  not  be  thought  of  as  simply apparatus  of
coordination between monadic individuals. This is how aggregative democrats understand
the functioning of democracy,  for example.  It  is  hard to see how or why anyone must
necessarily volunteer to join and maintain a state apparatus which may not always serve her
narrow, or even wide, self-interest. The problem with individualistic accounts are obvious:
the authority of the state cannot necessarily be reduced to the preferences and benefits of
* Not to mention Marx 2000, Simmel 1910, Durkheim 2013, Dewey 1983 and 2008, Ch 3 and Mead 1962
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the individual. However, without a proper understanding of institutions is difficult to see an
alternative. 
The idea here has echoes of Rousseau’s remark that:  “[t]he commitments which
bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual, and their nature is
such that in fulfilling them one cannot work for others without also working for oneself”
(Rousseau 1997, p. 61). What we are going to need to determine in the following is how to
understand the relationship between individual agents and institutions. That is, we need to
provide an account of the social ontology which makes it intelligible as to why individual
agents are bound together in institutions. Understanding how individuals are bound together
will be the key to determine an answer to the question of standing and the question of
content. 
1. The Social Ontology of Institutions
A helpful place to start  is to follow Searle a bit further by making a distinction
between  something  being  ontologically  objective  and  something  being  ontologically
subjective.  The  rough  distinction  goes  as  follows.  What  is  ontologically  objective  is
anything that could exist independently of human minds: atoms, mountains, the sun etc.
Ontologically subjective, on the other hand, is anything that could only exist in virtue of the
activities  of  humans:  art,  buildings,  money.  This  distinction  is  the  basis  of  all  social
ontology. Everything that needs to be accounted for in terms of social ontology will be
ontologically subjective.  However,  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  everything that  is
ontologically subjective also requires a social ontology. We might think, for example, that
at least some things are ontologically subjective but not social phenomena. They might only
require one mind for their existence.  So they would be ontologically subjective but not
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social.  Perhaps some individual tastes or desires are not social in this way but still  are
ontologically subjective (however, I do not want to commit to a view on this particular
issue here).
It  should be obvious that  what  we are concerned with here is  the ontologically
subjective and the social. If there were no human beings there would be no institutions or
authorities  and,  presumably,  if  there  were  no  human  beings  needing  and  wanting  to
coordinate socially there would be no institutions or authority either. By definition, then,
the way to account for the mode of existence of institutions is to give a social ontological
account.
However, this distinction, although fundamental, is still not enough to get us to a
proper  social  ontology.  This  calls  for  a  further  distinction,  one  between  holism  and
individualism. It is important to be clear what is and what is not meant by holism. There is
one view of holism which is beyond the scope of the present discussion. That is the social
holism of Charles Taylor and Philip Pettit, among others (Taylor 1985, Ch. 7, Pettit 1993,
Ch 4, Pettit 2002). Their concern is with certain human capacities, for example, the ability
to  think,  have  language  or  be  self-conscious,  which  they  claim can  only  be  achieved
through interaction with others. Now clearly there would not be the human capacity to
think if there were no humans. However, these social holists make the stronger claim that in
order for one individual to, say, think it is necessary for that individual to interact with other
individuals.  They  are  making  a  claim  about  the  logical  impossibility  of  a  congenital
Robinson Crusoe to think or have language. 
The holism of the present discussion consists in a more modest claim. It is the claim
that  to  understand  collective  social  phenomena  we  cannot  appeal  only  to  the  actions,
beliefs, preferences etc. of individuals (Gilbert 2000, p. 155). Accounts that only appeal
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individual actions, beliefs, and preferences are individualist accounts of social ontology.
Bratman  and  Darwall  are  individualist  in  this  sense.  This  chapter  will  serve  as  an
introduction and a justification for a holistic account of social ontology. In chapters Five
and Six this account will be used as the basis for answers to our two questions for authority.
It is important to note the ontological distinction between individualism and holism
does not have any necessary consequences for a similar epistemic distinction (Searle 1995,
pp.  5-13;  Searle  1998  pp.  44-45;  Searle  2005,  §2;  Searle  2010,  pp.  17-18).  That  is,
something can be ontologically subjective and yet it does not necessarily follow this that it
is epistemically subjective. Institutional facts, while being ontologically subjective, are still
epistemically objective. The facts about institutions are, in some sense, independent of the
beliefs, desires and actions of individuals within an institution. This is something that needs
to be explained by an account of social ontology.
Yet, this gives rise to a puzzle. If institutions could only exist in virtue of activities
of human beings, then how can institutions still be epistemically objective in that the facts
about these institutions are independent of the individual beliefs, desires and actions of
those who make up the institutions? Are we not facing the spectre of a group-mind? That is,
are we not in danger of ascribing intentional states to a super-individual entity? The worry
here is that we typically think that “[o]nly individuals have minds and only minds can have
intentional  states”  (Hindriks  2003,  p.  217;  cf.  Schmid  2009,  Ch.  II.7).  Many may  be
troubled by such an ontological implication of holistic accounts. As we shall see, this is a
misguided worry as the leading accounts in the contemporary literature are all committed to
denying the existence of group-minds in any mysterious sense. This is because there is also
room for an 'acceptable ontological holism' (Gilbert 1992, p. 431), one in which there is no
super-individual  entity  over  and  above  individuals  but  only  individuals  who  construct
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social collectives. 
If we were to follow Bratman's thesis about shared intentions and where to build an
account of institutions from it then it seems that we could not make sense of this puzzle.
For Bratman, the institutional facts are indeed dependent on the individual intentions. As
we have seen, if participants in a shared action change their minds then the nature of the
shared intentions, for Bratman, by necessity must also change. The facts of an institution on
Bratman's account then must be dependent, perhaps in some complex way, on facts about
the particular mental states of members making up the institution.
Yet, institutions are not like this and Bratman's ambition to extend his account to
larger groups “with potential flux in the list of their members” (Bratman 2014, p. 8) betrays
this fact. Institutions as we normally understand them tend to have a stability about them
which is independent of the mental states of the 'list of their members'. It is this that lets us
say that even though institutions are ontologically subjective they are still epistemologically
objective. How do we make sense of this?
2. The Problem of Collectivity: The Necessity for a Social Ontology of 
Institutions
It is becoming generally recognised that there are forms of human collectivity that
cannot be understood by adding traits individuals together. There are clear cases in which
human collectives can be accounted for by mere addition. For example, there are human
collection  of  right  and  left  handed  people.  These  collections  all  depend  on  individual
attributes of the members that make them up. This 'adding' of traits is what has been called
a summative account  (Quinton 1975, p.  9,  17;cf.  Gilbert  1992,  p.  19).  We can see the
simple phenomenon in our daily lives. However there are several standard examples that
cannot be accounted for through a summative account: painting a house together, planning
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a  trip  together,  dancing  together  and  walking  together.  In  other  words,  in  order  to
understand any institution we need to understand what kind of collective these are and why
a summative account is in adequate.
The reason why a non-summative account is necessary to explain these phenomena
is that they present peculiar features which actions of individual agents do not present.
They  involve  many  agents  non-accidentally performing  an  action  together.  If  two
individuals  accidentally  perform an action  at  the  same time  they are  merely  acting  in
parallel.  There is  a 'togetherness'  or collectivity that would be missing and needs to be
accounted for making the performance non-accidental.
There  have  been two types  of  argument  given for  the  need to  move towards  a
holistic social ontology in order to understand the collectiveness of cooperative activities.
The first type of argument has been developed in response to issues in game theory and the
necessity to move to what has been called 'team reasoning'  in order to account for the
cooperation actually observed (Sugden 1993). However, since there is no commitment in
the  present  work  to  a  rational  choice  model  of  individual  agency  we  can  leave  this
argument aside.
The second type of argument is stronger and does not presuppose a rational choice
theoretic framework, viz., the conceptual argument given by Raimo Tuomela. He writes:
There is a conceptual and logical difference between saying that a) I have as my goal
that we together paint the house […] and that b) I have as my goal to participate in
our painting the house. However, for the “thick” notion of participation by jointly
intentionally acting together it holds on conceptual grounds that a) is true if and only
if  b)  is.  The  thick  notion  of  participation  entails  the  participants'  collective
commitment to the collective action in question (Tuomela 2000, p. 32).
The idea which Tuomela is getting at is that if our target phenomenon is of doing something
together,  then  we  have  to  conceptually  understand  what  it  means  to  participate  in  a
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collective or to do something together.
Take,  for  example,  two  musicians  playing  music.  There  are  (at  least)  three
descriptions of a scene where two musicians play in harmony. First,  the two musicians
could, perhaps implausibly, be unaware of each other and happen, because they picked the
same piece of music play in harmony. There is no collectivity here. 
Second, there is Weberian 'social action' or Bratman-type shared intention where the
two musicians know that the other musician is going to be playing music at the same time
and  they  each  intends  to  play  in  harmony.  Perhaps  they  are  able  to  coordinate  their
behaviour by following a certain convention. The convention might be: “always play along
with whatever the first player is already playing'. In this case, each orientates her behaviour
towards  what  the  other  is  doing;  the  musicians  then  have  reached  a  'coordination
equilibrium': neither “one would have been better off had any one agent acted otherwise”
(Lewis  2002,  p.  14).  Even  though  this  case  is  non-accidental  action  it  seems  more
appropriate to call it acting in parallel rather than acting together. There still seems to be
something missing, a 'togetherness'. 
It will take us a bit of work to get to the third description which will account for this
togetherness. One might suspect that a summative account maybe able to account for this
'togetherness'.  However,  if  we are  to  account  for  togetherness we must  be  aware  of  a
particular  problem  in  a  summative  account.  In  many  cases,  the  content  of  individual
intentions diverge. It is unclear how a summative account, which adds up the intentions of
individuals, can account for such divergence. As Searle as made the point:
There may be a difference between the content of an intention or a belief of a group
as a whole, and that of an individual member of that group. The claim is that the
difference in  content  reveals that  there is  a  genuine difference between collective
intentional states and individual intentional states (Searle 1990, p. 403). 
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To carry on with the musicians playing together, it maybe that the group intention (however
that  is  accounted for)  is  to play Debussy's  Petite  Suite.  However,  because this  piece is
written for four hands on the piano, each individual will have to play her own part; each
individual's  intentions will  be about playing this  particular  part.  Neither individual will
have as the content of her individual intention to play Debussy's Petite Suite.
However, this is still a case where the intentions combine in a neat way. We might
think that we can account for this type of collectivity in some complex summative account.
There are cases in which this cannot be done.
The  cases  I  have  in  mind  are  ones  that  meet  what  Margaret  Gilbert  calls  the
'disjunction  criterion'  (Gilbert  2014,  p.  102).  That  is,  when  two  individuals  form  a
collective, neither of the individuals need have an individual intention whose content is part
of the overall collective intention. “There can be a tension or even outright conflict between
what one intends or believes personally and the intention or belief  one has as a  group
member” (Gilbert  1996,  pp.  201-202).  The idea is  that  one or  even both of  our  piano
players  might  change  their  individual  intentions.  Neither  may  want  to  play  Debussy.
Perhaps  they  both,  individually  want  to  play  Dvořák's  Legends  but  neither  has
communicated this to the other. However, their actions will still be coordinated and they
can play Debussy together even though neither personally wants to play the Debussy piece.
What  keeps  them  acting  together  is  not  their  individual  intentions  but  the  further
phenomenon which we are trying to characterise.
Evidence for this being the case is to think about what would happen if one of our
musicians  started  to  play  the  Dvořák  piece  rather  than  the  Debussy  piece.  The  other
musician would rightly rebuke her. She might say something like “we were going to play
Debussy, why are you play Dvořák?” Or simply, “that is not what we were going to play!”
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If nothing else, there would certainly be a moment of surprise on the part of the second
musician as it was not the intention of the two musicians as a group to play Dvořák.
Or it might be that both of them play the Debussy part together and afterwards one
turns to the other and say, 'I really did not want to play that piece. Next time we should play
Dvořák's  Legends.” The other musician at this point might reply, “I feel the same way! I
had no intention to play Debussy but that was what we were planning on playing.” Again,
the point of these examples,  is  that the individual intentions of the musicians need not
match what the two of them, as a group, intend to do and yet the can both successfully play
the piece they intended to play. 
Also, any plausible account collectives and in particular institutions need to allow
for the possibility of radical misunderstanding (Gilbert 1992, Ch. IV §4.1(6)). For example,
a group of people may agree to write a letter of protest together. However, even though they
have agreed to write this letter together, they may not have realised that the content of their
objections  are  fundamentally different.  Yet,  for  the  time being,  they still  seem to be a
collective whose content is to write a protest letter together. While they have a common
understanding of what they want to do and accomplish, they do not have a consensus. As
Charles Taylor has remarked:
common meanings are quite other than consensus, for they can subsist with a high
degree of cleavage; this is what happens when common meaning comes to be lived
and understood differently by different groups in a society.  It  remains  a common
meaning,  because  there  is  the  reference  point  which  is  the  common  purpose,
aspiration,  celebration.  Such  is  for  example  the  American  Way,  or  freedom  as
understood  in  the  USA.  But  this  common  meaning  is  differently  articulated  by
different groups. This is the basis of the bitterest fights in a society, and this we are
also seeing in the USA today (Taylor 1985, p. 39; cf. Gilbert 1992, p. 213).
The way to make sense of this phenomenon, I will suggest, has to do with the ability of
individual members of a collective to rescind or change the commitments of the group
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unilaterally.
In other  words,  it  is  possible  that  because  there is  such a  cleavage in  common
meaning between our letter writers that some of them no longer wish to participate. Yet,
they are committed until they as a collective rescind the commitment to write the letter.
This is  a further  criterion of collectives and particularly important for institutions.  It  is
precisely this bindingness that is inherent in the formation of collective enterprises like
institutions.
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3. The Bindingness of Institutions
In order to see the connection between collectivity and bindingness, let us take up a
historical example from Kant's  Metaphysics of Morals. Kant worries about how it is that
one can make a contract with someone and at the same time maintain both individual's
autonomy. If both individuals are autonomous and have the right to their own means and
property, neither can take from the other. However, a transfer cannot rightfully take place if
one party gives up what properly belongs to them. This would be abandoning, not a proper
transfer. Rather, a transfer can only properly take place according to Kant: 
“through a common will by means of which the object is always under the control of
one or the other,  since as one gives up his share in this  common undertaking the
object becomes the other's through his acceptance of it” (Kant 1996c, 6:271). 
This unification, Kant conjectures, is symbolised in the shaking of hands (ibid. 6:272).
Kant gives a helpful example to clarify this point, viz. the act of promising. He tells
us that “what belongs to the promisor does not pass to the promisee (as acceptant) by the
separate will of either but only by the united will of both, and consequently only insofar as
both wills are declared  simultaneously” (ibid.). That is, when we make promises it is not
that one person makes a personal commitment and then waits for the other person to accept
the commitment. There is a gap here that must be filled. Rather, the obligations which come
about through a promise apply to both parties simultaneously. This will initially strike some
as counter-intuitive because we sometimes think that if I promise you something, you can
unilaterally relinquish the promise, that I can only be let out of the promise if you consent.
This is not, in fact, the case; at least, not in such a simplistic form. We can see this if we
look closely at how the institution of promising actually works. By doing so, we can also
see that Kant's point seems to bear out.
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If A promises to meet B to φ, neither A nor B have an obligation until both have an
obligation.  Let us take the promise to be meeting you tomorrow. If  A says to be B, “I
promise that I will meet you tomorrow at 2pm”, it is clear that  A is not obligated until  B
accepts. This is clear but is also what misleads many into thinking that promises can occur
between an 'I' and a 'thou' without the forming of a united will. However, think of what
actually  occurs.  Why is  it  that  B's  acknowledgement  of  A's  promise  puts  A under  an
obligation?  Does  A  commit  herself  and  then  feel  relieved  that  B accepts?  No.  The
commitment only occurs when both A and B come together as a single 'we'. This has further
implications. B also incurs obligations: the obligation to be at the appropriate place, at the
appropriate time. It seems clear that if A shows up at 2pm and B is nowhere to be found, A
will be justified in rebuking B. This seems to be not only because B has an important and
indispensable role in enabling A to fulfil the promise but because B is obligated to A as well.
Kant further elaborates what he has in mind in the Metaphysics of Morals, both with
the example of sexual relationship and marriage which he characterises as “a relation of
equality of possession, equality both in their possession of each other as persons […] and
also  equality  in  their  possession  of  material  goods”  (ibid.  6:278).  Here,  we  see  Kant
struggle to overcome the basic dilemma of authority. How is it that we are able to subject
our will to another if our will is autonomous? Kant's answer seems to be that, in order for
this to occur, there must be a union of wills, the creation of a 'we' where both 'I's retrieve
their autonomy by mutually, and reciprocally, giving themselves to the other. This works
because if I possess you and everything that comes with you, and vice versa, I also possess
myself because that is something which you possess. Kant's remarks on this issue are more
or less schematic but I think is generally on the right track. 
Later,  Hegel  took up  Kant's  main  idea  and was  able  to  expand  and deepen  it.
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Although Hegel thought “Kant presents marriage in a shameful, ugly manner” (quoted in
Williams 1998, p. 215), this seems to be a verbal dispute. Take, for example, the following
passage for the Phenomenology of Spirit: 
[T]his movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has
in this way been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action of
the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action
of the other as well. […] Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the
two self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does itself
what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as the
other does the same. Action by one side only would be useless because what is to
happen can only be brought about by both. Thus the action has a double significance
not only because it  is  directed against itself  as well  as against  the other,  but also
because it is indivisibly the action of one as well as the other (Hegel 1977, §182-183;
cf. Honneth 2012 Ch. 1).
Here, Hegel is making the point that the desire for recognition from another can only be
had through the unification of both individual self-consciousnesses into a 'we' – Hegel later
elaborates this point in the third part of  Philosophy of Right  as  Sittlichkeit  or 'ethical life'
where membership of a community is of fundamental importance.  Both acting together
jointly, parties maintain themselves as unique, autonomous individuals by both allowing the
other  to  be  through  self-imposing  constraints  on  their  own  freedom.  This  idea  is  too
complex to go into detail here (see Williams 1998, Pippin 2008, Brandom 2007). However,
the point is the same, though in a more general way, as Kant's observation on promises and
marriage that the possibility for their occurrence necessitates a double moment of the 'I' in
the 'we' and the 'we' in the 'I'. These two historical examples were not meant to convince.
Rather,  they  serve  as  models  of  how  to  overcome  the  dilemma  of  authority  by
understanding how individuals can be bound together as a united will and yet still maintain
their autonomy.
In the case of the 'we', if we are committed to some end then each individual, qua
group member, is responsible for doing their part in actualising the end and is accountable
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to the group for non-compliance, i.e. not doing their part. The group's prior intention, then,
constrains  the individual’s  future actions and reasoning.  The question of  authority then
becomes about  how roles  can be formed which give individual  members  the power to
determine the group’s commitments. In this way, authority is derived from the group itself –
it is properly our authority or the authority of us – and the ends to which it is committed,
not particular individuals over other individuals. This seems to be a natural way to think
about positions of authority, particularly when we find something problematic about the
individual  who  happens  to  be  in  a  particular  position  of  authority,  when  we,  in
Tocqueville’s phrase, respect “the office rather than the official” (Tocqueville 2003, p. 237).
If this is right then the problem of authority as set out above dissolves. That is, if we
can conceive of commands as commitments of a group which have been delegated to a
certain role, then the infringement on autonomy is no longer a problem and the legitimation
of the coercive force of  commands is  also answered.  The former problem is  answered
because the autonomy of the individual is preserved by being committed to the institution
in which authority is embedded. The commitment is still, in a sense, the commitment of
particular individuals, as we will see. It is not an individual or personal commitment of the
individual  but  another  type  of  commitment  which  the  individual  makes,  a  joint
commitment. The answer to the latter problem would run something like this: just as in the
individual case, one must remain true to one's commitments, i.e. to follow through with the
decisions one has made, so in the group case we must remain true to our commitments. Part
of the mechanism to achieve this is necessarily going to consist of having critical reactions
towards non-compliance in order to bring one's inclinations in-line with the desired goals
and ends. That is, if I fail in trying to reach my ends then I should be regretful or angry with
myself. In this way, I will hopefully have more of an incentive to achieve my aims next
120
time around or there will be inertia provided by my 'high spiritedness' or disposition. The
same holds true for the institutional case. If I do not fulfil my role within the institution
then I am open to rebuke, not only from myself qua member but also from other members. 
The kind of bindingness we are looking to understand is going to have to be more
than some associative accounts of obligation claim (which was first discussed in Chapter
One, Section 1). As was observed in the first chapter, the idea behind this type of account is
to establish similarity between the special relationship which holds between parents and
children and the special relationship between citizens and their state. The idea is that both
of these relationships give rise to obligations and duties; that membership in and of itself
entails obligations. Both Dworkin's and Horton's accounts, in different ways, attempt to
provide conditions to establish what membership means. 
For  example,  Dworkin  in  Law's  Empire  writes  about  the  connection  between
community and obligation in the following terms: 
the  members  of  a  group  must  by  and  large  hold  certain  attitudes  about  the
responsibilities they owe one another if these responsibilities are to count as genuine
fraternal obligations (Dworkin 1986, p. 199). 
For Dworkin, each individual needs to hold certain attitudes. It is from these attitudes that
each  individual  actually  understands  that  an  obligation  has  arisen.  This  becomes  more
apparent  when  Dworkin  lists  four  conditions  on  associate  obligations:  “regarding  the
group's obligations as special”; “accept personal responsibility”; “see these responsibilities
flowing from a more general responsibility each has of concern for the well-being of others
in the group”; “equal concern for all members.” (ibid. pp. 199-201).
However,  it  is  not  just  that  one holds these attitudes but  rather  that  if  one is  a
member of such a community, what Dworkin calls a 'true community', one must hold these
attitudes. In other words, if one is formally a member of a true community then one does
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have the obligations. It is type of community which only gives rise to genuine obligations. 
For  Horton,  membership  must  be  ‘acknowledged’.  This  acknowledgement  is
‘subjective’ in  the  sense  that  it  relates  to  a  more  or  less  explicit  self-understanding,
incorporating  moral  sentiments,  emotions  and attitudes”  (Horton  2007,  p.  12 emphasis
added). However, Horton makes a similar move to that of Dworkin when he claims that
associative  obligations  can  only  arise  from  “associations  that  can  have  value  for  its
members” (Horton 2010, p. 176). 
What both of these accounts hold in common is that the strength or the bindingness
of the association is not actually located in the association itself. The association part of
their accounts is an attempt to answer the particularity problem. However, in each case the
association itself is not what brings the bindingness of institutions, or communities, out.
First, there seem to be communities and then, if the community is judged to have value or
judged to be a true community, then and only then is there bindingness (cf. Knowles 2009,
p. 190).
If this is right, it seems unclear from instrumental accounts what the substantive
difference is between the source of obligation and the source of bindingness. That is, both
accounts seem to rely more on the importance of equal concern or having value for the
particular members. It is not clear what the binding work of associative obligations is when
rendered  in  this  way.  The  binding  work  seems  to  be  done  more  on  these  content-full
concerns about the associations rather than the associations themselves (cf. Simmons 2001,
79n35). 
For this reason, we should attempt to move away from this way of formulating the
idea of associate obligation and attempt to understand the bindingness of association and
the  bindingness  of  institutions  for  an  internal  point  of  view.  We  should  attempt  to
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understand, if possible, how being part of such an institution can on its own bind us to the
institution. As we will see in Chapter Six, this does not have the consequence that every
command within that institution is valid, which might be part of the problem that Dworkin
and Horton are trying to avoid, but first we need to make more sense of the bindingness of
institutions.
4. The Constitution of Social Practices: We-Mode Accounts and Subject 
Accounts
So far, we have been discussing social ontology and institutions at a rather high
level and showing why individualistic accounts are problematic. What we have found is
that  we  need  to  account  for  several  different  things  in  a  proper  understanding  of
institutions. First, we need to understand how it is possible that individuals’ attitudes can
differ from the facts about the social institution which they in some way help to constitute.
This is important because if  we fail  to account for this we either end up with a super-
individual group mind or some complex, but still inadequate, summative account. 
We also need an account that can make sense of the bindingness that seems to be
inherent in the formation of institutions. This is for two reasons. First, many people feel a
sense of belonging and obligation to the institutions to which they belong. However,  it
should be clear from this that we cannot look for a psychological account which is “a mere
matter of ‘feelings”’ (Hart 2012, p. 56) of belonging to a certain collective. Rather, what
these attitudes point to is a (potential) aspect of something deeper, viz. a social rule. What
we want to know is whether these feelings are an error or if they rest on a deeper social
rule. As H.L.A. Hart makes clear, “Such feelings are neither necessary nor sufficient for the
existence of ‘binding’ rules. There is no contradiction in saying that people accept certain
rules but experience no feelings of compulsion” (ibid.). What we are looking for is: what
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gives  an  institution  their  binding  power  which  accounts  for  the  standing  of  particular
authorities? We want to know whether this is an error on members’ parts or if their feelings
rest on deeper social rules of institutions. Second, as we saw with the examples of Kant and
Hegel, there is an important sense in which we are bound to each other in institutions which
give us roles to perform which, if we fail to do, we violate those to whom we are bound. 
Currently  in  the  literature  there  are  two  broad  alternatives  to  Bratman's
individualistic account of shared intentions.  First,  there are Searle's  and Tuomela's  'we-
mode'  accounts (Searle  1995 and 2010, Tuomela 2010 and 2013).  Although Searle  and
Tuomela differ on how they account for the 'we-mode', they both share the idea that proper
understanding of collective social phenomena is through the 'mode' of intentions. Where
their accounts differ is in how to account for 'we-mode' intentions. Searle claims that the
we-mode or we-intentions are  primitive natural phenomena (Searle  1995; Searle 2010).
Tuomela attempts to give a reductionist account of them to more basic intentions (Tuomela
2007; Tuomela 2013). The we-mode account postulates that there are two different modes
that individual subjects can have as an intention: the I-mode intention and the we-mode
intention. Notice the 'we-intention' is attributed properly to the individual mind: I we-intend
to φ. 
It seems, however, that the we-mode account is going to run into the same problems
as Bratman's content-based approach. There does not seem to be any clear way in which
there is any binding to be had in an individual with a we-mode intention. The reason why
we should be sceptical about such a we-mode account is that it is not clear why there is
bindingness on the individual to the group in these cases. What would stop someone from
either changing their we-mode intention to an I-mode intention? Or from simply rescinding
the intention all together? 
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A more promising account is the one purposed by Margaret Gilbert. Gilbert's theory
is a commitment account of collective phenomena. As she puts it:
I refer to populations as “collectives” when I conceive of them as genuinely collective
subjects of  intention,  action and so on.  I  take it  that  a  population is  a  genuinely
collective subject of intention if and only if, roughly, it can plausibly be regarded as
having an intention of its own, an intention, if you like, of the population as a whole
(Gilbert 2014, p. 236)
In this joint-commitment account of collectives, it is the 'we' of a group who commit as a
whole to believe or intend something. It is the 'us' as a collective who is the subject of the
intentional state. These plural subjects, or 'we's, are formed through what Gilbert calls ‘joint
commitments’. I think this is a promising account for understanding both the bindingness
of institutions as well as the way to overcome the own-action condition. We shall look at
this account and its applicability to the issue of authority in the final two chapters.
With these basics on social ontology now in place, we can turn to our main target: to
understand how authority is embedded in institutions and how this helps to provide answers
to  our  two  questions  for  authority.  It  is  time  now to  turn  back  to  these  questions  for
authority.
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Five: Social Ontology and the Question of Standing: The Owing Account
The  first  two  chapters  of  Part  I  left  us  with  two  questions  which  need  to  be
answered  to  determine  the  legitimacy  of  authorities:  the  question  of  content  and  the
question of standing. There is good reason to think that the question of standing should be
seen as  the  proper  place  to  start  when attempting  to  give  a  full  account  of  legitimate
authority.  This  is  because  it  is  a  necessary condition  of  authoritative  commands  to  be
possible at all. Without standing to give commands the question of content, the question of
'are these commands valid?'  seems to be irrelevant.  The command itself  does not even
'make it' to the addressee in the proper way. Without the proper background relationship in
place, the addressee is not accountable to the authority.  This then gives the question of
standing priority. We must determine how the relationship of authority to their addressees is
possible. If the argument from Chapter Three is right, then we cannot adequately address
the question of standing within an individual methodology. We need to turn to the holistic
account that was outlined in Chapter Four. That is, the plural subject account offered by
Margaret Gilbert.
The  claim  is  that  the  two  general  problems  with  establishing  standing  can  be
overcome  through  understanding  the  social  ontology  of  institutions.  Remember,  the
problems  were  how  it  is  possible  to  acknowledge  that  human  agents  are  necessarily
autonomous in the sense of both the own-action condition and how addressees are bound to
particular  authorities.  The  basis  of  both  of  these  problems  stem from a  conception  of
individuals as self-originating sources of valid claims. This is an intuitive idea of how to
understand the importance of individual persons. It is the basis of both of these problems in
the following way. First, it is the source of the own-action condition because for an agent to
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act  at  all  they must  be the ones  intending,  it  must  be their  self-originating claims that
underlie what they are doing. More important, however, is the bindingness condition. The
problem with accounting for bindingness is that, if an individual is a self-originating source
of valid claims, then why should they not be able to change their minds at will? What is to
stop them from leaving an institution when they decide that they no longer want to be a part
of it? That is, what is to stop them from rescinding commitment with no normative reason
for regret? If we cannot overcome these two general problems, then we have to face the
same issue as Darwall's account, viz. the problem of the would-be independent. 
In  the  following  I  argue  that,  to  overcome  these  two  general  problems,  it  is
important to look at authority at the right level. That is, it seems to me that these general
problems only arise if one assumes that the only conceivable level of understanding agents
and authority is at the individual level. The problem of authority is often posed as a matter
of how A can command B: how can one individual command another isolated individual?
This is precisely why it is troubling to think of commands in terms of the intention in the
name of another. It is unclear how or whether this is even possible. Another way we can put
this,  which  highlights  the implausibility,  is  to  ask:  'how can one practically reason for
another?' 
This  individualistic  model  of  the  social  ontology of  practical  authority  has  the
tendency to conceptualise authority relationships only between separate beings. However,
this  tendency  is  often  hidden  because  the  question  is  put  in  terms  of  how  states  (as
corporate  entities)  can  command  individual  citizens,  for  example.  Yet  the  logic  of  the
answer has it that the question is still  thought of in terms of individual  A  commanding
individual B.
This,  I  submit,  is  the  predominant  way  of  posing  the  problem  of  authority
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descending from the consent tradition. Under this conception, authority, when legitimate, is
typically seen as being transferred from one individual to another. You have authority over
me if, and only if, I consent to your authority. This is an attempt to overcome the problem
of 'mineness' of intentions and the own-action condition. Yet, as we have seen, this ends in
instability because of the inability to account for the bindingness of such transference. If
one can make a commitment to obey some authority, what stops them from having a change
of heart?
It does not seem to me, however, to be the problem of authority with which many
other  traditions  have  been  concerned.  Among  those  who  want  to  ask  the  question
differently  are  Hobbes,  Rousseau,  Kant  and  Hegel.  They seem more  interested  in  the
question  of  self-governance  in  the  first  person  plural:  how  do  we  govern  ourselves?
Although this  account  has conceptual obstacles of its  own, notice that  the problems of
'mineness' of intentions and bindingness are not among them. Rather, what authorities do is
settle  our  deliberative  questions  for  us:  the  subject  of  the  intention  is  the  same as  the
intended agent of the intentional action. In other words, A inhabits the role in this institution
to settle these deliberative questions for the institution as a whole in which B is a member.
It is important to notice how distinct a question this really is. In the individualistic
version,  we  face  the  problem  of  transferring  authority  to  overcome  the  problem  of
practically reasoning for another: How does one give up one's natural authority to another?
When does this transfer actually take place? Why are the individuals not entitled to change
their mind? 
In this  alternative,  holistic  model,  we do not have these problems.  This  way of
conceptualising the relationship of authority is one in which the authority is created or,
better, emerges between individuals when they unite in institutions. The concern for this
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model is: how are institutions formed which can give rise to the roles of authorities and
addressees?
The reason for the move to the holistic model can be put in a straightforward way: if
we accept the idea that as individual agents we can form commitments to pursue certain
ends then, if we form institutions, we can also legitimately form commitments to pursue
certain ends as a group – we can 'pick up the reins'  together.  How does this  solve our
problem? In order to be an autonomous agent, when I commit myself to an end then I am
responsible for actualising (or trying to actualise) that end as well as being accountable at
least to myself if I fail. In this way, my prior intentions constrain my future actions and
practical reasoning. In the holistic model, this autonomous agent is the plural subject of an
institution: we commit ourselves to an end and are responsible for actualisation of the said
end. 
1. Standing and Authority as Owing Relation
It is now time to turn to understanding the strong form of binding that is involved in
institutions. This will  allow us to understand how authorities can have standing to give
commands and hold their addressees accountable for conformity.
In the process, we will see that there is some truth in the consent tradition. There
does  indeed  seem  to  be  a  story  about  what  gives  someone  a  right  to  rule  and  why
individuals  are  committed  to  their  particular  institutions;  we  need  to  explain  why
individuals are bound to their institutions. However, opposed to the story of the transfer of
authority via consent, authority is constituted by the creation of institutions by us and the
obligation to defer is owed to the institution as an us.
Although we want to understand the authority in larger institutions like those found
129
in states, it is helpful to try to understand authority on a dyadic level first for the sake of
simplicity. Obviously, we then need an argument as to why this dyadic mode of authority
can be translated to macro-level, but this can wait until we have a better grasp on what is to
be translated.
How  should  we  understand  the  relationship  between  individuals  and  their
institutions? The best place to start  is  with a  proposal Margaret Gilbert  has made.  She
maintains that the appropriate standing to command can be at “least partially explicated” by
reference to the “owing relation” (Gilbert 2006b, p. 247). In her words, 
if X has the standing to command Y to do A, then, when X issues to Y the imperative
'Do A!' or does something that amounts to this, Y owes it to X to comply with this
imperative (ibid. p. 248; cf. Gilbert 2014, pp. 414-415) 
To use a simple example to illustrate: Bill owes Nathan a favour. If Nathan issues to Bill the
imperative “Pick me up from work today!” Bill owes it to Nathan to pick him up from
work. Furthermore, if  Bill  refuses, then Nathan is in a position to rebuke him for non-
compliance. Gilbert has suggested that this is not only a necessary condition for Nathan to
have standing over Bill but is also “at least close to a sufficient condition” (ibid.). This
seems plausible as a first approximation.
Notice,  however,  that  we  have  started  with  some  form  of  background  owing
relationship. In the simple case above, it was the background relationship of Bill owing
Nathan a favour. It is this background relationship which we need to explicate as it is the
foundation of authority. I argue that this background relationship is best understood as a
member of an institution. Being a member of an institution, in turn, is best understood in
terms of joint commitments. 
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2. The Social Ontology of Authority: Joint Commitment as Foundation
How then does this background relationship of standing characterised as an owing
relationship come about? I follow Gilbert in her answer: through the establishment of a
joint commitment. To understand this answer, we need to know what a joint commitment is
and how it is formed. Gilbert understands the term as:
A  joint  commitment…  is  a  commitment  of  two  or  more  parties.  It  is  not  a
combination of commitments, one of one party, one of another, and so on. Given their
joint commitment, each party has sufficient reason to act accordingly, just as one has
sufficient reason to act according to a personal decision one has made. As [Gilbert]
understand[s] the phrase, if one has sufficient reason to do something, then one is
rationally required to do it, all else being equal (Gilbert 2006a, p. 158, cf. Gilbert
2006b Ch. 7 and Gilbert 1996 Ch. 6) .
The first thing to see is how this diverges from the accounts of sociality we have so far
considered. First, unlike Bratman's individualistic account, this is clearly a holistic account.
Where Bratman's shared intention thesis focused on the individuals’ intentions and how
they  combine,  Gilbert  is  interested  in  understanding  the  jointness,  as  it  were,  of  the
commitment. Bratman argues that, in order to understand sociality, we should look at how
two (or more) individuals’ intentions 'that we φ' come together through meshing sub-plans.
The  structure  of  Gilbert's  account  is  fundamentally  different.  She  begins  by  trying  to
understand how we can commit to φ. There is no way, for Gilbert, to understand social
phenomena without referring to others.
However, there is also a major difference between the holistic accounts of Searle or
Tuomela's we-mode accounts. These we-mode accounts want to understand sociality via
each individual's 'we-intentions': I 'we-intend' to φ and you 'we-intend’ to φ. Rather, Gilbert
attempts  to  account  for  sociality  in  the  subject  of  the  intention,  not  the  mode  of  the
intention.  It  is  fundamentally  we,  jointly  committing  together,  to  φ  that  is  the  proper
foundation of sociality.
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Furthermore,  the  bindingness  which  we found  lacking  in  the  other  accounts  of
sociality which we have looked at is built directly into Gilbert's joint-commitment account.
Just as when individuals wish for or commit to a particular end, when we jointly commit to
an end there is sufficient reason to pursue that end.  Gilbert defines sufficient reason in a
standard sense that: 
X has sufficient reason for performing A if and only if a consideration C that speaks
in favour of X's doing A is such that, all else being equal, rationality requires that X
do A, given C (Gilbert 2006b, p. 29). 
It should be noted that reason here is used in a normative sense, not a motivating sense.
That is, 
X will act irrationally in not doing A if X believes he has sufficient reason to do A,
and that all else is equal, and yet does not do A (ibid. p. 29n7). 
That is, X has sufficient reason to φ in situation S if X is part of a joint commitment to φ in
situation S, all things being equal.  Why do these joint commitments bind us together and
obligate each to fulfil their respective roles?
In  her  essay entitled  “Obligation  and Joint  Commitment”,  Gilbert  lays  out  five
arguments for why a joint commitment carries with it obligations (Gilbert 2000, p. 54-58).
Although these arguments are distinct, they generally all come down to the same reason:
the “jointness of commitment” (ibid. 55; cf. Gilbert 2006b, p. 163). It is the “jointness” of a
commitment  that  is  of  the  utmost  importance  for  Gilbert.  This  means  that  a  joint
commitment is not the commitment of any of the individuals but rather the commitment of
the group itself – it is a 'plural subject' committed to act together as a single body.
The normativity we find here is the same kind of normativity implication of willing
we saw in Chapter Three, Section 3. In that section, we looked at how when individuals
step back from their desires and commit to certain ends, they are constituting their identity
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which brings a form of integrity with it. When we have a particular practical identity, we
have sufficient reason to pursue the ends which are entailed by that identity. The same is
true here. When a plural subject is created, it gives itself an identity to which all members
are bound and have sufficient reasons to purse the ends which are entailed by that identity.
However,  instead of this being an individual reason for action,  it  is  a social  reason for
action. It is a reason for all individuals as members of the institution to act.
We can see now why a joint commitment is strongly connected to obligation and,
further, to authority:
By virtue of being party to a joint commitment I owe my conformity to the other
parties in their capacity as parties. In this capacity, therefore, they all have a
special standing in relation to my conformity; they have a right against me to it,
and they will rightly take themselves to have the standing to demand it from me
and to rebuke me if it is not forthcoming (Gilbert 2006b, p. 161).
In other words, the members of a joint commitment have authority to make claims by virtue
of joining together. 
 To understand fully what this means, it is instructive to look closely at how a joint
commitment is formed. For this, we need an expression of readiness, i.e. an intention to
form a joint commitment as well as common knowledge of this readiness (Gilbert 2006b, p.
138-139). In other words, the expression of readiness needs to be 'out in the open' (ibid. p.
53; Gilbert 1992, pp. 191-197). The intention to join, for Gilbert, can be “at some possibly
quite low level of awareness” (ibid. p. 234) which can be characterised as a ‘pooling of the
wills.’ (Gilbert 1992 Ch. IV §3.7.iii; cf. Gilbert 1996 p. 186).*
We might worry at this point that an appeal to individual readiness to form a joint
commitment will be too individualist or too implausible for our needs. However, Gilbert
distinguishes between two types of will formation which help to alleviate this worry. The
* After  On Social  Facts,  Gilbert  uses  the phrase 'joint  commitment'  rather  than 'pooling of  wills',  not
because 'pooling of wills' is inappropriate but because she finds it “more helpful” (Gilbert 1996 p. 9)
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first type is what she calls an “intuitive” exercise of the will, characterised by making a
decision. For example, I decide since it is a warm day that I would like to go for a walk
with you. So I turn to you and say, “It is really warm out today. Will you go for a walk with
me?” You think for a moment and reply, “It is really warm out. A walk would be nice. Yes, I
will go for a walk with you.” This is obviously a stilted conversation and it is evident that
most 'pooling of the wills' does not take this form. Even if some do, it is surely not how
most of us find ourselves wrapped up in many of the institutions of which we are a part,
particularly the state.
Gilbert's  second  type  of  will  formation  is  more  helpful  in  this  context.  As  she
explains, 
[w]hile  a  personal  decision  may  be  characterized  as  an  act of  will,  a  personal
intention  may  be  characterized  rather  as  a  state  of  will,  or,  to  use  a  common
philosophical phrase, a conative state (Gilbert 2006b, p. 128) 
In other words,  intentions  form  without the active decision of the individual to form the
intention that we saw highlighted in the previous example. When an intention to φ is shared
by multiple individuals to whom this intention is common knowledge, a joint commitment
with obligation is formed, or as she sometimes puts it, in this case “a tacit understanding”
has  “emerged” (ibid.  p.  367). Unlike the  example used above,  the 'pooling  of  wills'  is
usually this more subtle matter.
The committing of oneself is analogous to what Wittgenstein meant when he said,
“they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life”
(Wittgenstein  2010,  §241).  These  joint  commitments  form the  background  agreements
which make intelligible the activities and behaviours of the institution.
One might worry that low level conative states, which are involved in the creation
of joint commitments, are not powerful enough to have the socialising effects necessary for
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the  maintenance  and  functioning  of  background  agreements  (Gilbert  2014,  Ch.  11).
However, the primary abilities to form such intention develop as early as infancy and the
socialising effect can be seen even in this pre-lingual age. For example, Michael Tomasello
reports that children as young as 14-months old can understand the background agreements
of group activity (Tomasello 2010, §4.1.4). The case Tomasello describes is as follows: an
infant (between 14- and 18-mouths old) and an adult are picking up toys and putting them
into a basket together. When the adult points to a target toy, the infant will pick up the toy
and put it in the basket. We can gloss the communicative act here as follows: “Pick up that
toy and put it in the basket.” However, when a second adult, who is not involved in the
group activity of picking up toys enters the room and points at a target toy, the infants do
not react in the same way, i.e. they did not put the toy in the basket. Tomasello presumes
this is “because the second adult had not shared the cleaning-up game as common ground
with  them”  (ibid.  p.  127).  In  other  words,  the  second  adult  did  not  have  the  request
relationship which is necessary for joint commitments – the infant did not feel committed
with the second adult to pick up toys. It was not intelligible to the infant that the second
adult wanted the same thing as the first.
This  example  demonstrates  two  things.  First,  the  construction  of  a  background
through constitutive joint commitments can be accomplished even by infants – they can
understand who is part of a group commitment and how the group commitment constitutes
the  meaning  of  future  behaviours.  Second,  and  correlated  to  the  first,  it  shows  how
constitutive commitments can create meaningful behaviour and different roles which each
individual of the commitment is meant to pursue.
We  can  now  make  more  sense  of  the  Wittgenstein  passage  quoted  above.
Constitutive commitments determine a group's identity – form of life – by making certain
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behaviours meaningful for the members of the group. Not only are they meaningful but
they demand certain other meaningful behaviours in response. It is in this way that these
commitments constitute a non-reducible 'we', a form of life. 
It  is no accident that institutions and language can be explicated in such similar
ways. As Peter Winch once remarked: 
[t]here are important formal analogies between language and other institutions; for to
act  in  context  of an institution is  always to  commit  oneself  in  some way for the
future: a notion for which the notion of being committed by what one says provides
an important parallel” (Winch 1972, p. 70; cf Searle 1995, p. 59, Searle 2010 Ch. 4
and Tomasello Ch. 5). 
Hegel made a similar point when he said that “we can see language as the existence of
Spirit. Language is self-consciousness existing for others...” (Hegel 1977, §652; Houlgate
2013, p. 169). That is, in language we become publicly committed with others in that we
must recognise ourselves and others as mutually committed to a shared public meaning. 
One  example  of  this  more  subtle  form  of  intention  being  formed  is  through
repetition.  You  and  I  can  become  jointly  committed  in  the  following  way:  after  the
departmental seminar, we decide to have a drink at the campus pub. Following the next
departmental seminar we both, without saying anything to each other, start walking to the
pub to have a drink. At this point we can be said to be part of a joint commitment to have
drinks together  at  the pub after  the departmental  seminar.  If,  after  a third departmental
seminar, I decide not to join you for drinks it seems reasonable that if I do not communicate
this intention to you for you to accept, you have the right to rebuke me with “Where were
you? We were supposed to go for drinks together.” In this case, we each owed it to the other
to  have  drinks  together;  we  were,  as  a  “plural  subject”,  committed  to  do  something
together. 
I have been claiming that this kind of account is foundational to our understanding
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of institutions. In other words, if this practice of having drinks after departmental seminars
carries on and involves, perhaps, an expanding and changing group, we might naturally call
it an institution. It would be an informal institution, to be sure, but an institution none the
less.  However,  I  am  not  committed  to  this  two-person,  ephemeral  group  being  an
institution. The claim is not that all plural subjects are institutions. Rather, I am claiming
that all institutions are plural subjects. The important difference between being a plural
subject and an institution is the permanence of the plural subject. 
Some  have  accused  Gilbert  of  'over-intellectualising'  the  notion  of  joint
commitment  and  criticised  her  insistence  that  individuals  must  understand  a  joint
commitment in order to be part of one (Baumann 2010, p. 15). They maintain that it is
“psychologically  implausible”  for  an  individual  to  understand  a  joint  commitment.
Presumably, the thought is that the conceptual work that goes into understanding plural
subjecthood and joint commitment is far too complicated for people to have intuitively.
This criticism misses the mark because Gilbert is clear about the idea that individuals do
not  need  to  understand  her  technical  treatment  of  joint  commitment  to  understand  the
phenomenon implicitly. This does not seem to be an extraordinary claim. It is a case of
‘knowing how’, rather than a case of ‘knowing that’ (Ryle 1945). Just as in Heidegger's
analysis  of  hammering  in  Being  and  Time,  a  hammer  does  not  need  to  be  known
theoretically for us to be able to manipulate it (Heidegger 1962, pp. 69ff; cf. Carman 2003,
p. 19n24). Joint commitments are something that is 'ready-to-hand' (zuhanden) and Gilbert
is giving us a theory on how to understand them. 
We can see this more clearly by looking at people's intuitive reactions to uses of
'we'. For example, if in line at the cinema a stranger were to turn to you and ask, “Should
we see a film?” you would not assume that the 'we' was meant to include you. Most likely,
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you would think that she is asking something like “Do you think it is a good idea if my
friend and I see a film?” – a weird question, perhaps. In fact, it would be quite odd if this
person was including you in this 'we'; at best, it would be what Gilbert calls an “initiatory”
use of 'we' – an attempt to create a plural subject with you (Gilbert 1992, p. 178).
Now take a slightly different situation. You and a good friend decide to go to the
cinema. Perhaps this is decided in the following dialogue: “Should we go to the cinema?”
“Sure, let's go!” Now in line at the cinema, your friend turns to you and asks the same
question as above, “What should we see?” In this situation, the 'we' clearly includes you.
You and your friend have decided to go to the cinema together. Conversely, it would be odd
if the friend turned to you and said, “I am going to see this film, what are you going to
see?” Surely, you would respond, “I thought we were seeing a film together!” 
Therefore,  I  take  it  that  Gilbert's  project  as  a  whole  is  a  promising  quasi-
transcendental proposal on how to make sense of institutions. She takes as a given that joint
commitments do occur and she is trying to map out the conditions for the possibility of this
phenomenon. By doing so, she thinks we can gain a better  understanding of the social
world. If this is the case, then the argument for being overly intellectual misses its mark; it
is not the phenomenon that is overly complex but rather it is the theory which is forced to
be complex in order to capture all the important aspects of the phenomena.
To understand the important use of the 'we' and plural subjects further, we need to
understand  plural  subjects  and  establish  their  particular  identities.  Plural  subjects  are
defined by and gain their identity from their constitutive commitments. For example, what
makes baseball an institution is the constitutive commitments that make it up: the rules and
roles of the game. If these rules and roles are not abided by then the activity, whatever it is,
is  not baseball.  A constitutive commitment,  as we have been seeing,  comes about only
138
when each party expresses readiness to commit. There can also be derived commitment.
These commitments can only occur when a plural subject is already formed. 
It is these derivative commitments in which authority in our everyday sense can first
be seen. That is to say, the individual who is appointed by the group to be in authority is
now owed obedience – this is akin to Hobbes's ‘Leviathan’.
An example is helpful. To use the paradigm case Gilbert often uses to illustrate joint
commitments, we look at the case of ‘walking together’: two individuals, Leo and I, both
express a readiness to walk back from a conference to a hotel together, either through a
verbal or non-verbal exchange. In this case, we are not individually committed to walk back
together  but  committed  together  to  walk  back  to  the  hotel.  Following  this  collective
commitment, neither of us is able to rescind the commitment without the other's agreement.
It is not that Leo is committed to go with me and I am committed to go with Leo, in the
sense that Leo can rescind his commitment if he gets tired or wants to do something else.
Rather, we are both committed as a body, or a 'plural subject', to walk back to the hotel
together – neither individual can change this unilaterally. Furthermore, if I begin to walk
faster than Leo, Leo is in a position to rebuke me for breaking the commitment  to walk
together and I may feel remorse, not for walking too fast but for breaking the commitment
– for not giving what was owed to the group.
In the case of walking together, a derivative commitment can be formed where Leo
is in authority. This can happen if, say, as we begin to walk I ask, “Which way is the hotel?”
and Leo tells me it is this way. At the next street, Leo then turns left and I follow. At this
point,  it  can  be  said  that  Leo  is  in  authority  when it  comes  to  decisions  about  which
direction to go. Leo now has the proper standing because I owe my deferral to him: we
have formed a derivative joint commitment to follow Leo's directions. 
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Now, of course, if Leo starts to go the wrong direction and I become aware of this, I
might have overriding reasons not to follow him. I might even object that he is going the
wrong way. However, as we see in the next chapter, it does not follow from this that the
reason from within the commitment completely vanishes. I am still committed to the group.
However, I have overriding reasons not to conform.
The owing relationship that is characteristic of a group's constitutive commitment
gives  each  member  a  directed  obligation.  Hence,  a  group  commitment  gives  each
member a sufficient reason to conform to the group’s commitment. Further, it gives each
member, qua member, the right to hold other members accountable. The members of the
group  then  are  “publicly  bound  (within  the  group)  to  maintain  and  satisfy  the
[constitutive commitments] and bear responsibility for these to matters, hence for the
group members'  acting correctly as group members” (Tuomela 2010, p. 16).* This is
where authority begins to emerge within a group commitment. If each member is bound
and responsible to the constitutive commitment, then there is a sense in which members
of  a  group  commitment  have  authority  over  the  other  members  of  the  group:  each
member  has  the  authority,  as  a  representative of  the  group,  to  hold  all  other  group
members to account for their conformity. It is, however, the constitutive commitments of
the group itself which are the grounds of these authoritative relationships. It might be
appropriate to call this a kind of “constitutional patriotism” (Habermas 1998 p. 500; cf.
Gilbert 2014, Ch. 16) in which all members qua members are bound to the constitutional
commitments. This is the internalising and socialising role that group membership plays
in our practical lives.
* Tuomela's original phrasing is in terms of 'ethos' of the group, which he defines as “the set of constitutive
goals, values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices, and/or traditions that give the group motiving reasons
for action.” My use of constitutive commitment as opposed to 'ethos' is merely terminological. 
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 Now we should turn to an object we put off at the beginning of this discussion
regarding the issue of large groups. A. John Simmons formulates this large group objection
by telling the famous story of the women of Königsberg setting their clocks to Kant passing
on his daily walks (Simmons 2001, pp. 76-77). Simmons rightly contends that the women
of  Königsberg  have  mere  reasonable  expectations,  not  entitlements,  in  regard  to  Kant
walking by at  the same time.  The mere fact  of  regularity is  not  enough.  A contrasting
example that Simmons proposes that would entail obligation and entitlements is one of a
group  of  friends  who  meet  every  Friday to  play  bridge.  He  further  contends  that  the
political “more closely resemble the indirect, impersonal relationship between Kant and the
housewives […] than they do the direct and personal relationship […] between the bridge-
playing friends” (ibid. p. 77). This is a significant objection if this understanding of joint
commitment is going to help account for state authority. However, if we remember that,
according to Gilbert, the only major requirement for a joint commitment is an intention to
be committed which is  common knowledge and that commitments form rather than  are
formed, we can get a sense of how this can occur with large groups.
According to Gilbert, all that needs to occur is that the inhabitants of an island start
to  refer  to  themselves  using  a  collective  ‘we’,  perhaps  in  a  newspaper  that  is  easily
available and read on the island. On more than one occasion she has pointed to Benedict
Anderson's classic work, Imagined Communities, as a potential explanation of how this 'we'
formation of large groups may come about (Gilbert 2000, p. 119n27 and Gilbert 2006b p.
272n43). 
Briefly,  Anderson  defines  an  imagined  community  in  the  following  way:  “It  is
imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image
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of their communion” (Anderson 2006, p. 6) and it is “a community, because, regardless of
the  actual  inequality  and  exploitation  that  may  prevail  in  each,  the  nation  is  always
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”. (ibid. p. 7). This (imagined) comradeship is
fostered by the print media (and now by electronic media) and a changed understanding of
time in which events are only connected by “calendrical coincidence” (ibid. p. 33) and are
brought together to create the imagined linkage. This new understanding of events has been
fostered by the print  media and the novel (Anderson 2006, p.  35; cf.  Benjamin 1999).
Whether this is sufficient for Gilbert's needs is too large a question to presume here, though
it does seem like a live and promising option. 
Furthermore,  “existing  members  may  establish  rules  that  determine  who  may
become a member” (Gilbert 1992, p. 233). In the case of our island, the initial forming
group then can establish a rule that states 'only people born on our island are citizens once
they reach the age of majority and are citizens by fiat.' A child growing up on this island
would surely learn of the group’s existence and that they are a part of it through standard
socialisation processes. 
Apart from this more practical issue of how there can be common knowledge of a
joint commitment within a large group, we must also remember that, according to Gilbert's
account, there is nothing that restricts coerced agreement, i.e. one can be coerced into being
part of a joint commitment. How can this be? In her article, “Agreements, Coercion, and
Obligation”,  she  criticises  two  arguments  against  coercive  agreement:  'the  Obligation
Argument' and 'the Voluntariness Argument'. 
The  first  argument,  'the  Obligation  Argument',  amounts  to  saying,  “A genuine
agreement cannot be made in the face of coercion” (Gilbert 1996, p. 283). The idea is that
agreements conceptually entail obligation. However, if one makes an agreement in the face
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of  coercion,  then  there  is  no  obligation  (ibid.  pp.  282-283;  cf.  Gilbert  2006b,  p.  77).
However, it does not seem that it is at all a “contradiction in terms” to talk about coerced
agreements (Gilbert  2006b, p.  78) -  “He forced me to agree” is  not a linguistic  oddity
(Gilbert 1996, p. 286).
The  second  argument,  'the  Voluntariness  Argument',  claims  that  agreements  by
definition  are  voluntary  and  coercion  does  not  allow  for  voluntariness.  According  to
Gilbert,  this  argument  exploits  an “ambiguity in  the notion of voluntariness” (ibid.;  cf.
Gilbert  2006b,  p.  78).  To help  clear  up  this  ambiguity,  she  introduces  the  idea  of  the
'decision-for' sense of voluntariness (ibid.). In her later work, this becomes the “intention”
sense (Gilbert 2006b, p. 78). That is, an agreement is not voluntary if there has not been a
decision in favour of the said agreement. For example, a person walks up to Bob Dylan and
asks, “Can I have your autograph?” and Dylan without much thought, because this is a
common occurrence for him, signs his name on the paper handed to him. If the paper was
actually a recording contract (and there was no prior understanding of this, i.e. this person
was a complete stranger) Dylan did not intend to sign a contract. He was duped. That is,
this situation is not voluntary in the decision-for sense. Now, coercive agreements, on the
other hand, are clearly voluntary in the decision-for sense – we know what we are doing
when we make a coerced agreement.
Nor is  it  plausible  to  suppose  that  everyone becomes so unnerved in  the face  of
coercion that they are incapable of making up their minds at all, that they are, so to
speak, rendered witless (Gilbert 1996, p. 287)
In both of these cases, if these arguments are correct, it appears that one can be coerced into
an agreement. 
In Darwall's discussion of Gilbert, he objects to the idea that there can be coerced
agreement. He does not argue from the standard presupposition of most theories of consent
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that  coerced  agreements  are  non-binding,  but  rather  the  second-personal  recognition
underlying any genuine agreement rules it out: 
the capacity of individuals  to  make agreements  and form plural  subjects  depends
upon their already presupposing one another's second-personal standing in seriously
addressing each other in the first place. So any resulting obligation depends both on
what they presuppose, namely, that they both have the requisite authority, and on their
addressing one another on terms that presuppose this. It is the terms of this standing
as  mutually  accountable  persons in  general  that  then  gives  them the  authority to
obligate themselves especially to one another through the terms of their agreement
(Darwall 2006, p. 202).
Thus, without presupposing the 'equal dignity' (ibid. p. 202n35) of each party, the reasons
to act are 'defeasible not just overridable' (ibid. p. 186n9). However, this seems premature
on Darwall's part. As Honneth has clearly shown via Sartre's encounter with Frantz Fanon,
there  can  be  social  situations  that  “distort  intersubjective  relationships  of  reciprocal
recognition” and which “represent interactive relations that demand from both sides the
simultaneous  denial  and  maintenance  of  relationships  of  mutual  recognition”  (Honneth
1995, p. 157). In other words, Darwall is overloading his notion of 'equal dignity'. 
It is possible, and this has occurred throughout history, that individuals convince
themselves of being inferior to others and to respect their own dignity is to respect them in
this way – think of an 'Uncle Tom'. This person would have an individual commitment, an
internalised ought (Gaus 2011,  §12), towards the other: “I ought to be...”. Paradigmatic
instances  of  such distorted  relationships  of  mutual  respect  are  colonialism,  racism and
sexism. From our contemporary perspective, it is clear that these relationships are distorted.
Hence, we find these type of relationships morally unjustifiable. We cannot understand the
reasons that  either  side of the asymmetrical  relationship give; they,  as it  were,  speak a
different moral language. However, from their own perspective, this was not entirely clear
to the participants themselves, even with the “quasi-necrotic” behaviour they manifested
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(Honneth 1995, p. 157). Darwall's criticism misses the mark because he confuses moral
justification with the bindingness of standing. As we will see in the next chapter, there is no
reason to think that joint commitments create moral obligations. All they seem to create is
the direction of obligations  between individuals  in institutions.  Furthermore,  he takes a
spectator's position outside the institution and looks for justification as such. However, this
is  something  that  can  only  be  done  given  our  knowledge  of  said  biases.  From  the
perspective of  the  participants,  these biases  remain hidden,  which is  what  makes  them
dangerous and distorting (Peter 2009, p. 135).
3. The Authority of Us
How can all  of  this  account  for  political  authority?  Now we should be  able  to
understand why all authority is located with the members of the group as a whole. When a
joint commitment is first formed, each member of the joint commitment is in authority in
that  “[e]ach,  as a member of the whole,  has the standing to demand compliance,  issue
rebukes for non-compliance, and the like” (Gilbert 2006b, p. 253). In other words, each
member  of  a  political  society  owes  the  community  as  a  whole  conformity  to  the
commitment  to  govern  together.  If  the  group  as  a  whole  decides  that  a  certain  act is
forbidden, all the members are in the appropriate position to demand compliance.
 Furthermore,  there  can  be  a  derivative  commitment  that  each  has  expressed  a
readiness to accept the yearly election of a leader through a vote; the leader thus elected
will have sole authority over issuing edicts and punishing non-compliance. It could also be
the case that the group as a body expresses a willingness to commit to having a small group
be the sole authority over issuing edicts and another small group having the sole authority
to punish non-compliance. It is in this way that Gilbert helps to shed light on the idea of
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popular sovereignty. As she points out, 
one interesting aspect of this conception is that it helps to explain the sense one might
have that the source of political authority in every case lies with 'the people'. Here, a
joint commitment of the whole population in question – the people – is  taken to
underlie whichever kind of rule is in place (Gilbert 2006b, p. 213).
At this point, it is helpful to introduce the notion of a status function to make sense of this
claim. A status function, according to Searle (1995), is when through an act of declaration
we count one thing as something else. This is like the famous pillar on the Isthmus. By
carving into the east side of the pillar that “Here is not Peloponnesus, but Ionia” it became
the case that the east side of the pillar counted as Ionia (Plutarch 1960, p. 31; cf. Turner
2009). Or perhaps in a simpler example which Searle favours, that of money (Searle, 1995).
With paper money, we all know that it only counts as valuable because we take it to be
valuable; we make it the case by taking it to be the case. We place on these little bits of
paper the status of money. 
The same holds true for authority. It is not until the group commitment is formed
that there is authority – authority is parasitic on the commitments to the group. Unlike
consent tradition ideas of authority, the creation of a group commitment is not a transfer
of authority but rather the creation of a new source of authority. The only time A  has
authority as a representative of the group is when A has been designated by the group as
the authority:  “They [the group] accord to him [the authority] a status, and with that
status a function. He now counts as their leader” (Searle 2003, p. 201). Only as a group
and not as individuals do they have this power, as it is a group that they have brought
their representative authority figure into existence. This is not necessarily to rule out the
moral authority of pre-group individuals. Rather it is to claim that there is another source
of authority in the creation of a social group.
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Jean Hampton has developed a model similar to the one being developed here. On
Hampton's 'convention model', political authority is: 
invented by those people through their participation in a governing convention, by
which they give what I [Hampton] call convention consent to their regimes. Such
consent  is  insufficient  to  morally  legitimate  the  regime  in  full,  but  it  forms  the
foundations for such legitimation […] The invention of political authority involves
creating authoritative offices such that when officeholders issue commands, they give
the rest of the populace reasons to perform actions that preempt other reasons these
people have to do other things (Hampton 1997, pp. 112-113).
However, one obvious difference between Hampton and Gilbert is the following. To be
minimally legitimate, for Hampton, the authority must be “at least minimally rational and
moral” which is internal to the creation of legitimate power (ibid. p. 112). This is captured
in her discussion between a ruler acting as the people’s agent and a master who rules purely
by force (ibid. pp. 86-94). Gilbert does not make such a distinction.  It should by now be
clear how standing is created in Gilbert's account, but what about justification of content?
This is what we turn to in the next chapter.
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Six: Social Ontology and the Question of Content: Unity through Social 
Reason
In  the  previous  chapter,  we  developed  an  understanding  of  the  background
relationship  which  establishes  the  standing  of  authority.  Standing,  remember,  is  the
normative  relationship  between authorities  and their  addressees.  It  was  argued that  the
notion of a plural subject is a particularly powerful way of understanding this dimension of
practical  authority  and the  way it  emerges  between  individuals  when they form plural
subjects which are the basis of institutions. We can characterise this relationship as one of
owing. The basic idea is the following: when B owes conformity to A, then A has authority
over  B. The conformity that  B owes to  A is derived from the conformity  B owes to the
constitutive commitments of the institution of which A and B are both committed members. 
To come to grips with the other aspect of authority which was delineated in Chapter
One,  viz.  what  justifies  the  content  of  authoritative  commands,  we  must  focus  on  the
constitutive commitments of plural subjects themselves. Particularly, we must understand
the  relationship  between  constitutive  commitments  and  the  validity  of  particular
commands. 
To do so,  we turn to the connection between institutions  and the idea of social
reasons which is the topic of Section 2. This connection provides an internal criterion for
judging the validity of commands. That is, this internal connection answers the question of
content. The basic idea is to show the symmetry between reasons which are constructed by
individuals through the act of willing and social reasons which are constructed through the
collective deliberation. This type of symmetry is not unique in the history of philosophy. In
fact, it is similar to the symmetry proposed by Plato in  The Republic between individual
souls and the  polis (Plato 1997c, 368c–369a and 434d–435a).  In other words, what we
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show is that institutions are able to be a source of social reasons just as the individual wills
can be a source of reasons for individual agents.
How does this answer the question of content? The question of content was about
who benefits  from commands.  That  is,  it  is  meant  to  justify  why authorities  can  give
particular commands. In Raz's service conception of authority, we saw one answer to this
question. Authorities are justified in giving commands when those commands get subjects
to conform better to reasons they already have. The account here has a similar structure in
that authorities are justified in giving particular commands when they get their addressees
to conform to reasons they already have.
However, unlike Raz's account, the reason that the addressees already have are a
general reason to conform to the constitutive commitments of the institution of which they
are a member. In other words, unlike Raz's and Enoch's accounts which suggest that we
need  to  look  for  the  reasons  that  each  individual  already has  outside  of  the  authority
relationship, the argument developed here aims to show that we only need to look at the
authority relationship itself to see whether a command is valid or not.
I want to suggest that these claims can be made sense of – and are not as counter-
intuitive as many seem to think – by looking at a distinction Gilbert has repeatedly made
since 2006, that: 
Standing,  incidentally,  must  be  sharply distinguished  from justification.  One  may
have the standing to demand something of someone, yet not be justified in doing so,
in the circumstances.” (Gilbert, 2014, p. 111) 
Or more forcefully:
By virtue of the existence of the commitment, and that alone, the parties have rights
against each other to actions that conform to the commitment. As a result, they have
standing to demand such actions of each other and to rebuke each other not so action
[…] this is not to say that their  making such demands or issuing such rebukes is
always  justified,  all  things  considered.  To  say  that  someone  has  standing  to  do
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something means simply that he is in a position to do it. If someone lacks the standing
to do it, the question whether he is justified in doing it does not arise. For he cannot
do it. One who lacks the standing to make a certain demand or issue a certain rebuke
can, of course, utter a purported rebuke or make a purported demand. He can speak in
a rebuking or demanding tone. His target, meanwhile, may have little interest in this
if it is possible to question his standing actually to rebuke or demand (Gilbert 2006b,
p. 147; cf. pp. 45-46, 103-104, 190, 245-255).
In other words, by virtue of being in the right relation with another – i.e. being part of a
plural subject – one has the proper standing to demand φ from other members; however,
they might not be morally justified in making that demand. This implies that, in some sense,
a plural subject is, in Georg Simmel's words, “composed of beings who are at the same time
inside and outside of them" (Simmel 1910, p. 384; cf. Gilbert 1992, Ch. IV and Gilbert
2003 p. 57).
As we will see, Gilbert means by ‘justified’ in the above passages that the command
is justified from a point of view, particularly the moral point of view, which is outside the
joint-commitment itself. To understand this distinction further, she introduces the idea that
the obligations within a joint commitment are direct, as opposed to moral obligations which
are not. This is the topic of Section 3.
If  this  is  correct,  it  suggests  far-reaching  consequences  for  the  lives  of  groups
generally  and  for  political  institutions  in  particular.  If  there  is  a  necessary  connection
between institutions and social reason then we are moved closer to seeing the necessity of
democracy.  Further,  there  emerges  a  connection  between  institutions  and  epistemic
justifications of democracy, particularly pure epistemic proceduralism. If I am right, then
we move towards a vindication of Hilary Putnam's claim that, “Democracy is not just a
form of social life among other workable forms of social life; it is the precondition for the
full application of intelligence to the solution of social problems” (Putnam 1990, p. 1671).
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However, this consequence cannot be fully worked out here. What will be established is
that the internal standards of an institution give grounds on which to judge the legitimacy of
a command. It does not, however, follow that this makes the commands just or, as Gilbert
puts it in the above quote,  justified. What would make a command just would be a just
institution. The criterion for a just institution, however, must be brought in from outside the
institution  itself.  What  we show instead  is  when a  command is  valid  according to  the
internal criteria of the institution itself.
1. Constitutive Commitments
As we have seen, one of the most important questions for an agent is,  who can
speak for the whole? This question is important precisely because it is what brings unity to
the  potential  disunity  of  competing  desires.  However,  there  is  a  difficult  dis-analogy
between institutions and individual agency in that institutions are composed of individual
agents.  This  is  problematic  in the following way:  if  autonomy is  a constitutive part  of
agency, then how can individual agents subordinate themselves to the commitments of the
institution? Bear in mind that this is the classic dilemma we started with under the own-
action condition. Thankfully, Rousseau shows us a way out: “Since no man has a natural
authority over his fellow-man, and since force produces no right, conventions remain as the
basis of all legitimate authority among men” (Rousseau 1997, p. 44). In other words, what
is required is a convention to which all agents commit themselves. However, as we have
seen, this commitment cannot be the individual commitment of the individuals but rather a
joint-commitment to the constitutional essentials of an institution. 
Due to the infamous problems in the realm of consent, however, this cannot be a
matter of actual consent in the way consent is traditionally understood. We are not asking
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the traditional question of consent, which is the idea that each individual consents to be
ruled by a central authority. Rather, our question must be the following: how can individual
agents produce an institution with unified commitments that all the agents can recognise? 
A good place to begin is with a point that Velleman has made. An intention is the
resolving of a deliberative question. As he says, if the question is not up to you, you have
nothing to settle (Velleman 2000, p. 203). Therefore, the question 'what should we do?'
must be settled by us; you cannot settle our deliberative questions unilaterally (unless you
have the authority to do so). 
From Velleman's point, we can draw some important conclusions. First, and entailed
by what  was just  said,  we cannot  think  of  the  types  of  commitment  of  institutions  as
individual  commitments.  This  was the  argument  of  Chapters  Three and Four.  In  short,
individuals are not entitled to change the commitments of an institution unilaterally. If they
are not able to settle an issue on their own because it is not up to them to settle, then it
surely follows from this that they are not able to rescind the commitment by themselves,
either.  This  is  a  point  upon  which  Margaret  Gilbert  has  been  particularly  adamant  in
insisting. 
We have used the term ‘constitutive commitments’ several times throughout this
discussion but have not done much to understand what these are.  It  is  time to give an
account of such commitments and their importance for institutions. 
Constitutive commitments are, to quote John R. Searle, what “create or define new
forms of behavior” (Searle 1969, p. 33; cf. Rawls 1999a, p. 49). In other words, the content
committed to by the members which constitute the identity of the plural subject. It is these
basic constitutive commitments that form the heart of justifying the contention of authority.
That is, what authorities can command is determined by what the constitutive commitments
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of the group give them power to command. If someone in the role of authority commands
something which they are not entitled to command by the constitutive commitments of the
institution,  then  it  is  an  invalid  command.  The  authority  does  not  have  the  power  to
command such things.
The claim of this section, therefore, is that there lies in all institutions a way to see if
further commitments and, most significantly for our purposes, commands are justified in
terms  of  more  basic  commitments.  This  is  a  fundamentally  important  way  in  which
standing,  being  a  product  of  a  joint  commitment,  is  related  to  the  content  of  such  a
commitment.
The basic thought is this: the constitutive commitments of an institution establish
limits to what the authorities embedded in the said institution can command, ensuring that
the authority is  not entitled to command anything that would be incompatible  with the
content of the institution’s constitutive commitments. Like all members of an institution,
the  authority  is  also  publicly committed  to  conform and respect  the  joint  commitment
which is at the heart of the institution. 
This is a justificatory relationship between constitutive commitments and derivative
commitments;  the  constitutive  commitment  has  internal to  it  certain  normative  criteria
according to which derivative commitments may be judged (MacIntyre 2007 and Marmor
2009 Ch. 2). One thing to note is that there is no reason why constitutive commitments
cannot be nested. For example, within an institution a sub-group can be formed with its own
constitutive commitments.  The constitutive commitment  of the sub-group is  therefore a
derivative commitment of the larger institution. In this way, the sub-group is constrained by
the constitutive commitments of larger institutions as well as its own.
Indeed, we can see this kind of structure in the history of the United States. After the
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American Revolution, a new constitutive commitment was formed. The identity of the new
institution was determined by the commitment to this new constitutive commitment, viz.
those  committed  to  the  United  States  Constitution.  Within  the  framework  of  the
Constitution, the process of judicial review has been established. Here we can see a primary
example of how derivative commitments are challenged on the basis of the constitutive
commitments, in this case the Constitution of the United States. 
The idea of judicial review is that the derivative commitments (i.e. laws) that are
created by the legislature – one aspect of political authority or “authorizing members” (List
and Pettit 2011, p. 35) in the United States – can be reviewed by the judiciary to ensure that
they  do  not  violate  the  constitutive  commitments  of  the  United  States  (i.e.  the  US
Constitution). One particularly appealing way to conceive of judicial review is as “a kind of
rational and shared pre-commitment among free and equal sovereign citizens at the level of
constitutional choice […] limit[ing] the range of legislative options open to themselves or
their representative in the future” (Freeman 1990a, p. 353). What is important here is not
the contractarian element but rather the view that judicial review can be seen as a 'shared
pre-commitment'  which  functions  to  eliminate  legislative  options.  There  are  many
complications and debates about judicial review and its legitimacy for democracy. We can,
for our  purposes,  leave these aside.  What  is  important  for  us  is  to  see that  if  we take
seriously the constitutional commitments that are fundamental to a particular institution as a
'shared  pre-commitment',  we can  see  the  limiting  effect  they have  on  future  decisions.
These shared pre-commitments rule out certain decisions that authorities can make for the
group and remain valid.
Roberto Unger has argued that contemporary jurisprudence has a “discomfort with
democracy.”  This discomfort  “shows up in  every area of contemporary legal culture...”
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which has led to the “[f]ear and loathing of the people” which “threaten[s] to become the
ruling passions of this legal culture” (Unger 1996, pp. 72-73). Jeremy Waldron agrees and
has tried to rise to Unger's challenge (Waldron 1999, pp. 8-10). Something similar can be
said about at least a portion of contemporary political philosophy when it comes to the
justification of authoritative content.
For example, if we turn back to Raz's Normal Justification thesis (NJT) or Jonathan
Quong's recent 'anti-perfectionist'  or 'political-liberal'  reworking of NJT as a duty-based
account  (Quong  2011,  Ch.  4  §§4-5),  we  can  see  this  trend.  Although  there  are  many
fundamental differences between Raz and Quong, both of their accounts rely on the idea
that what justifies the authority of the state and its commands is showing that we have
“most reason to do what the state commands” (ibid. p. 111) In this way both are (or are
potentially) anti-democratic in that the state has to be justified based on an independent
criterion. For Raz, it is the ability to get us to conform better to reasons we already have.
For Quong, it is the ability to get us to conform better to our natural duty to support just
institutions  reasonably.  Neither  appeal  to  the  internal  justification  of  the  institutions
themselves which have been created by individuals through forming joint-commitments;
that  is,  the  justificatory  power  of  the  popular  sovereignty  that  we  saw underlines  the
emergence of all institutions. 
The implicit worry of those like Raz or Quong about democracy seems to come
down to democracy coming to the 'wrong' answers; that it does not conclude in policies that
get agents to comply better with reasons they already have (Raz) or decisions that are not
reasonably just (Quong). If democracies do not come to decisions that meet this sort of
external criterion then it does not issue authoritative commands and citizens have no reason
to  obey.  This  is  tying  justice  and  external  justification  too  closely  to  legitimacy  of
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command.
Gerald Gaus, who is interested in 'public reason' and 'public justification', is also
sceptical about democracy. Gaus's deliberative model, for example, relies on “Members of
the Public” who are “idealized counterparts of actual members of the public, but they are
not so idealized that their reasoning is inaccessible to their real-world counter-parts” (Gaus
2011, p. 276). Gaus wants to avoid appeal to actual people and actual deliberation. This is
because Gaus thinks democrats are captivated by a romantic and “the highly ideal picture in
our  mind's  eye  of  the  Athenian  polis”  which  can  “only  lead  to  authoritarianism  and
oppression”  (ibid.  p.  387)  and  that  what  we  really  need  to  do  is  take  seriously  our
evaluative differences and concentrate on what is justifiable to “the Members of the Public”
as  such,  '[d]emocratic  procedures  simply  are  not  up  to  the  task  of  collective
commensuration” (ibid. p. 388).
Projects like those of Raz, Quong and Gaus are important and can help to give us a
perspective outside the democratic process. However, in the following, I take the view that
“no amount of insight into what might be owed to people will settle the question of how
decisions about [policies] ought to be made” (Peter 2009, p. 1). Focusing on and trying to
determine the justificatory power of procedures is important for real world politics as most
agree,  or  popular  rhetoric  would  lead  us  to  believe,  that  it  is  commonly accepted  that
democratic governance is the only justifiable form of governance which we know of today.
Most  decisions  are  claimed  to  be  democratic  and  there  is  outrage  from  many  when
governmental decisions are made behind closed doors. This can be see, for example, in the
growing concerns over the current secretive negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
between  12  Pacific  nations  (the  US,  Japan,  Australia,  Peru,  Malaysia,  Vietnam,  New
Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Canada, Mexico and Brunei Darussalam). These negotiations
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have been deemed secret by the Obama administration who are even denying members of
Congress access to the terms of the negotiations and the Australian Government has banned
reporters from being briefed on the negotiations.
What follows from such a project, however, is not an apology for present policies or
the status quo. Rather, there is a critical edge viz. by determining the justificatory force of
democracy, one can then see how well existing democracy compares to the ideal type that is
developed in theory (Young 2002, pp. 10-11).
The  relationship  between  standing  and  content,  however,  does  not  have  to  be
limiting.  There  is  also  a  positive  side  to  how commitments  can  justify the  content  of
commands. This is the case of the creation of political authority. When an individual or
group  comes  to  hold  standing  as  a  practical  authority,  it  becomes  a  matter  of  status
conferral: “They [the institution] accord to him [the practical authority] a status, and with
that status a function. He now counts as their leader” (Searle 2003, p. 201). With this status
function,  the  practical  authority  now  has  the  deontic  power  to  make  a  certain  set  of
decisions for the group as a whole.
Let us now see how the conferral of a status function entitles a practical authority to
give certain types of command – that is, how it is justified in giving commands of a certain
nature. It seems natural to say that whenever someone is made the leader of a particular
institution,  they are  made leader  to  use  their  particular  deontic  powers,  viz.  powers  to
change the normative circumstances of those she has authority over, for a particular set of
purposes. It is these powers that determine what the authority is entitled to command or the
content of the directives the authority is entitled to give. 
In the political case, take again the United States. To simplify, Congress is entitled
to make laws that change the citizen's normative circumstances. As we saw above, this
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entitlement  also  has  its  limits,  viz.  commands  must  not  be  incompatible  with  the
constitutional commitments of the institution. Even so, there is a great range of content-full
directives that Congress has the right to give, such as to set federal tax levels and federal
environmental protection laws.
Perhaps it would be helpful to give a simplified example. Let us take three people
who have formed a joint commitment to read a particular book together. The group has also
decided that one of its members,  A, will lead the reading group. They accord  A with the
status function of leader. The group as a whole has given  A  the deontic power to make
decisions  for  the  group:  A  gets  to  decide  when  the  group  will  meet,  how  to  run  the
meetings, how much to read for each meeting, etc. When A makes a decision about these
issues, it changes what the other members of the group ought to do. However, there are also
clearly things that A cannot direct the group to do even though A has the standing to make
decisions. For example, although A has the standing to dictate how much to read, it is not in
A's  power to change the group's  reading material,  nor can  A  decide to spend the entire
meeting  without  discussing  the  book  despite  having  the  standing  to  dictate  how  the
meetings will run. In both these cases, the members of the reading group would have reason
to protest because A is commanding things that violate the very commitments which are the
basis of A’s authority in the first place. 
Further,  as  a  member  of  the  group,  A  is  also  committed  to  the  constitutional
commitment of reading this particular book and discussing it with these people. A has the
authority  to  determine  a  wide  range  of  the  group’s  activities  but  the  content  of  A's
commands must still conform to the constitutive commitments of the group. This is due to
A necessarily being part of the group commitment as well as being the leader of the group. 
We  can  see  a  further  positive  power  authorities  have  if  we  turn  back  to  the
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discussion above about how the background constitutive commitments of an institution are
not necessarily formed through consensus. That is, there can be divergent understandings
about what those commitments mean. What authorities are able to do is fix for a time the
interpretation of these background agreements. 
This is one of the fundamental roles of authority. There may be deep interpretive
disagreements amongst members of an institution about what the constitutive commitments
are that make up the background commitments. Authorities can help alleviate this situation
in the following way: the authority can make public an authoritative interpretation of the
background agreement that all  members of the institution are accountable for following
until the institution as a whole changes its mind.
To carry on with the reading group example, there are many different ways in which
a reading group can be understood and structured. Two possible ways might be for there to
be just a free-floating discussion when the group meets or there could be a more structured
conversation where one member begins by providing a summary and questions for the
group  to  discuss.  When  our  reading  group  was  formed,  the  members  did  not  have  a
consensus about how the group would proceed during their meetings. Once there is a leader
of the group, that leader can decide for the group on which of these two, or some possible
other,  ways  of  structuring  the  meetings.  This  fixes  and  makes  public  to  all  the  other
members how the group is going to understand what it means to have a meeting. They are
all committed as group members to running the meeting this way. 
Now, authorities will not resolve the disagreement but only alleviate some of the
problems of disagreement when it actually comes to enacting policy choices. If there is
deep disagreement  between  members  on  the  appropriate  amount  of  reading,  A has  the
ability to determine how much the group will read per week. The other members may still
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disagree, but they are responsible for following A's directive on this issue until the directive
has changed.
In this section, I have outlined some of the ways that constitutive commitments and
authorities are important for our normative landscape. Further, we have begun to see how
authorities  can  fix  the  interpretation  of  background commitments  as  well  as  determine
further commitments of the group to solve issues of disagreement. What the authorities are
doing when they change the normative landscape of the group is creating social reasons for
action. Now it is time to turn to more detail about the reasons that the authorities are able to
give and how these reasons come about.
2. What are Social Reasons?
What are social reasons? In this section, I argue that there is a symmetry between
the reasons that are binding for agents that are the product of their practical deliberation and
practical identities, and those that are binding for members of an institution which are the
product of institutional deliberation and practical identity. The way that practical identities
give reasons for action has been helpfully elaborated by Christine Korsgaard. An example
she uses is that of a student (cf. Korsgaard 1996a, §3.3.4). The idea is that a student might
be required to take a particular class, e.g. logic. Since the student here endorses practical
identity as a student, this is a reason for her to act and her acting on this reason does not
interfere with her autonomy. This is because she has endorsed the practical identity of being
a student and this is what it means to be a student, to take the classes required of you. The
reasons that are the product of institutional deliberation are what I will call ‘social reasons’.
They  are  social  reasons  because  they  are  binding  on  all  members  qua  members  of  a
particular institution.
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To  see  how  this  works  with  institutions  as  whole,  rather  than  with  individual
practical identities, let us turn to a particular case. Presumably, any philosophy department
is going to be constituted by several commitments. These commitments might be, in no
particular order, the following: providing a quality philosophy education to undergraduates,
a quality research environment for staff, support for graduate students, etc. All of these
provide reasons for the department to act. However, as we know, philosophers tend to be
individuals with strong opinions about how these commitments should be fulfilled. The
politics  internal  to  the  department  could  be  complex  and  contentious  with  deep
disagreement as to what constitutes a quality philosophy education. Some may think that
undergraduates should have a firm foundation in the history of philosophy while others
may think that the best way to teach philosophy is through contemporary debates about
current problems. How is the institution as a whole to make a decision on these types of
issue? 
Like the individual case where an individual deliberates about her practical identity,
institutions  also  deliberate  about  their  identities.  However,  rather  than  the  individual
deliberating alone, in the case of institutions it is a social form of deliberation. When an
institution finds itself pulled apart by disagreement, the institution is no longer able to act
and is forced to deliberate until the issues it is dealing with are settled, at least for a time.
The  issue  of  how  to  teach  undergraduates  must  be  settled  in  part  for  the  philosophy
department to teach successfully.  In other words, we need to work out how the head of
Reason in Plato's analogy (see Chapter 3.3) can be understood as the deliberation of the
institution. 
The proposal here is that the notion of social reason is helpful for this purpose. The
term ‘social reason’, sometimes called ‘public reason’, has been highly contested and there
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are many interpretations of how it is best understood. The general idea which I put forth
here is that the norms structuring the life of an institution must be deemed acceptable by all
its members. The general interpretative strategy I adopt here is the following: social reason
is best understood in procedural terms, rather than in substantive terms. This amounts to
saying  that  social  reason is  connected  to  the  justification  of  the  norms  of  deliberative
processes  themselves,  rather  than to  what  kinds  of  reason individuals  can  appeal  to  as
deliberators (Peter 2009, Ch. 6; cf. Laden 2000, p. 551). 
Rawls has referred to this as ‘constitutional essentials’, which he tells us are “what
is of greatest urgency” for consensus (Rawls 2001, §9.3). Thus, the deliberative process
itself must be justifiable in terms that all members can freely recognise, and any decision
resulting from this process is legitimate if we remember that the content of a decision is
legitimate only as the product of a deliberative process.
An  alternative  interpretation  of  social  reasons  is  a  substantive  one.  On  this
interpretation,  all  decisions  must  be  justifiable,  as  well  as  accessible,  to  all  via  social
reasons. The main problem with this interpretation lies in the difficulty in seeing the value
of an appeal to social reason as a standard for all decisions. Social reason on the substantive
interpretation is indeterminate, i.e. unable to generate a conclusive result. For the sake of
illustration we may look at cases of substantial disagreement, as the very point of appealing
to social reason is to deal with disagreement and reasonable pluralism. 
This is the problem we encountered at the end of Chapter Two. Remember there we
discussed Sandel's view on the distinction between fines and fees. From this, there was the
claim that we should reject carbon trading markets because it fails to maintain the moral
stigma  of  using  more  carbon  than  one  should.  There  seems  here  to  be  a  reasonable
disagreement  between  Sandel  and  proponents  of  carbon  trading markets.  How can the
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substantive form of social reasoning alleviate this agreement? More precisely, to what can
the institution appeal to resolve the disagreement?
We now have two potential ways of choosing institutional commitments. The first
option  requires  agreement  on  the  procedural  requirements  of  deliberation,  whereas  the
second demands substantive agreement on every decision in the sense that, for a norm to
pertain to the entire institution, it must be accepted by all participants. However, as with the
Sandel case, it looks like he would not accept a norm of carbon trading. He would reject
such a more because it seems to keep the moral stigma he finds necessary when it comes to
over-using common goods. Sandel does not seem to be unreasonable in rejecting this norm.
It is a reasonable position to maintain, and to reject it as unreasonable risks undermining
Sandel's status as a self-originating source of valid claims. This leads to a policy stalemate.
Both sides see the importance of doing something for the good of the environment but
deeply disagree as to how to proceed. Any institution caught in such a problem will be
unable to act or will violate its members's status as a source of valid claims.
If this is correct, the second option is indeterminate with regards to choosing norms
of action for the institution. This leaves us with the procedural option, which gives a way
for an institution to make a decision, at least provisionally, that all the members are bound
to accept as the norm of the institution. We find consonance between this and the following
remark by Korsgaard:
In order to act together – to make laws and policies, apply them, enforce them – in a
way that represents, not some of us imposing our private wills on others, but all of us
acting together from a collective general will – we must have certain procedures that
make collective decision and action possible,  and normatively speaking,  we must
stand by their actual results (Korsgaard 2008, p. 247).
If this is not accomplished because of internal disagreement then deliberation as to what the
institution ought to do will not cease. There will be continual conflict and disunity. 
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We can see this if we take a small group, say, a committee planning a party. If the
committee does not jointly commit to the manner in which decisions will be made within
the group, the group will be in continual disunity. Say there is a disagreement about what
kind of food to buy for the party. It would be problematic if the group, working on a limited
budget, were just to buy whatever anyone suggested. There must be a single decision made
for the whole of the group. Let us say that the group recognises a simple majority rule
decision procedure, in which case the individual members are obligated to follow whatever
the outcome of the vote may be. This is how unity is brought to the group.
We  can  now  see  how  important  is  the  connection  between  social  reason  and
institutions. The obvious reason for a connection, and a natural starting point, is that for an
institution to be effective – just as in the case of individual agents – there must be a unity
that  overcomes  the  diversity  and  disunity  internal  to  any  institution.  There  must  be
something that holds the institution together as an institution in order for it to be able to do
anything at all. It seems that for this to be possible, there needs to be some reliance on the
idea of social reason which allows us to solve the disunity problem by giving us agreed-
upon procedures to deal with disagreement and pluralism.
In the end, social reason is important to the constitution of group agency precisely
because it is what determines the unity of the agent, which allows it to be effective. Social
reason, then,  plays  the role  of Reason in Plato's  analogy for the group as a whole.  As
suggested above, it also gives us a criterion for the success of an action. When an institution
acts for reasons which are not the products of the procedure agreed upon via social reason,
this results in disunity within the agent itself. We can say, with Rousseau, that in this case
the institution fails to have a general will but instead is determined by the private interests
of  particular  wills  (Rousseau  1997,  Ch.  2.3.2).  However,  when  an  institution  acts  for
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reasons which are grounded in publicly accessible norms of fair procedures then we can say
that the group acted as a whole, as a general will.
We have seen how agents are normatively constituted and how there is a symmetry
between the individual constitution of agents and the constitution of group agency. This has
been the initial stage setting in order to answer the question of content. Let us now look
more closely at how proceduralism helps us in answering the question of content.
3. Proceduralism and Content
The  current  debate  about  deliberative  democracy  has  paid  particularly  close
attention to  the power of  proceduralism.  It  is  helpful  to canvas this  debate in  order to
understand more fully how proceduralism can justify the constitutional  essentials  of an
institution and how this justification is transferred to the particular commands of authorities
which, as we have seen, are roles that emerge from the workings of institutions. 
Bernard Manin gives what can be seen as the shibboleth of deliberative democracy:
“the source of legitimacy is not the predetermined will of individuals, but rather the process
of its  formation,  that  is,  deliberation itself”  (Manin 1987, pp.  351-352).  More recently,
James Bohman has strongly echoed Manin when he said that:
political decision making is legitimate insofar as its policies are produced in a process
of public  discussion and debate in which citizens and their  representatives,  going
beyond  mere  self-interest  and  the  limited  points  of  view,  reflect  on  the  general
interests or on their common goods (Bohman 1996, pp. 4-5).
Finally, to help clarify to what deliberative democrats see themselves as committed, David
Held provides a particularly helpful summary of this model of democracy in this way:
The  terms  and  conditions  of  political  association  proceed  through  the  free  and
reasoned assent of its citizens. The 'mutual justifiability' of political decisions is the
legitimate basis for seeking solutions to collective problems (Held 2006, p. 253; cf
Habermas 1996, p. 448 and Cohen 1997, pp. 72-73).
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Notice that these characterisations tend to rely on some form of idealisation, similar
to the idealisation we saw in Darwall and Gaus's accounts. Iris Marion Young has presented
a  much  more  realistic  view of  the  process  in  the  opening pages  of  her  Inclusion  and
Democracy.  She presents a picture of a complex and slow process of democratic change.
However,  she agrees that the fundamental point of deliberative democracy is  that  “few
question the legitimacy of the outcome because the process was relatively public, inclusive,
and procedurally regular” (Young 2000, p. 3). She goes on to claim that “[t]he normative
legitimacy of a democratic decision depends on the degree to which those affected by it
have  been  included  in  the  decision-making  process  and  have  had  the  opportunity  to
influence the outcomes” (ibid. pp. 5-6).
The  important  aspect  of  these  views  is  that  they claim that  the  justification  of
decisions is gained through the process in which the decisions are made. The decision made
through the process, whatever it is, creates for the group social reasons for actions. If the
members  of  an  institution,  who  have  recognised  the  decision-making  procedure  as  a
constitutional  commitment  of  the institution,  do not  conform their  actions  to  the social
reason created by the decision procedure, then they are violating their commitment to the
institution. Furthermore, it looks as if the institution has the right to hold accountable and
rebuke those who do not conform.
Now we are able to understand the underlining structure of this situation more fully.
The members of the institution have expressed readiness to recognise a certain decision
procedure.  That  is,  they  have  formed  a  joint-commitment  to  conform to  any decision
produced through the procedure of their institution. The decision procedure is analogous to
the deliberation which individuals must go through when they step back from their desires
and reflect on what to do. To be able to act again, the individual must endorse which ends
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to pursue. The only difference is that the will of the institution is the pooling of many wills
to form a general will and what this will create is not individual reasons for action but
social reasons for action. Social reasons are binding on all members of the group qua being
the result of their pooling of wills.
The process element is the element that most strongly sets deliberative democracy
apart from aggregative conceptions of democracy. In aggregative democracy, decisions gain
their legitimacy through a synchronic voting procedure; deliberative democracy claims that
legitimacy is garnered through a diachronic deliberative procedure, a process that is slow,
fallible and complex. It is important to point out, however, what is really at issue. The issue
that is at stake is the very identity of the institution as such. When members of an institution
are deliberating what to do, they are also deliberating what kind of institution they are
going to be going forward, they are deliberating the very identity of the institution. The
reasons this is so are because they are deliberating how best to interpret the constitutional
commitments that are the basis of the institution's life.
There is, as Fabienne Peter has argued, “some sort of an agreement about the two
main  features”  of  deliberative  democracy:  “(1)  decision  making  is  based  on  public
reasoning  (2) under conditions of  political equality or fairness”  (Peter 2009, p. 31). In
order to understand the legitimating virtue of deliberation, it is imperative to understand
these  two  features.  Let  us  look  briefly  at  each  feature  to  see  how  it  factors  into  the
justificatory task which deliberative democrats support.
First, public reasoning, or what I have been calling ‘deliberation’, is the giving and
taking of  reasons for or  against  a  particular  policy in the public  sphere.  Gutmann and
Thompson put the point succinctly when they say that the difference between deliberative
and aggregative conceptions of democracy is  that  the deliberative conception “asks  for
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justifications” (Gutmann and Thompson 2004, p. 13). The public sphere and the condition
of publicity is important because it necessitates that reasons given in the public sphere,
which is the sphere which incorporates all the members of a particular institution, must be
potentially acceptable  by others.  This  excludes  – not  formally,  but  pragmatically – the
individual  reasons that  the members  of the group have qua individuals  from doing the
justificatory work. That is, a claim of individual preference will do little to convince others
that a particular policy is really the best policy to adopt. 
Gerald Gaus has raised a worry about the reasonableness of subjects which can also
be interpreted as a challenge to the idea that deliberation has epistemic value. He recounts
the  belief  perseverance  experiments  of  Lee  Ross.  The  experiments  showed  that  when
subjects were induced to hold an unjustified belief and 
[t]he subjects were above normal in intelligence, and their beliefs were subject to far
more rigorous criticism than are most of our political  beliefs.  In spite  of all  this,
subjects continued to hold beliefs that seem manifestly unjustified (Gaus 1997, p.
213) 
The  worry  here  seems  to  be,  how can  the  exchange  of  reasons  and  criticism be  any
justification  for  the  beliefs  and  actions  of  an  institution  if  individual  beliefs  are  so
recalcitrant to rigorous criticism?
 However,  there is another aspect to deliberation that is of equal importance that
Gaus's  worry  does  not  touch.  This  is  the  element  which  Young  calls  deliberative
democracy's 'disclosive' effect. That is to say, the point of deliberation is at least partly to
open up new possibilities that individuals may not have factored into their  preferences.
Contrary to Habermas's overly rationalistic theory, deliberation does not necessarily lead to
changes in preferences by appeal to the force of the better reason.* Rather, deliberation can
* The 'disclosive' power of deliberation is often overlooked by Habermas, even in his own writings (cf.
Kompridis 2011 and Miller 2011).
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bring forth new options and directions for citizens to factor into their preference sets. 
This  transformative  effect  is  essential  to  the  epistemological  justification  of
democracy and  the  legitimating  force  of  deliberation  (Putnam 1990,  p.  1671).  Putnam
summarises the thought in the following way: 
The fact that someone feels satisfied with a situation means little if the person has no
information or false information concerning either her own capacities or the existence
of available alternatives to her present way of life. The real test is not what women
who have never heard of feminism say about their situation; indeed, it is hard to see
how the situation of a chauvinist woman in India is different from the situation of a
chauvinist woman in this country thirty years ago who had never been exposed to
feminist ideas. Such women might well have answered a questionnaire by saying that
they were satisfied with their lives; but after realizing the falsity of the beliefs on
which the acceptance of their lives had been based, the same women not only felt
dissatisfied  with  those  lives,  but  they  sometimes  felt  ashamed  of  themselves  for
having allowed such a belief system to be imposed upon them (ibid).
The 'disclosive' effect of discourse, or rather the revealing of new options and possibilities
through  disagreement,  and  the  procedural  adjudication  of  disagreement,  has  been  “a
constant  engine  of  change”  (Hampshire  1989,  p.  55).  These  disagreements  and  the
'disclosive' effect they help to produce are important because, as Stuart Hampsire tells us: 
Every person and every social group is to a greater or lesser extent blind to many of
the  injustices  of  its  time,  because  its  own  culture  and  education,  supporting  a
particular way of life, represents embedded and distinctive features of this way of life
as unavoidable features of human life in general (ibid. p. 59)
This brings us back to the discussion of how social situations can be distorted that we saw
in the previous chapter. Notice, however, that what drives the social innovation and change
is not throwing up one’s hands and saying that the bindingness of institutions do not hold
because they are,  from a backwards-looking glance,  unjustifiable.  Rather,  the  authentic
change in the lives of institutions comes from the disagreements internal to it and forces a
change in the very identity of the institution. The thought might be that we are not looking
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for revolution but conversion and rebirth.*
This is exactly the point of Putnam's example of the possibility of a less chauvinistic
culture. However, the importance of this effect does not have to be so grand but can be
something as simple as the exposure of a lesser-known candidate. Fabienne Peter's example
illustrates  the  middle  ground  between  the  reason-based  and  the  'disclosive'  aspect  of
deliberation: 
As  a  result  of  deliberation,  some  initially  expressed  preferences  will  seem
unsustainable  and  be  transformed,  and  new  preferences  will  emerge  during  the
process of public deliberation. Deliberation may, for example, strengthen the reasons
people have for not endorsing a policy that discriminates against women. Or it may
lead some to  abandon  their  strong initial  preference  to  elect  a  woman to  a  high
political office, if the deliberative process generates strong reasons in support of a
previously lesser known male candidate. (Peter 2009, p. 33)
There is an important point here that is crucial in the following. Just as in scientific
experiments,  hypotheses are  tested on how well  they work and revised accordingly (of
course, this is an oversimplification but the point is the emphasis of the back and forth
movement between hypothesis and critique based on 'success' or 'failure' of experiments),
the same is necessary in the public sphere. Hypotheses, i.e. policies, are to be proposed and,
if implemented, criticised based on their success or failure. This may seem common sense
but this is what is overlooked by some when thinking about the transformative effect of
deliberation. Part of the deliberative process is showing that certain policy choices are not
working. Of course, recalcitrance and perseverance of beliefs is a problem but it is no more
of a problem than in any other domain of inquiry – deliberative politics is a long, slow
process that makes mistakes and gets things wrong, but why should it  not be and why
would this be a criticism of it? John Dewey, in Putnam's reading, brings these two elements
together  in  what  he  calls,  following C.S.  Peirce,  'the  scientific  method':  “the scientific
* Compare  with Stanley Cavell's  remarks  about  education for  grown-ups in  his  The Claim of  Reason
(Cavell 1999, p. 125)
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method is simply the method of experiment inquiry combined with free and full discussion
– which means,  in  the case  of  social  problems,  the  maximum use of  the  capacities  of
citizens for proposing courses of action, for testing them, and for evaluating the results”
(Putman 1990, p. 1671).
This leads to the main point of Gaus's criticism and also indicates the way out of it.
What he has called, and rightly criticised, the ideal of social reason in a “radical sense” is
true in that “only reasons that can be embraced by all of us are truly public, and hence
justificatory” (Gaus 1997, p. 205). There certainly is no reason to believe that social reason
will ever have the outcome of “wide, though of course not complete, actual consensus on
political outcomes” (ibid. p. 206; cf. Gaus 2011, pp. 387-388). There will, as long as we
have a deeply pluralistic society, be disagreement about justice and the common good. 
Gaus's criticism is directed at deliberative democrats like Cohen and Benhabib who
believe that aim of deliberation is 
to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus – to find reasons that are persuasive to
all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of
alternatives by equals (Cohen 1997, p. 75; Benhabib 1994, p. 31).
The  idea  that  these  deliberative  democrats  are  working  with  is  one  in  which  public
deliberation  should lead  to  substantive  consensus  on the issue before  us.  It  seems that
Gaus's point is well made against this type of theory.
However, not all deliberative democrats agree that we should focus on consensus
and the common good, e.g. Iris Marion Young (2000) and, following her, Fabienne Peter
(2009). For Young and Peter argue rather that 'the politics of difference' can be a resource
for democracy which, through the situatedness of different individuals and groups, can,
because of
the plurality of perspectives they offer to the public helps to disclose the reality and
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objectivity of the world in which they dwell together […] By communicating to one
another their differing perspectives on the social world in which they dwell together,
they collectively constitute an enlarged understanding of the world (Young 2000, p.
112; cf. Peter 2009 p. 35f).
This gives us a basic understanding of what it means for decision-making to be based on
'public reasoning.' It is not that the public needs to form a consensus on any particular topic
but rather that the reasoning that goes into decision-making must be out in the open. The
importance of this, as we have seen, as more to do with bringing forth new possibilities and
perspectives on how an institution should think of itself.
There were two claims made above that may seem contradictory and hard to square.
These were: (1) the rejection that deliberative democracy needs be about a search for a
consensus  and  (2)  that  there  is  an  epistemic  dimension  (the  transformative  effect)  to
deliberation. If deliberation is not a search for a consensus then what is it searching for – if
anything - and what is the importance of the epistemic dimension? There are two answers
which  are  currently  in  the  literature:  a  rational  proceduralist  answer  and  a  pure
proceduralist answer. I take each in turn.
One  understanding  of  epistemic  proceduralism  is  David  Estlund’s  rational
epistemic proceduralism. Estlund rejects pure proceduralism, advocating that it  must be
supplemented  by  procedural  impartiality,  which  has  a  tendency to  ‘track  the  truth.’
Estlund’s idea is an updated version of Rousseau’s general-will, where citizens ought to
follow the  public view  in so far as its procedures reliably generate results that are better
than  random (Estlund  1997,  p.  196-198).  There  is  a  degree  of  truth  to  this;  however,
Estlund inflates the importance of the tendency to 'track the truth'. This inflation is due to
Estlund's evaluation of pure proceduralism as equivalent to the “flip of a coin” because it
lacks a “cognitive process” (ibid. p. 176-196; cf. Estlund 2008, p. 82). This might be true
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for aggregative models of pure proceduralism, however, as Fabienne Peter notes, Estlund’s
account minimises deliberation’s constructive power. 
According to Peter, Estlund fails to acknowledge that “the epistemic dimension may
be rooted in a fair decision-making process” (Peter 2009, p. 82). In other words,  contra
Estlund, fair procedures, when deliberative, have a cognitive element (as discussed above),
which gives one reasons to  doubt  that one’s “own moral judgement about the outcome is
supreme” (Estlund 1997, p. 195; cf. Estlund 2008, p. 108). That is, he does not see why one
would  change one’s  mind based  on the  outcome  of  deliberation  alone.  Estlund  in  this
passage is making the point that, after deliberation, one’s own deliberation is superior to
that  of  deliberation  in  general.  However,  it  does  not  follow that  because  one does  not
change one's mind after deliberation that one does not have reasons for one's confidence to
diminish  (Peter  2012).  Therefore,  Estlund's  worry  is  placated  once  we  recognise  fair
deliberative procedure's “knowledge-producing potential” (Peter 2007, p. 343). There is,
then, no need to qualify epistemic proceduralism with the procedure-independent criterion
of ‘better than random’. 
There  seems  to  be  good  grounds  to  accept  the  pure  proceduralist  account  of
democratic  authority  in  regard  to  practical  cases.  Furthermore,  most  decisions  that  an
institution needs to make are practical or come down to a practical issue such as which
institutions ought to receive resources at the expense of others, e.g. should we build a new
school or a new police station? This is not just an issue of expedience or efficiency but an
issue of what weights we should give to different ends. It may even be the case that many
issues which appear superficially to be theoretical will, in fact, be practical. For example, is
the teaching of intelligent design allowed in public science classes? Many see this debate as
being about the truth or falsehood of intelligent design. Yet the issue really is about freedom
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of thought or conscience and how it ought to impact (or ought not to impact) the education
of children in a free society. The truth of intelligent design is a different question to whether
it  should  be  taught  or  not  in  publicly  funded schools.  According  to  the  deliberative
democrat who accepts pure proceduralism, whatever the answers to these questions are,
what is justified to enforce, i.e. what an institution has authority to do, is a matter of what
falls out of the deliberative process itself. 
The second feature of deliberation democrats share is the idea of political equality,
fairness or inclusion which amounts to having the opportunity to participate in the political
public sphere. As we saw above, Young takes inclusion and equality to be fundamental to
the legitimacy of democratic decisions: 
a democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those affected by it are
included in the process of discussion and decision-making... Not only should all those
affected be nominally included in decision-making, but they should be included on
equal terms (ibid. 23).
This  runs  together  her  comments  on 'inclusion'  and 'political  equality'  but,  as  she  says
herself after this passage, 
While I have distinguished the terms 'inclusion'  and 'political equality'  in order to
specify their normative import, for the rest of this book when I refer to a norm of
inclusion I shall understand it to entail the norm of political equality. (ibid. pp. 23-24)
It is best to understand this feature of political equality as equal opportunity to participation
in a broad sense and not limited to formal argumentation.
Bringing these two features together, we can give a statement as to how deliberative
democrats see the legitimation of policies: through the procedure that is characterised by an
exchange of reasons for and against constitutive commitments, all who are affected have
the  opportunity  to  participate  provisionally  which  legitimises  the  outcome  until  the
institution  as  a  whole  is  convinced  to  reconsider.  This  is  what  makes  the  constitutive
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commitments of the group maintain their popular sovereignty and gives justification to the
constitutive commitments. All members of the group as group members maintain the right
to question the content of the joint-commitment and the institution of which they are part.
The epistemic benefit of doing so is to disclose new options for how the group can identify
itself. 
Whenever  these constitutive commitments  are  settled,  the  further  content  of  the
institution's decision making is bound to conform to it. As long as the institution’s further
commitments are within the limits of the constitutive ones, they gain their legitimacy and
force from the basic commitments.
There is a worry that follows from this type of position which has been indicated
several times. Namely, it looks like the consequence of such a proceduralist interpretation
of  what  justifies  constitutive  commitments  of  an  institution  will  lead  individuals  to  be
bound to an institution which gives them social reasons to act which are objectionable. Not
only that but that they are obligated to follow these social reasons. Furthermore, how is one
to criticise one's institution if one is bound to these social reasons? Are they not, after all,
the individuals’ reasons? This is the major theme of the concluding section.
4. Directed Obligations: Social Standpoints and the Tragedy of the Social
One of the major obstacles to an adequate understanding of the bindingness and
obligations  that  are  part  of  institutions  is  the type of obligation which is  at  stake.  The
argument in this section is that the type of obligation which institutions generate are of a
different kind from other types of obligation, particularly moral obligations. There are two
consequences of this fact. First, understanding these different types of obligation allows us
to understand how conflicting obligations and standpoints enable criticism of institutions.
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Second,  these  conflicts  are  irreducible  and  tragic  in  the  sense  that  one  has  normative
reasons to regret not being able to fulfil both conflicting obligations. 
Many simply see obligations and the reasons for action which they generate in an
univocal  way.  Accounts  which rely on the univocity of normative reasons,  e.g.  that  all
normative (practical) reasons are moral reasons, hide or make it impossible to make sense
of the tragic character of the human condition. Typically these positions see all normative
reasons as being straightforwardly weighable against each other (Scanlon 1998, Raz 2011
and Parfit 2011).* On these univocity accounts, the problem of what we have most reason to
do is an epistemic problem rather than a metaphysical one, viz. the problem is about our
limited abilities as practical agents to determine what we have most reason to do. It is
incompatible with this view that there is still conflict which an agent ought to regret for not
being able to fulfil both conflicting reasons.
A non-univocal account of normative reasons, on the other hand, argues that there
can be conflicts between what we morally ought to do and what we ought to do from the
perspective of other practical identities (Korsgaard 1996b). This is a deeper problem than
our epistemic limitations. No amount of knowledge will get us out of these tragic situations.
The normative landscape is arranged in such a way that we are forced to choose between
practical  identities  with an  inescapable  regret  for  not  choosing or  fulfilling  one  of  our
obligations because we are fulfilling another (Williams 1976, 1981, Nussbaum 1985).
With accounts that start from the idea of practical identities and a notion of social
reasons,  it  becomes more  difficult  to  think about  reasons that  can  be straightforwardly
weighted against  each other.  This is  because with the multiplicity of social  standpoints
* Note  that  there  can  still  be  talk about  plurality of  values,  incommensurable  (Raz)  and  things  being
'roughly equal' (Parfit 1987, p. 431). However, that is not what is being claimed here by the talk of tragic.
When Raz discusses  the plurality of  value,  he is  talking about  choices once reasons “have run their
course” (Raz 2000, p. 48), for example.
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which  all  generate  different  obligations,  when  these  obligations  call  for  different  or
incompatible actions, we are simply unable to act on them all.
This brings us to a potential worry that although the institutional account that has
thus  far  been  developed  helps  us  to  understand  authority  as  created  through  a  joint
commitment,  it  has  said  very little  about  whether  or  not  this  authority  deserves  to  be
supported by the community (Baumann 2009, pp. 16-17). This is not only because a joint
commitment can be coerced into existence but there is also no necessary restriction on what
the content of such a joint commitment can be (Gilbert 2006b, pp. 75-82, 228-229). It is
clear  that  a  joint  commitment  is  normative  in  the  sense  that  is  there  is  authority  and
obligation. However, it is not normative in another sense, “a sense standardly connoted by
the qualifier 'moral'” (ibid.. p. 81.; cf. Gilbert 1996, pp. 299-300, 353 and Gilbert 2000, p.
114-115).  This  is  a particularly important  issue to  understand so we will  examine it  at
length in terms of Gilbert’s distinction between legitimacy and justice or moral obligation. 
It is this distinction between legitimacy and justice which makes it important to
emphasise the non-univocity of obligations. We can be obligated to obey the commands of
a legitimate authority without being morally obligated to obey these commands. The claim
here  is  that  the  obligations  generated  by  legitimate  authorities  are  different  from  the
obligations of justice. 
Let  us  begin  to  clarify  this  issue.  Aristotle,  in  Book  V  Chapter  7  of  the
Nicomachean Ethics, develops a  distinction between what  he calls  ‘natural’ justice and
legal, or conventional, justice. The first type of justice, ‘natural’ justice, Aristotle tells us, is
“that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or
that”  (Aristotle  1984b,  1134b18-19).  We  must  be  careful  here  not  to  think  that  what
Aristotle is saying is that natural justice is unchanging, for he says “while with us there is
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something that is just even by nature, yet all of it is changeable” (ibid. 1134b29-30; cf.
Gadamer 2013, p. 330 ). The second type of justice, legal or conventional justice, Aristotle
tells us, is “originally indifferent, but when it has been laid down it is not indifferent” (ibid.
1134b20). This part of Aristotle can be difficult to parse but I think there is an important
truth to be drawn from it. When we look at norms of a particular institution, it is important
to pay attention to both the naturally just and the conventionally, or legally, just norms – the
latter  I  would  call  ‘legitimacy’.  However,  Aristotle  does  not  give  us  much  on how to
evaluate  the  difference  between  these  norms,  and  it  is  rather  obscure  as  to  what  the
importance of this distinction is for him. He seems to mean something like the following:
conventional justice is by definition different everywhere and can be evaluated based on
natural justice, which is the same everywhere. Aristotle does not tell us what happens with
the conflict between natural and conventional justice nor whether conventional justice still
has an impact on our practical reasoning in spite of its conflict with natural justice. 
A  similar  distinction  has  recently  been  developed  by  Margaret  Gilbert.  Her
distinction  takes  place  between  directed  obligation,  which  is  grounded  in  joint-
commitment, and moral obligation. This seems promising and leaves room for a discussion
of what Gilbert calls 'the morality of obedience' (Gilbert 2014, p. 426), i.e. when a directed
obligation is  or is  not  overridden by moral considerations  or perhaps by other directed
obligations.
On a phenomenological level, this analysis is highly appealing and makes sense of
Stanley Milgram's  famous  experiment  which  asks  the  question  of  why people  feel  the
pressure, the obligation, to follow immoral commands: 
In order to take a close look at the act of obeying, I set up a simple experiment at Yale
University... A person comes to a psychological laboratory and is told to carry out a
series of acts that come increasingly into conflict with conscience. The main question
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is  how far the participant  will  comply with the experimenter's  instructions  before
refusing to carry out the actions required of him (Milgram 1974, pp. 2-3)
If  Gilbert's  account  is  correct,  the  answer  is  that  their  directed  obligation  to  obey the
commands is in conflict with their moral obligations. Furthermore, this might illuminate
why many contemporary theorists have concentrated exclusively on moral obligations to
obey the law to the exclusion of directed obligations: there may be anxieties about many
people's  seeming  inability  to  make  the  correct  decision  when  their  direct  and  moral
obligations are in conflict.
One  might  hope  that  all  joint  commitments  are  formed  with  Aristotle’s  natural
justice in mind, as Gilbert has recently remarked: 
[i]n particular cases, there could be background understandings or explicit conditions
that rule such commands out [i.e., immoral commands], restricting what the parties
are jointly committed to... Possibly there is a refined and convincing philosophical
argument  to  the effect  that  such a  proviso is  always  implicit  when relevant  joint
commitments are made (Gilbert 2014, p. 424).
This might indeed be the case. However, this type of argument runs the risk of moralising,
of seeing obligation only in a univocal moral sense, and would miss or distort important
aspects of the human condition as Milgram's experiment shows. Further, it is hard to see
how  such  an  a  priori argument  would  run  without  a  distorting  effect  on  our  human
practices. It is a fact that people do make immoral commitments to each other and feel
obligated to fulfil them. We may not even be aware of our commitments as being immoral.
Milgram's experiment shows one danger of moralising, viz. the influence of directed
obligation on the decisions of real people.  As Gilbert  points out in her “De-Moralizing
Political Obligation”, by ignoring the motivational significance of directed obligation, we
hamper our understanding of political  societies and how to deal with morally bad laws
(Gilbert 2014, pp. 406-408).
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Yet  there  is  another  important  aspect  to  this.  It  is  not  obvious  that  all  political
decisions  are  going  to  be  reducible  to  moral  decisions,  nor  is  it  obvious  that  moral
obligations have a direct bearing on all aspects of joint commitments. Even if it is the case
that the moral obligations do have a bearing on all aspects of an institution commitment, it
is not obvious from this fact alone whether one ought to abolish or reform the commitment.
I am thinking here of John Rawls’s opening to his A Theory of Justice:
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought. A
theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue;
likewise laws and institutions  no matter  how efficient  and well-arranged must  be
reformed or abolished if they are unjust (Rawls 1999a, p. 3).
What I want to draw attention to are the two disjunctions in the above quote, particularly
the second:  rejected or  revised  and  reformed or  abolished. This  is  not  an insignificant
disjunction  for  our  thinking  about  joint  commitments.  I  take  it  that  this  same  thought
motivates Rawls’s later remark that “legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice…” (Rawls
2005 p. 428). Although Rawls is not explicit about this, the later remark may be instructive
in  understanding the  disjunction  of  the  above passage  from  A Theory  of  Justice.  If  an
institution is unjust  and  illegitimate, we should abolish it,  but if it  is legitimate despite
being  unjust  we  should  reform  it.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  grasp  what  makes  an
institution  or  institution  commitment  legitimate.  By  moralising  obligation,  by  seeing
obligations as obligations only to a just  institution,  we run the risk of overlooking this
important distinction.
Finally,  the  third,  and  perhaps  the  most  important,  aspect  of  the  importance  of
directed obligation is  to  do with the issue of  moral  disagreement.  There  are  important
political issues which are also moral issues that are highly disputed, and yet – politically
speaking – an enforceable decision needs to be made. Again, think of the issue of climate
180
change and the importance of making a decision between a carbon tax model and a Sandel-
type fines system. There is a deep moral disagreement here as well as an important practical
and political issue. Climate change is an immediate danger to human and animal life and
something must  be done about  it.  Yet  we should not  allow this  moral  disagreement  to
invalidate  the  directed  obligation  which  a  state  could  impose  to  follow  one  of  these
systems. In situations of this sort, the obligations that are part of an institution commitment
will help to stabilise these public issues while moral debate continues in the public sphere.
It would be problematic for political institutions, or other  institutions for that matter, to
need to wait for the morally correct answer before committing to a particular policy. 
It is generally accepted by most contemporary perspectives that the moral point of
view is the dominant point of view for any critique of institutional and political obligation
(Horton 20010, p. 144 and Knowles 2009, p. 188). The idea here is that the obligations
which count  and make one actually accountable to an institution are those that  can be
shown  to  be  moral  obligations.  A major  problem  with  this  point  of  view,  from  my
perspective, is the assumption that underlies it. The assumption seems to be that we have
some idea of what a 'final' morality will look like or what approximates it, that we have
access  to  a  privileged  point  of  view outside  our  present  context.  However,  when  one
surveys  contemporary  political  and  moral  debates,  one  will  at  once  notice  entrenched
disagreements  on  virtually  every  moral  issue.  For  example,  in  debates  about  political
authority  and political  obligations,  there  are  deep  disagreements  between  philosophical
anarchists, natural duties theorists (fair-play, gratitude and Samaritanism) and associative
obligations theorists. There is even the emergence of pluralistic accounts which combine
these different views in interesting and compelling ways. However, the point I would like to
make is that there does not seem to be any forthcoming agreement on this issue which one
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needs if there is going to be a knock-down argument from the moral point of view. This is
not to suggest that these views do not give us resources and important insights to critique
current political authorities. They do. Rather, the point is that neglecting other important
aspects of our practical lives may be detrimental to further progress on these issues. 
I think that there are three general perspectives in which a critique of the content of
a command can be given. The first is by far the most dominant in contemporary political
and moral philosophy, e.g. universally valid norms or what Aristotle has called ‘natural’
justice. Analogous to this perspective is that it is from a privileged epistemic point of view,
e.g.  climate  scientists’  privileged  view  point  on  global  climate  change.  I  will  not
concentrate on this perspective, but everything said about the moral point of view will,
mutatis mutandis, also hold for the epistemic, unless otherwise noted. These two points of
view can be considered forms of transcendent critique because they are points of view
outside  specific  commitments  of  a  particular  institution.  When  the  content  of  these
commitments is absolutely unjustified in terms of one of these points of view, the directed
obligation to conform is overridden. That is, the institutional commitment still exerts force
on its members but, from the moral point of view, the obligation to the institution should
not be followed. 
Why should we think that directed obligations are overridable and not, as Stephen
Darwall thinks, as “defeasible – so defeasible, in fact, that it may never have any force at
all...” (Darwall 2006, p. 186n9)? One way to make sense of this dispute is that when a
reason is  overridden,  there is  some remainder  left  over,  some normative reason to feel
remorse. There may be reasons for one to justify oneself  to the group for breaking the
directed  obligation.  When  a  reason  is  defeasible,  there  is  no  remainder.  The  reason  is
defeated. There are two types of response we can make to Darwall.
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The first response is that it is not entirely clear why the fact that a reason has a very
weak  force  means  that  there  will  be  no  remainder  or  why  a  justification  cannot  be
demanded  by  the  institution’s  members  for  the  non-conformity.  Furthermore,  it  is  not
entirely clear why we are to think that the forces of directed obligation are so weak. It
seems to be a bare assertion that is being made with no forthcoming justification. 
The second response is epistemic. We cannot rule out the possibility of error. In our
current epistemic position, when the commitments of an institution come into conflict with
what we take to be morally right, it may bring about the process of moral learning. It may
lead us to revise what we take to be morally right. This is part of the advantage of taking
seriously the potential conflicts between directed obligations and moral obligations. In this
way, the overrideability,  as opposed to  defeasiblity, may keep us from disregarding our
directed obligations too hastily.
To understand why it is important to understand the difference between defeasiblity
and ovverrideability, let us look at three different types of case.  The way we can make
sense of this is that having reasons not to conform does not undermine the genuineness of
the obligation – genuine obligations are not  pro tanto  (so far as it goes) obligations.  In
Gilbert's words:
if an obligation of this type is present in one context (e.g., an agreement stands), then
it does not disappear if the context is enlarged (e.g., the agreement still stands, but
one can save someone's life by violating it). It may be discounted in the light of the
additional considerations, but it does not disappear (Gilbert 1996, p. 299). 
Although each member of the institution is obligated to the institution qua member, each
member also transcends the institution qua individual (or member of another institution). It
is from the transcendent standpoint, an enlarged context, that the group must be justified in
its  demands.  This  transcendent  standpoint  does  not,  however,  need to  be  a  'view from
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nowhere'. We can identify at least three standpoints (Habermas 1998, Ch. 4.2, Habermas
1994, Ch. 1, Forst 2012, Ch. 3 and Forst 2002, Ch. 5). 
First,  we have what we can term 'instrumental' cases. In these cases, an institution
may be unjustified if,  for example, in the case of collective belief (Gilbert 1992 Ch. V,
Gilbert 1996 Ch. 14), the belief is false or, in the case of a goal, the institution's plan is not
the most effective course of action. In these types of case, members may not necessarily be
epistemic equals. Say, on our walk together where you have the standing to decide in which
direction to go, we come upon a fork in the road. You say “Left!” but I know the left is a
dead-end and we want to have a long walk. In this case, although I do not have the proper
standing,  I  still  would  be  justified  in  saying  “No,  right!  Left  is  a  dead-end.”  In  these
'instrumental' cases, the knowledge of the individuals transcends that of the institution and
may be justified in correcting or, in extreme cases, even dissolving a plural subject.
The  fact  that  I  may  be  justified  in  doing  so  does  not  automatically  make  the
institution or the obligations which I have to it void. Rather, it puts me in the position to try
to convince you that you are going the wrong way. This may indeed cause conflict and
tension  within  the  group because  you  could  still  rightfully  claim that  you  are  the  one
leading  the  group  and  that  I  am  obligated  by  that  fact.  This  would  be  true,  but  the
instrumental  considerations  may override  the  obligations  I  have  to  the  group  and  you
should, for this wider perspective, change the direction you are taking us.
Next is from the individual point of view, e.g. the suffering of the individual who is
deprived  of  basic  capabilities.  Amartya  Sen  gives  the  following  examples  of  basic
capabilities: “the ability to be well-nourished and well-sheltered, the capability of escaping
avoidable morbidity and premature mortality and so forth” (Sen 1992, pp. 44-45). It is no
surprise that these basic capabilities are part of our moral commitments. The case I have in
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mind  here  is  when  the  moral  point  of  view  is  in  agreement  with  certain  institutional
commitments but still leads to the suffering of the individual. It is only the “cries of the
wounded” (James 1979, p. 158), to borrow a phrase from William James, which can bring
our attention to individual suffering. 
We have cases of 'moral obligation'.  In this type of case,  there is  some conflict
between an obligation incurred in virtue of joint commitments and some “intrinsic good” or
“moral  norm”  (for  our  present  purpose  we  can  remain  agnostic  about  the  nature  of
“intrinsic goods” or “moral norms”). Take, for example, an (in)famous case that occurs in
Hobbes: 
The question is often asked whether  agreements extorted by fear are obligatory or
not. For example, am I obligated if, to save my life, I make an  agreement  with a
highway robber to pay him thousand gold pieces tomorrow, and to do nothing that
might result in his arrest and arraignment (Hobbes 1998, p. 38) 
Now, we can agree with Hobbes that from the perspective of the institution that is formed
by this agreement one is obligated to pay the highway robber, but from the perspective of
'morality'  we are justified in  taking action to have him arrested – that  is,  to  break our
obligation. As Hobbes notes, this is only the case in the state of nature (ibid.). Let us then
take a non-state of nature example.
Some paradigmatic cases for this could be: a pharmacist who opposes abortion on
moral grounds in a state which has a law that obligates her to sell abortifacient drugs to
patients with prescriptions, refusal to follow the Jim Crow laws of the southern United
States after Reconstruction (1877-1965) or refusing to obey orders to perform “enhanced
interrogation techniques”. These can all be classed as refusal based on moral obligations.
Whether they are all cases of “true” or justified objections we can leave to the side. The
important point is that there is a place to be a moral objector to state obligation.
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I think it would be an exaggeration if I were to say that there are only conflicts
between  moral  and  individual  perspectives  in  regard  to  institutions  and  not  between
conflicting  institutional  perspectives  themselves.  We  have  what  we  can  call  cases  of
individual 'bifurcated obligation'. This is due to the intuitive idea that individuals can and
do belong to more than one institution at a time (Gilbert 1992, p. 220; cf. Forst 2002 p.
272).  These  situations  are  quite  familiar  due  to  their  sometimes  tragic  nature,  e.g.
Sophocles's  Antigone (cf.  Hollis 1996, Ch. 7 and 9).  However, there can be less dramatic
examples: Jack and Jill are parties of a joint commitment to have dinner together. As soon
as they arrive at the restaurant, Jill receives a call from her boss informing her that there is
an emergency which she needs to take care of immediately (we will stipulate that this is
part  of  her  normal  obligations  at  her  place  of  work,  though  it  rarely  occurs).  In  this
situation, it is clear that Jill is obligated both to stay to eat dinner with Jack and leave to
take care of the work emergency. Jack as well as Jill's boss both have the standing to rebuke
her  from  different  points  of  view.  Neither  of  her  commitments  are  predicated  on  a
conditional commitment. She has not jointly committed to have dinner together with Jack
if, and only if, she is not called into work – she has an unconditional commitment to have
dinner with Jack until such time as the commitment is fulfilled or dissolved. Now as it
happens,  Jack  is  has  a  sympathetic  nature  and  realises  the  consequences  of  Jill  not
immediately leaving. Jack and Jill jointly agree to postpone their dinner together – though
Jill may still feel remorse or regret. The important point here is that obligations can conflict
and, as Bernard Williams has pointed out, they “are neither systematically avoidable, nor all
soluble without remainder” (Williams 1973. p. 179).
Similar cases exist  in the political  sphere.  Think of a person who grew up as a
Quaker (Rawls 2005, p. 393), a group known for being conscientious objectors, but who is
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not particularly religious but remains deeply committed to her/his family and is also deeply
patriotic to their country. During war-time this person is drafted, hence has the obligation to
serve. The family may, on the other hand, rebuke him or her for not being a conscientious
objector. There seems to be no non-obligation breaking decision for this person to make. 
This is the second type of case. We can see this in terms of a de-centring of the
subject.  Famously,  W.E.B Du Bois  described this  type  of  de-centring  in  the  American
experience in 1903 as the 'peculiar sensation' of 'double-consciousness': 
this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring
one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever
feels his twoness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it
from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this
strife,—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a
better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost.
He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and
Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he
knows that Negro blood has a message for the world. He simply wishes to make it
possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American, without being cursed and spit
upon by his fellows, without having the doors of Opportunity closed roughly in his
face (Bois 1994, pp. 2-3; cf. Anderson 2001, pp. 35-36).
Although there are clear political tones to Du Bois's words, to see them as merely political
would be a simplification and a falsification. Du Bois's point is much further-reaching than
the political. The idea is that because we have a multiplicity of practical identities due to
our membership of different  institutions,  we can play them off one another in order  to
improve all of the institutions.
Since we feel committed to furthering and conforming to what we find desirable
and compelling about our different identities, we feel not only the motivational force but
also the normative force of conforming to them. However, when one identity conflicts with
another we can be motivated to attempt to make both of these identities and the institutions
from which they are derived compatible with each other.
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There is the internal point of view which makes up the third type of case and is
different  from the  above  because  it  is  a  case  of  defensibility,  rather  overridability.  As
opposed  to  the  above  positions,  when  a  command  is  in  conflict  with  a  constitutive
commitment, there  is  no  directed  obligation  at  all.  One  does  not  owe  the  institution
conformity to commitments which violate its constitutive rules. From the point of view of
the institution, our fundamental obligation is conformity to the constitutive commitments. It
would  be  natural  to  say that  it  is  outside  the  standing  of  the  authorising  members  to
command such things. This might confuse matters. The issue here is not one of standing but
one of content. The United States Congress, presumably, has the standing to make laws in
the United States. However, it does not have the authority to issue commands that violate
the US Constitution. This is, strictly speaking, an issue of content and not of standing as
was argued above. 
Contra Simmons, who thinks an account based on Gilbert-style joint-commitments
encourages  confused,  oppressed,  unthinking people to  make “leaps  of  faith”  (Simmons
2001, p. 75), Gilbert writes: 
I in no way urge unreflective commitment. On the contrary, that is all too easy to
come by, and should be challenged, and become – if we were being reasonable all
along – reflective commitment (Gilbert 1996, p. 372)
We can read Gilbert's comments about reflective commitment as a call to redeem our
'genuine' obligations in regard to the above 'contexts of justification'. As is clear, each of
the  above  contexts  (instrumental/pragmatic,  ethical  and  moral)  have  their  own
justification grammars (Habermas 1996 and Forst 2002). Furthermore, it seem clear that
for the most  part,  the call  for  redemption of obligation is  prompted by conflict  and
disagreement, as demonstrated by the cases above (Honneth 1995). That is, the conflict
between “our wants and my wants” (Gilbert  1992 pp.  424-425) – although self  and
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social-reflection  as  per  Rawls's  original  position  thought  experiment  and  reflective
equilibrium are other important avenues (Rawls 2001, §§6 and 10). However, we should
not overlook the fact that Rawls also sees the positive side of conflict. His analysis in
Political Liberalism of the origins of liberal tolerance in the religious wars of tolerance,
which he credits Hegel with also seeing, is a paradigm example of the positive aspect of
social conflict. 
Let us take a look at conflict between obligations and how this can lead to progress
and moral learning. We are all familiar with Antigone’s dilemma: she must decide whether
to follow her familial duty and bury her traitor brother Polynices, or follow King Creon’s
edict  forbidding the burial  of  a  traitor,  i.e.  her  political  duty.  Today,  we have  a  strong
tendency to reconcile these two conflicting demands through formalistic theories. That is,
we tend to think the only way to view this sort of issue is from the moral point of view, that
the only reasons that matter are moral reasons (Williams 1981 Ch. 1 and Scheffler 1994).
Charles Taylor put it best when he said: 
that  the  price  of  modern  formalism  […]  has  been  a  severe  distortion  of  our
understanding of our moral thinking. One of the big illusions which grows from [this
reduction] is the belief that there is a single consistent domain of the ‘moral’, that
there is one set of considerations, or mode of calculation, which determines what we
ought ‘morally’ to do (Taylor 1985, p. 233).
The  'modern  formalism'  which  Taylor  is  identifying  is  a  type  of  reductionism  which
discounts other points of view, e.g. joint commitments.
Instead of this modern formalism, we must acknowledge Rainer Forst’s point that: 
[a]  form of  life  does  not  become  false  because  its  general  realization  cannot  be
morally demanded. Just as ethical reasons are not necessarily general reasons in a
moral sense, moral reasons are not sufficient to determine the good life (Forst 2002,
p. 39). 
This is precisely the point that is being argued here. We need to pay attention to joint
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commitments.  It  certainly  is  the  case  that  the  most  joint  commitments  are  not
universalisable. 
What we end up with is a situation like the following. X qua institution member
has sufficient reason to  φ in situation S, all  things being equal for X qua institution
member. However, X qua moral being does not have sufficient reason to φ in situation S,
all  things  being  equal  (Anderson  2001).  This  is  Simmel's  point  about  individuals
transcending their society. This does not make the sufficient reason superfluous internal
to an institution. For one thing, it helps to solve coordination problems – e.g. it is what
makes driving on the correct side of the road rational (Gilbert 2006b, p. 33).
In  the  above  mentioned  political  cases,  we  need  a  theory  which  helps  us
determine when the state  is  justified in  using coercive power to  enforce its  policies
against 'instrumental' claims, 'value/ethical' claims and 'moral' claims. However, there is
a problem with a sub-class of 'instrumental' cases with which deliberative democracy in
its standard form cannot deal. This has to do with what Habermas calls “administrative
power” which the deliberating public cannot itself rule but only point “administrative
power in specific directions” (Habermas 1996, p. 300). 
Gilbert has given us an understanding of the proper standing necessary for someone
in authority to be able to create sufficient reasons, although perhaps in a limited fashion, for
those  commanded.  X  has  authority  over  society  S  if,  and  only  if,  there  is  a  joint
commitment  in  society  S  to  accept  the  commands  of  X where  a  joint  commitment  is
characterised by: (1) an expression of readiness to  accept Y together on the part of all in
society S and (2) it is common knowledge in society S that 1 exists.
This can be seen clearly in the rise of religious tolerances to a moral norm through
the  violence  of  the  wars  of  religion.  According  to  Rawls,  liberalism  and  its  value  of
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tolerance, came directly out of the Thirty Years War which was concerned with the power
of the Holy Roman Empire (Rawls 2005,  p.  xxvi). The modus vivendi  that emerged from
the  religious  wars  has  now become solidified  into  moral  principles:  the  interconnected
principles of freedom of conscience and tolerance. As Rawls notes, Hegel might have been
the first to acknowledge this point. In his Philosophy of Right, Hegel said: 
This division [in the church] is likewise the most fortunate thing which could have
happened to the church and to thought as far as their  freedom and rationality are
concerned (Hegel 2008, §270 Remark).
He quite clearly sees that religious pluralism was a precondition for religious liberty. It is in
this way that we can see the truth in Raymond Geuss’s recent claim that: 
Ethics is usually dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching out
to try to extend its grip to the present and the future.  There is nothing inherently
wrong with this. Our past is an essential part of what we are, which we ignore at our
peril (Geuss 2009, p. 42). 
What we can bring out of these considerations is that we need to integrate all three
perspectives into our evaluative process. We need to critique our institutions simultaneously
from the transcendent point of view and the immanent point of view while paying close
attention to the implications of both critiques.
We can say, in the tradition of Nelson Goodman and John Rawls, a moral obligation
is amended if it conflicts with a directed obligation we are unwilling to amend; a directed
obligation is amended if it  violates a moral obligation we are unwilling to amend. The
process  of  justification  is  a  delicate  one  of  making mutual  adjustments  between moral
obligations  and  directed  obligations,  and  the  needs  of  the  individual.  The  agreement
achieved lays the only justification needed for either (Goodman 1983, §2 and Rawls 1999a,
p. 18n7). This, then, is a three dimensional view of justification. That is, there will be a
process of reaching reflective equilibrium between: (1) groups and the moral, (2) groups
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and the individual, (3) the moral and the individual.
One way to see what is going on here is the 'critical role' that is constitutive of the
creation  of  an  agent’s  practical  identity  (Korsgaard  1996b  p.  101)  –  to  make  oneself
intelligible as an agent. This is our second-nature which separates merely natural beings
from culturally bathed humans.  There are  all  sorts  of roles  which we are more or less
thrown into: subject qua moral community, subject qua political community, subject qua
family member, subject qua employee, etc. Part of constructing oneself as an agent, then, is,
in the words of Korsgaard:
The  work  of  pulling  ourselves  back  together  is  also  the  work  of  pulling  those
identities into a single practical identity,  choosing among them when we have to,
deciding which is to have priority, harmonizing them when we can (Korsgaard 2009,
p. 126; cf Brandom 2009, p. 52)
The recognition of the unreconciled state of individuals, i.e. conflicts that arise between
different roles to which one is committed, is an impetus to the critical stance (cf. Adorno
2005, p. 39 and Horkheimer 2004, pp. 76-77). As Simone Weil once put it: 
No human being, whoever  he may be,  under whatever circumstances,  can escape
them [obligations] without being guilty of crime; save where there are two genuine
obligations which are in fact incompatible, and a man is forced to sacrifice one of
them.
The imperfections of a social order can be measured by the number of situations
of this kind it harbours within itself (Weil 2002, p. 3). 
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